<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>It wasn't an issue in 2000 because we hadn't destroyed foreign relations and spent 2+ years in genocidal wars under Al Gore's command and King George was still murdering people in Texas at a record pace. - Lander <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Lander, what a warped sense of reality you have.You don't think that the events of September 11,2001 were the reason that we, including most of the opposition party in Congress, went to war? You really believe that Bush was the main reason we invaded Afganistan and Iraq? What are your positive ideas on how to fight a war against terrorists who hide in accomodating countries?
Kwalder,
Do you have some sort of knowledge that Iraq was part of 9/11? The rest of the free-thinking world would certainly welcome this information.
Interestingly, since you bring that up - what are your thoughts on Georgie not attacking Saudi Arabia? Remember, (facts this time, unlike your Iraq 9/11 theory) that 15 or 19 hijackers were Saudi, the masterind was Saudi(remember Osama bin Laden - that guy we stoppped fighting so we could pre-emptively occupying Iraq and murder thousands of it's people) ... oh, and of course - do you remember that Bushie ordered a private flight for the Bin Ladens out of Manhattan on 9/11 after the FAA grounded all flights?
Odd, isn't it? I'm not sure why we're suddenly concerned with safety for the family of the man whom killed 3000+ US civilians, but we look the other way when thousands of innocent Iraqi are murdered by "precision bombs" (who's country had NOTHING, NADA, ZIPP-FUKING-O, to do with 9/11). Fuk it - it's just a cost of war, right?
NJ,
Are we going to count Gulf War I, the effects of the economic sactions, and Bushie II's genocide? Or were you planning to "overlook" that part? While we're at it - we should just count the years since Bush I - thank God the Constitution prohibits genocidal lunatics like the Bushies from stealing unlimited elections.
"Would a coward fly to Iraq?"
Apparently. I think pointless questions, so I have one for you - would a coward fly to Nam? or just go AWOL and let Grandpa's political empire sweep it under the rug?
Do you have some sort of knowledge that Iraq was part of 9/11? The rest of the free-thinking world would certainly welcome this information.
Interestingly, since you bring that up - what are your thoughts on Georgie not attacking Saudi Arabia? Remember, (facts this time, unlike your Iraq 9/11 theory) that 15 or 19 hijackers were Saudi, the masterind was Saudi(remember Osama bin Laden - that guy we stoppped fighting so we could pre-emptively occupying Iraq and murder thousands of it's people) ... oh, and of course - do you remember that Bushie ordered a private flight for the Bin Ladens out of Manhattan on 9/11 after the FAA grounded all flights?
Odd, isn't it? I'm not sure why we're suddenly concerned with safety for the family of the man whom killed 3000+ US civilians, but we look the other way when thousands of innocent Iraqi are murdered by "precision bombs" (who's country had NOTHING, NADA, ZIPP-FUKING-O, to do with 9/11). Fuk it - it's just a cost of war, right?
NJ,
Are we going to count Gulf War I, the effects of the economic sactions, and Bushie II's genocide? Or were you planning to "overlook" that part? While we're at it - we should just count the years since Bush I - thank God the Constitution prohibits genocidal lunatics like the Bushies from stealing unlimited elections.
"Would a coward fly to Iraq?"
Apparently. I think pointless questions, so I have one for you - would a coward fly to Nam? or just go AWOL and let Grandpa's political empire sweep it under the rug?
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>Kwalder,
Do you have some sort of knowledge that Iraq was part of 9/11? The rest of the free-thinking world would certainly welcome this information. - Lander<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Lander, You've never heard of the Ansar al-Islam Terrorist Training camp in Northeastern Iraq. Additionally, you might want to educate yourself with the information below:
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, & the 9-11 hijackers received assistance from Iraq.
Bill Clinton declared in Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999: I, William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the actions and policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in allowing territory under its control in Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven and base of operations for Usama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda (sic) organization who have committed and threaten to continue to commit acts of violence against the United States and its nationals, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the U.S., and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
On June 30, 2001 President George W. Bush continued the same Executive Order from Bill Clinton, using nearly identical language in a notice repeated here:
23. On information and belief, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the hijackers also received material support and assistance from Iraq, by and through its officials, agents, and/or employees, to carry out terrorist attacks on the United States, including the September 11, 2001 attacks.
24. In their February 23,1998 Fatwah, Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda expressly referenced the United States’ “continuing aggression” towards Iraq as one of their reasons for calling on all Muslims to kill Americans “wherever and whenever” the are found:
The best proof of this is the Americans’ continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the [Arabian] Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, still they are helpless.
Bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s Fatwah also cited the alleged “great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people” by the United States, as well as the United States alleged “eagerness to destroy Iraq.”
25. Bin Laden reportedly visited Baghdad for consultations in March 1998. Giovanni De Stefano, an international lawyer visiting Baghdad on business, had a chance encounter with Bin Laden in the lobby of the Al-Rashid Hotel, during which the two men introduced themselves and engaged in polite conversation. De Stefano did not, at the time, recognize Bin Laden’s name. Five months after the chance encounter, agents of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda attacked the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.
26. Between April 25 and May 1, 1998, two of Bin Laden’s senior military commanders, Muhammad Abu-Islam and Abdallah Qassim, reportedly visited Baghdad for discussions with Saddam Hussein’s son -- Qusay Hussein -- the “czar” of Iraqi intelligence matters. Qusay Hussein’s participation in the meetings highlights the importance of the talks in both symbolic and practical terms. As a direct result of these meetings, Iraq reportedly made commitments to provide training, intelligence, clandestine Saudi border c****ings, and weapons and explosives to support Al Qaeda.
27. By mid-June, 1998, operatives of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda reportedly were at the al-Nasiriyah training camp in Iraq receiving instruction and training from Iraqi intelligence and military officials on reconnaissance and targeting American facilities and installations for terrorist attacks. Another group of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives from Saudi Arabia reportedly were trained by intelligence officials in Iraq to smuggle weapons and explosives into Saudi Arabia, and, upon returning to Saudi Arabia, successfully smuggled weapons and explosives into that country. A third group of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives reportedly received a month of sophisticated guerrilla operations training from Iraqi intelligence officials later in the Summer of 1998.
28. Bin Laden reportedly sought to strengthen and reinforce the support he and Al Qaeda received from Iraq. In mid-July 1998, Bin Laden reportedly sent Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian co-founder of Al Qaeda, to Iraq to meet with senior Iraqi officials, including Iraqi vice president Taha Yassin Ramadan. The reported purpose of this meeting was to discuss and plan a joint strategy for a terrorist campaign against the United States. Iraqi officials reportedly pledged Iraq’s full support and cooperation on the condition that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda not incite the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamic organization, against the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Zawahiri reportedly toured a potential site for a new headquarters for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda near al-Fallujah in Iraq and observed training by Iraqi intelligence officials of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives at al-Nasiriyah. In recognition of Bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s leadership role in the terrorist war against the United States, Iraqi officials allowed Zawahiri to assume formal command over the al-Nasiriyah training camp in the name of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
29. By mid-November 1998, Saddam Hussein reportedly came to the conclusion (with the advice and prompting of his son and intelligence chief, Qusay), that a campaign of terrorist attacks against the United States, under the banner of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, was the most effective means of deflecting U.S. attempts to topple his regime.
30. Shortly thereafter, Iraqi intelligence officials reportedly met with Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and Iraq reportedly agreed to join efforts in a detailed, coordinated plan for a protracted terrorist war against the United States. Iraq also reportedly agreed to provide Bin Laden and Al Qaeda with the assistance of an expert in chemical weapons, and Bin Laden reportedly agreed to hunt down Iraqi opposition leaders who cooperated with the United States against Hussein. In furtherance of this agreement, Bin Laden reportedly dispatched four hundred of Al Qaeda’s “Afghan” Arabs to Iraq to fight Kurds.
31. Following a four day air strike by the United States in December 1998, Iraqi trade minister Muhammad Mahdi Salah reportedly stated that he expected terrorist activities against the United States to increase as a result of the bombing of Iraq. The Arabic language daily newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi first raised the issue of cooperation between Iraq, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in a late December 1998 editorial, which predicted that “President Saddam Hussein, whose country was subjected to a four day air strike, will look for support in taking revenge on the United States and Britain by cooperating with Saudi oppositionist Osama bin-Laden, whom the United States considers to be the most wanted person in the world.” The editorial noted that this type of cooperation was very likely considering that “bin-Laden was planning moving to Iraq before the recent strike.”
32. Following the December 1998 air strikes, Saddam Hussein reportedly dispatched Faruq al-Hijazi to Kandahar, Afghanistan in order to meet with Bin Laden. Hijazi, the former deputy chief of Iraqi intelligence, had first met Bin Laden in 1994. During his visit to Kandahar, Hijazi reportedly offered expanded cooperation and assistance to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well as a re-extension of the offer of shelter and hospitality Iraq previously extended to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Bin Laden reportedly agreed in principle to give Iraq assistance in a revenge campaign against the United States, but suggested further study and coordination before committing to a specific course of action or agreeing to a particular terrorist strike.
33. To demonstrate Iraq’s commitment to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, Hijazi reportedly presented Bin Laden with a pack of blank, official Yemeni passports, supplied to Iraqi intelligence from their Yemeni contacts. Hijazi’s visit to Kandahar was reportedly followed by a contingent of Iraqi military intelligence officials who provided additional training and instruction to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. These Iraqi officials reportedly included members of “Unit 999,” a group of elite, Iraqi intelligence officials who provided advanced sabotage and infiltration training and instruction for Al Qaeda operatives.
34. In addition to the al-Nasiriyah training camp, by January 1999, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives also were reportedly being trained by Iraqi intelligence and military officers at training camps on the outskirts of Baghdad.
35. Following the Hijazi meetings, Qusay Hussein reportedly dispatched representatives to follow-up with Bin Laden and obtain his firm commitment to exact revenge against the United States for the December 1998 bombing campaign. Iraq reportedly offered Bin Laden and Al Qaeda an open-ended commitment to joint operations against the United States and its “moderate” Arab allies in exchange for an absolute guarantee that Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and their allies would not attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.
36. Israeli sources reportedly claim that, for the past two years, Iraqi intelligence officers have been shuttling back and forth between Baghdad and Afghanistan. According to the Israelis, one of these Iraqi intelligence officers, Salah Suleiman, was captured last October by Pakistani officials near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
37. In January 1999, Iraq reportedly began reorganizing and mobilizing intelligence front operations throughout Europe in support of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
38. According to Czech intelligence sources, Mohammad Atta, the operational ringleader of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, met in June 2000 with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, a consul and second secretary at the Iraqi embassy in Prague. Al-Ani is one of Iraqi’s most highly decorated intelligence officers, a special forces veteran, and a senior leader of Iraq’s “M-8” special operations branch. Other reports indicate that Al-Ani may have met with another hijacker, Khalid Almihdar.
39. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav G**** has confirmed that Atta met with al-Ani in early April 2001 in Prague. Atta also reportedly met with the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and the former Iraqi deputy intelligence director, Farouk al-Hijazi, in Prague sometime in early April 2001.
40. Czech intelligence sources further report that Atta and al-Ani embraced upon meeting at Prague’s Ruzyne airport, and that Atta may have visited the Czech capitol on four other occasions.
41. Czech intelligence sources also reported that al-Ani had been under surveillance because he had been observed apparently surveying the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague. Czech authorities believed the site had been selected for attack by terrorists. Later in 2001, al-Ani was expelled from the Czech Republic for espionage activities.
42. Reports of additional intelligence ties between Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and Iraq continue to mount. The CIA reportedly believes Iraq provided falsified passports for the nineteen hijackers who carried out the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Further, senior U.S. intelligence sources have revealed that, in the Spring of 2001, Marwan al-Shehri and Ziad Jarrah -- two of Atta’s closest associates and members of the Al Qaeda “cell” in the Federal Republic of Germany -- met with known Iraqi intelligence agents outside the United States.
43. Italian security sources have reported that Iraq made use of its embassy in Rome to foster and cultivate Iraq’s partnership with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Habib Faris Abdullah al-Mamouri, a general in the Iraqi secret service, and, from 1982 to 1990, a member of Iraq’s “M-A” special operations branch charged with developing links with Islamist militants in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the states of the Persian Gulf, was stationed in Rome as an “instructor” for Iraqi diplomats. Al-Mamouri reportedly met with Mohammed Atta in Rome, Hamburg, and Prague. Al-Mamouri has not been seen in Rome since July 2001, shortly after he last met with Atta.
44. Recent Iraqi defectors provide additional details of Iraq’s support for international terrorism throughout the 1990s. The Public Broadcasting Service documentary program entitled “Frontline” interviewed former Iraqi intelligence and army officers with first-hand accounts of highly secret installations run by an international terrorist known to Iraqi staffers only as “the Ghost.” “The Ghost” is reported to be Abdel Hussein, the chief trainer at a training camp inside Iraq, which includes the fuselage of a Boeing 707 jetliner that is used to practice hijacking scenarios. U.N. inspectors independently confirmed the existence of this particular training camp inside Iraq.
45. The Iraqi defector known as “Saddam’s Bomb-maker,” Dr. Khidhir Hamza, who served as Iraq’s Director of Nuclear Weaponization, analyzes Iraqi’s sponsorship of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda as follows:
What I think is there is somehow a change in the level of the type of operation Bin Laden has been carrying [out]. What we are looking at initially is more or less just attempts to blow some buildings, just normal use of explosives for a terrorist. What we have in the September 11 operation, [is a] tightly controlled, very sophisticated operation; the type an Iraqi intelligence agency, well versed in the technology [could pull off]. ... So my thinking is a guy sitting in a cave in Afghanistan is not the guy who will do an operation of this caliber. It has to have in combination with it a guy with the sophistication and know-how on how to carry these things.
. . . Iraq [also] has a history of training terrorists, harboring them, and taking good care of them, by the way. A terrorist is well cared for with Saddam. So he has a good reputation in that type of community, if you like.
46. Several leading authorities on Saddam Hussein, Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda concur on the likelihood of Iraq’s sponsorship and coordination of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The former head of Israel’s Mossad secret service, Rafi Eitan, and former CIA Director James Woolsey, share the view that Iraq, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda conspired in the attacks. Their views also are shared by Laurie Mylroie, an academic and Iraqi affairs expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.. Mylroie cites the role of Iraqi operatives in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center to support her claim that the September 11, 2001 attacks are a matter of unfinished business for Iraq, which considers itself to be at war with the United States.
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>Interestingly, since you bring that up - what are your thoughts on Georgie not attacking Saudi Arabia? Remember, (facts this time, unlike your Iraq 9/11 theory) that 15 or 19 hijackers were Saudi, the masterind was Saudi(remember Osama bin Laden - that guy we stoppped fighting so we could pre-emptively occupying Iraq and murder thousands of it's people) ... oh, and of course - do you remember that Bushie ordered a private flight for the Bin Ladens out of Manhattan on 9/11 after the FAA grounded all flights? -Lander <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Lander, again you show your ignorance and lack of comprehension. Usama Bin Laden has been denounced and excommunicated from the Bin Laden Family which happens to be comprised of 100's of relatives. The Bin Laden family is regarded as a patriotic family in that country. The Government of Saudi Arabia regards Al Qaeda as an enemy and has begun raiding suspected terrorists camps. Why do you think Usama can't return to Saudi Arabia? Everyone knows that there is an Islamic Extremist sentiment in Saudi Arabia, but it is no where near the majority. If it were, the existing government with it's Anti-Al Qaeda actions would have been overthrown. You can't see the difference between this country's efforts to combat Al Qaeda and that of Afganistan's or Iraq's? There are 23 million people in Saudi Arabia, most of whom support their government. You think 15 Al Qaeda individuals who happen to be born in Saudi Arabia override the position of the Saudi Government and the majority of its people?
Do you have some sort of knowledge that Iraq was part of 9/11? The rest of the free-thinking world would certainly welcome this information. - Lander<HR></BLOCKQUOTE> Lander, You've never heard of the Ansar al-Islam Terrorist Training camp in Northeastern Iraq. Additionally, you might want to educate yourself with the information below:
Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, & the 9-11 hijackers received assistance from Iraq.
Bill Clinton declared in Executive Order 13129 of July 4, 1999: I, William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States of America, find that the actions and policies of the Taliban in Afghanistan, in allowing territory under its control in Afghanistan to be used as a safe haven and base of operations for Usama Bin Laden and the al-Qaeda (sic) organization who have committed and threaten to continue to commit acts of violence against the United States and its nationals, constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the U.S., and hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
On June 30, 2001 President George W. Bush continued the same Executive Order from Bill Clinton, using nearly identical language in a notice repeated here:
23. On information and belief, Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and the hijackers also received material support and assistance from Iraq, by and through its officials, agents, and/or employees, to carry out terrorist attacks on the United States, including the September 11, 2001 attacks.
24. In their February 23,1998 Fatwah, Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda expressly referenced the United States’ “continuing aggression” towards Iraq as one of their reasons for calling on all Muslims to kill Americans “wherever and whenever” the are found:
The best proof of this is the Americans’ continuing aggression against the Iraqi people using the [Arabian] Peninsula as a staging post, even though all its rulers are against their territories being used to that end, still they are helpless.
Bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s Fatwah also cited the alleged “great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people” by the United States, as well as the United States alleged “eagerness to destroy Iraq.”
25. Bin Laden reportedly visited Baghdad for consultations in March 1998. Giovanni De Stefano, an international lawyer visiting Baghdad on business, had a chance encounter with Bin Laden in the lobby of the Al-Rashid Hotel, during which the two men introduced themselves and engaged in polite conversation. De Stefano did not, at the time, recognize Bin Laden’s name. Five months after the chance encounter, agents of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda attacked the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania.
26. Between April 25 and May 1, 1998, two of Bin Laden’s senior military commanders, Muhammad Abu-Islam and Abdallah Qassim, reportedly visited Baghdad for discussions with Saddam Hussein’s son -- Qusay Hussein -- the “czar” of Iraqi intelligence matters. Qusay Hussein’s participation in the meetings highlights the importance of the talks in both symbolic and practical terms. As a direct result of these meetings, Iraq reportedly made commitments to provide training, intelligence, clandestine Saudi border c****ings, and weapons and explosives to support Al Qaeda.
27. By mid-June, 1998, operatives of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda reportedly were at the al-Nasiriyah training camp in Iraq receiving instruction and training from Iraqi intelligence and military officials on reconnaissance and targeting American facilities and installations for terrorist attacks. Another group of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives from Saudi Arabia reportedly were trained by intelligence officials in Iraq to smuggle weapons and explosives into Saudi Arabia, and, upon returning to Saudi Arabia, successfully smuggled weapons and explosives into that country. A third group of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives reportedly received a month of sophisticated guerrilla operations training from Iraqi intelligence officials later in the Summer of 1998.
28. Bin Laden reportedly sought to strengthen and reinforce the support he and Al Qaeda received from Iraq. In mid-July 1998, Bin Laden reportedly sent Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the Egyptian co-founder of Al Qaeda, to Iraq to meet with senior Iraqi officials, including Iraqi vice president Taha Yassin Ramadan. The reported purpose of this meeting was to discuss and plan a joint strategy for a terrorist campaign against the United States. Iraqi officials reportedly pledged Iraq’s full support and cooperation on the condition that Bin Laden and Al Qaeda not incite the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, a radical Islamic organization, against the regime of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein. Zawahiri reportedly toured a potential site for a new headquarters for Bin Laden and Al Qaeda near al-Fallujah in Iraq and observed training by Iraqi intelligence officials of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives at al-Nasiriyah. In recognition of Bin Laden’s and Al Qaeda’s leadership role in the terrorist war against the United States, Iraqi officials allowed Zawahiri to assume formal command over the al-Nasiriyah training camp in the name of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
29. By mid-November 1998, Saddam Hussein reportedly came to the conclusion (with the advice and prompting of his son and intelligence chief, Qusay), that a campaign of terrorist attacks against the United States, under the banner of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, was the most effective means of deflecting U.S. attempts to topple his regime.
30. Shortly thereafter, Iraqi intelligence officials reportedly met with Bin Laden in Afghanistan. Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and Iraq reportedly agreed to join efforts in a detailed, coordinated plan for a protracted terrorist war against the United States. Iraq also reportedly agreed to provide Bin Laden and Al Qaeda with the assistance of an expert in chemical weapons, and Bin Laden reportedly agreed to hunt down Iraqi opposition leaders who cooperated with the United States against Hussein. In furtherance of this agreement, Bin Laden reportedly dispatched four hundred of Al Qaeda’s “Afghan” Arabs to Iraq to fight Kurds.
31. Following a four day air strike by the United States in December 1998, Iraqi trade minister Muhammad Mahdi Salah reportedly stated that he expected terrorist activities against the United States to increase as a result of the bombing of Iraq. The Arabic language daily newspaper Al-Quds al-Arabi first raised the issue of cooperation between Iraq, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda in a late December 1998 editorial, which predicted that “President Saddam Hussein, whose country was subjected to a four day air strike, will look for support in taking revenge on the United States and Britain by cooperating with Saudi oppositionist Osama bin-Laden, whom the United States considers to be the most wanted person in the world.” The editorial noted that this type of cooperation was very likely considering that “bin-Laden was planning moving to Iraq before the recent strike.”
32. Following the December 1998 air strikes, Saddam Hussein reportedly dispatched Faruq al-Hijazi to Kandahar, Afghanistan in order to meet with Bin Laden. Hijazi, the former deputy chief of Iraqi intelligence, had first met Bin Laden in 1994. During his visit to Kandahar, Hijazi reportedly offered expanded cooperation and assistance to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, as well as a re-extension of the offer of shelter and hospitality Iraq previously extended to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Bin Laden reportedly agreed in principle to give Iraq assistance in a revenge campaign against the United States, but suggested further study and coordination before committing to a specific course of action or agreeing to a particular terrorist strike.
33. To demonstrate Iraq’s commitment to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, Hijazi reportedly presented Bin Laden with a pack of blank, official Yemeni passports, supplied to Iraqi intelligence from their Yemeni contacts. Hijazi’s visit to Kandahar was reportedly followed by a contingent of Iraqi military intelligence officials who provided additional training and instruction to Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. These Iraqi officials reportedly included members of “Unit 999,” a group of elite, Iraqi intelligence officials who provided advanced sabotage and infiltration training and instruction for Al Qaeda operatives.
34. In addition to the al-Nasiriyah training camp, by January 1999, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda operatives also were reportedly being trained by Iraqi intelligence and military officers at training camps on the outskirts of Baghdad.
35. Following the Hijazi meetings, Qusay Hussein reportedly dispatched representatives to follow-up with Bin Laden and obtain his firm commitment to exact revenge against the United States for the December 1998 bombing campaign. Iraq reportedly offered Bin Laden and Al Qaeda an open-ended commitment to joint operations against the United States and its “moderate” Arab allies in exchange for an absolute guarantee that Bin Laden, Al Qaeda, and their allies would not attempt to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq.
36. Israeli sources reportedly claim that, for the past two years, Iraqi intelligence officers have been shuttling back and forth between Baghdad and Afghanistan. According to the Israelis, one of these Iraqi intelligence officers, Salah Suleiman, was captured last October by Pakistani officials near the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
37. In January 1999, Iraq reportedly began reorganizing and mobilizing intelligence front operations throughout Europe in support of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda.
38. According to Czech intelligence sources, Mohammad Atta, the operational ringleader of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, met in June 2000 with Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, a consul and second secretary at the Iraqi embassy in Prague. Al-Ani is one of Iraqi’s most highly decorated intelligence officers, a special forces veteran, and a senior leader of Iraq’s “M-8” special operations branch. Other reports indicate that Al-Ani may have met with another hijacker, Khalid Almihdar.
39. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav G**** has confirmed that Atta met with al-Ani in early April 2001 in Prague. Atta also reportedly met with the Iraqi ambassador to Turkey and the former Iraqi deputy intelligence director, Farouk al-Hijazi, in Prague sometime in early April 2001.
40. Czech intelligence sources further report that Atta and al-Ani embraced upon meeting at Prague’s Ruzyne airport, and that Atta may have visited the Czech capitol on four other occasions.
41. Czech intelligence sources also reported that al-Ani had been under surveillance because he had been observed apparently surveying the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty headquarters in Prague. Czech authorities believed the site had been selected for attack by terrorists. Later in 2001, al-Ani was expelled from the Czech Republic for espionage activities.
42. Reports of additional intelligence ties between Bin Laden, Al Qaeda and Iraq continue to mount. The CIA reportedly believes Iraq provided falsified passports for the nineteen hijackers who carried out the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Further, senior U.S. intelligence sources have revealed that, in the Spring of 2001, Marwan al-Shehri and Ziad Jarrah -- two of Atta’s closest associates and members of the Al Qaeda “cell” in the Federal Republic of Germany -- met with known Iraqi intelligence agents outside the United States.
43. Italian security sources have reported that Iraq made use of its embassy in Rome to foster and cultivate Iraq’s partnership with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Habib Faris Abdullah al-Mamouri, a general in the Iraqi secret service, and, from 1982 to 1990, a member of Iraq’s “M-A” special operations branch charged with developing links with Islamist militants in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the states of the Persian Gulf, was stationed in Rome as an “instructor” for Iraqi diplomats. Al-Mamouri reportedly met with Mohammed Atta in Rome, Hamburg, and Prague. Al-Mamouri has not been seen in Rome since July 2001, shortly after he last met with Atta.
44. Recent Iraqi defectors provide additional details of Iraq’s support for international terrorism throughout the 1990s. The Public Broadcasting Service documentary program entitled “Frontline” interviewed former Iraqi intelligence and army officers with first-hand accounts of highly secret installations run by an international terrorist known to Iraqi staffers only as “the Ghost.” “The Ghost” is reported to be Abdel Hussein, the chief trainer at a training camp inside Iraq, which includes the fuselage of a Boeing 707 jetliner that is used to practice hijacking scenarios. U.N. inspectors independently confirmed the existence of this particular training camp inside Iraq.
45. The Iraqi defector known as “Saddam’s Bomb-maker,” Dr. Khidhir Hamza, who served as Iraq’s Director of Nuclear Weaponization, analyzes Iraqi’s sponsorship of Bin Laden and Al Qaeda as follows:
What I think is there is somehow a change in the level of the type of operation Bin Laden has been carrying [out]. What we are looking at initially is more or less just attempts to blow some buildings, just normal use of explosives for a terrorist. What we have in the September 11 operation, [is a] tightly controlled, very sophisticated operation; the type an Iraqi intelligence agency, well versed in the technology [could pull off]. ... So my thinking is a guy sitting in a cave in Afghanistan is not the guy who will do an operation of this caliber. It has to have in combination with it a guy with the sophistication and know-how on how to carry these things.
. . . Iraq [also] has a history of training terrorists, harboring them, and taking good care of them, by the way. A terrorist is well cared for with Saddam. So he has a good reputation in that type of community, if you like.
46. Several leading authorities on Saddam Hussein, Bin Laden, and Al Qaeda concur on the likelihood of Iraq’s sponsorship and coordination of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The former head of Israel’s Mossad secret service, Rafi Eitan, and former CIA Director James Woolsey, share the view that Iraq, Bin Laden and Al Qaeda conspired in the attacks. Their views also are shared by Laurie Mylroie, an academic and Iraqi affairs expert at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.. Mylroie cites the role of Iraqi operatives in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center to support her claim that the September 11, 2001 attacks are a matter of unfinished business for Iraq, which considers itself to be at war with the United States.
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>Interestingly, since you bring that up - what are your thoughts on Georgie not attacking Saudi Arabia? Remember, (facts this time, unlike your Iraq 9/11 theory) that 15 or 19 hijackers were Saudi, the masterind was Saudi(remember Osama bin Laden - that guy we stoppped fighting so we could pre-emptively occupying Iraq and murder thousands of it's people) ... oh, and of course - do you remember that Bushie ordered a private flight for the Bin Ladens out of Manhattan on 9/11 after the FAA grounded all flights? -Lander <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>Lander, again you show your ignorance and lack of comprehension. Usama Bin Laden has been denounced and excommunicated from the Bin Laden Family which happens to be comprised of 100's of relatives. The Bin Laden family is regarded as a patriotic family in that country. The Government of Saudi Arabia regards Al Qaeda as an enemy and has begun raiding suspected terrorists camps. Why do you think Usama can't return to Saudi Arabia? Everyone knows that there is an Islamic Extremist sentiment in Saudi Arabia, but it is no where near the majority. If it were, the existing government with it's Anti-Al Qaeda actions would have been overthrown. You can't see the difference between this country's efforts to combat Al Qaeda and that of Afganistan's or Iraq's? There are 23 million people in Saudi Arabia, most of whom support their government. You think 15 Al Qaeda individuals who happen to be born in Saudi Arabia override the position of the Saudi Government and the majority of its people?
Kwalder,
First, let me thank you for actually taking the time to defend your views with a somewhat more intelligent approach than sheepish cheerleader Hansen Sister (incidentally Bushie was also a cheerleader) and his logic of, "I'm going to kick your ass so I'm right."
That said, since we're "educating" each other - have you considered that the presence of a few Al Queda in a country might not (imagine that) prove a country-sponsered terror effort (or intentional harboring of terrorist)? If you haven't considered that, then consider the "Lackawanna six" - under your il"logic" we'd be preping for an unjust preemptive strike on suburbs of Buffalo, NY as I type.
As for your article - despite your lack of references, I am indeed aware of the allegations that Iraq was working with Al Queda. Of course, like the rest of Bushies evidence, most of the propaganda was later denounced as fabricated or simply unverified. Have a lookski -
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3540586/
Case Decidedly Not Closed
The Defense Dept. memo allegedly proving a link between Al Qaeda and Saddam does nothing of the sort
Newsweek Web ExclusiveNov. 19 - A leaked Defense Department memo claiming new evidence of an “operational relationship” between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein’s former regime is mostly based on unverified claims that were first advanced by some top Bush administration officials more than a year ago—and were largely discounted at the time by the U.S. intelligence community, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials.
advertisement
CASE CLOSED blared the headline in a Weekly Standard cover story last Saturday that purported to have unearthed the U.S. government’s “secret evidence of cooperation” between Saddam and bin Laden. Fred Barnes, the magazine’s executive editor, touted the magazine’s scoop the next day in a roundtable chat on “Fox News Sunday.” (Both the Standard and Fox News Channel are owned by the conservative media baron Rupert Murdoch.) “These are hard facts, and I’d like to see you refute any one of them,” he told a skeptical Juan Williams of National Public Radio.
In fact, the tangled tale of the memo suggests that the case of whether there has been Iraqi-Al Qaeda complicity is far from closed. The Oct. 27, 2003, memo, prepared by Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith’s office, was written in response to detailed questions from the Senate Intelligence Committee about the basis for intelligence pushed by Feith and other senior Pentagon officials during the run-up to the Iraq war.
With a few, inconclusive exceptions, the memo doesn’t actually contain much “new” intelligence at all. Instead, it mostly recycles shards of old, raw data that were first assembled last year by a tiny team of floating Pentagon analysts (led by a Pennsylvania State University professor and U.S. Navy analyst Christopher Carney) whom Feith asked to find evidence of an Iraqi-Al Qaeda “connection” in order to better justify a U.S. invasion.
Within the U.S. intelligence establishment, the predominant view—then as now—is that the Feith-Carney case was murky at best. Culling through intelligence files, the Feith team indeed found multiple “reports” of alleged meetings between Iraqi officials and Al Qaeda operatives dating back to the early 1990s when Osama first set up shop in Sudan. But many of these reports were old, uncorroborated and came from sources of unknown if not dubious credibility, U.S. intelligence officials say. (Not unlike, as it has turned out, much of the “reporting” on Iraq’s ever-elusive weapons of mass destruction.) Moreover, other reports—some of which came foreign intelligence services and Iraqi defectors—were selectively presented by the Feith team and are, as one U.S. official told NEWSWEEK, “contradicted by other things.”
Consider one of the seemingly more compelling reports cited in the memo: that Farouk Hijazi, the former chief of Iraqi intelligence and then ambassador to Turkey, flew to Afghanistan in late 1998 to meet with bin Laden. As Stephen Hayes, author of The Weekly Standard piece dutifully notes, accounts of this purported Saddam overture to Osama made its way into the mainstream press at the time—including NEWSWEEK. A Feb. 6, 1999, story in the British newspaper The Guardian contended the purpose of Hijazi’s visit was to offer a presumably besieged bin Laden asylum in Iraq.
But, as Vince Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism official, says, the Feith-Carney memo omits the rest of the story: that bin Laden actually rejected the Hijazi overture, concluding he did not want to be “exploited” by a regime that he has consistently viewed as “secular” and fundamentally antithetical to his vision of a strict Islamic state.
There is, moreover, compelling reason to believe bin Laden clung to this view as late as this year when Bush administration officials were making no secret of their plans to invade Iraq and topple Saddam. In a Feb. 11, 2003, audiotape released by Al-Jazeera, a voice believed to be bin Laden called on Arabs to rise up and strike at the U.S. invaders—a declaration that contributed to a Bush administration decision to ratchet up the country’s threat level at the time. But, less well publicized, bin Laden emphasized in the same tape his interest was in defending the Iraqi people, not an “infidel” like Saddam.
“The socialists and their rulers [had] lost their legitimacy a long time ago and the socialists are infidels regardless of where they are, whether in Baghdad or in Aden,” the bin Laden tape proclaimed. (The CIA later concluded the voice on the tape was “almost certainly” Osama.) Overlooked in The Weekly Standard hype, the Pentagon memo itself concedes that much of the more recent reporting about Iraqi-Al Qaeda ties is “conflicting.” It quotes one Iraq intelligence officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, as saying that “the last contact” between Iraqi intelligence and Al Qaeda was in July 1999 and that it was actually Saddam, not bin Laden, who cut off the contacts. While Hayes’s story insists “the bulk of the reporting ... contradicts this claim,” the actual examples cited in the memo to buttress this point are less than persuasive.
The memo invokes the by-now hoary claim—first reported by Czech intelligence-that Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in April 2001. But it concedes that the FBI and CIA “cannot confirm” that such a meeting actually took place. In fact, the Iraqi agent in question, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, has been in U.S. custody for months and, according to U.S. intelligence sources, denies ever meeting Atta—a denial that officials tend to believe given that they have not unearthed a scintilla of evidence that Atta was even in Prague at the time of the alleged rendezvous.
The memo also cites the claims of one senior Al Qaeda operative in U.S. custody, Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi, who reported to his interrogators that he was “told by an Al Qaeda associate” (who is unidentified) that two Al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq in December 2000 for training in the use of chemical and biological weapons. (Both national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld later relied on al-Libi’s claims to make the same allegation.) But U.S. intelligence officials note that al-Libi’s claims are hearsay (he professed no firsthand knowledge) and that his credibility, like that of many captured Al Qaeda detainees, is sometimes spotty.
In any event, the Pentagon memo pointedly omits any reference to the interrogations of a host of other high-level Al Qaeda and Iraqi detainees—including such notables as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah, and Hijazi himself. All of them have reportedly dismissed the idea that Al Qaeda and Saddam had any working relationship. Can there be any doubt that if any of these captives had confirmed such a relationship that Bush administration officials would have found a way to get the word out?
None of this means, of course, that all accounts of Iraqi-Al Qaeda connections should be completely dismissed. The memo, for example, makes brief reference to the intriguing case of Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national who, purportedly through the aid of an Iraq embassy employee, landed a job at the Kuala Lumpur airport and then served as greeter and driver for two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. The two men flew to the city for a crucial Al Qaeda planning session in January 2000. FBI documents obtained by NEWSWEEK more than a year ago show that U.S. law enforcement had a great deal of interest in interrogating Shakir in the months following September 11. After being picked up, first by Qatari intelligence and later by Jordanians, he was twice released—without the FBI ever getting a crack at him. He then flew off to Iraq, where he has never been seen since. U.S. military and intelligence officials are still looking for him to this day, sources say, and for good reason.
But all this is a far cry from solid evidence of ongoing cooperation between Saddam and Osama. The outing of the memo (a still classified document, as it happens) is likely now to become the subject of yet another Justice Department leak investigation. The CIA is expected to begin preparing a “crimes report” identifying the potential damage to national security (most likely pretty minimal). But there can be little doubt about the motive of the leaker: to shore up the Bush administration’s prewar claims and defuse the intelligence committee investigation into allegations of the misuse of intelligence. Unfortunately, for the Pentagon and the Standard, the claims detailed in the memo will do little, if anything, to advance the case.
© 2004 Newsweek, Inc.
First, let me thank you for actually taking the time to defend your views with a somewhat more intelligent approach than sheepish cheerleader Hansen Sister (incidentally Bushie was also a cheerleader) and his logic of, "I'm going to kick your ass so I'm right."
That said, since we're "educating" each other - have you considered that the presence of a few Al Queda in a country might not (imagine that) prove a country-sponsered terror effort (or intentional harboring of terrorist)? If you haven't considered that, then consider the "Lackawanna six" - under your il"logic" we'd be preping for an unjust preemptive strike on suburbs of Buffalo, NY as I type.
As for your article - despite your lack of references, I am indeed aware of the allegations that Iraq was working with Al Queda. Of course, like the rest of Bushies evidence, most of the propaganda was later denounced as fabricated or simply unverified. Have a lookski -
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3540586/
Case Decidedly Not Closed
The Defense Dept. memo allegedly proving a link between Al Qaeda and Saddam does nothing of the sort
Newsweek Web ExclusiveNov. 19 - A leaked Defense Department memo claiming new evidence of an “operational relationship” between Osama bin Laden and Saddam Hussein’s former regime is mostly based on unverified claims that were first advanced by some top Bush administration officials more than a year ago—and were largely discounted at the time by the U.S. intelligence community, according to current and former U.S. intelligence officials.
advertisement
CASE CLOSED blared the headline in a Weekly Standard cover story last Saturday that purported to have unearthed the U.S. government’s “secret evidence of cooperation” between Saddam and bin Laden. Fred Barnes, the magazine’s executive editor, touted the magazine’s scoop the next day in a roundtable chat on “Fox News Sunday.” (Both the Standard and Fox News Channel are owned by the conservative media baron Rupert Murdoch.) “These are hard facts, and I’d like to see you refute any one of them,” he told a skeptical Juan Williams of National Public Radio.
In fact, the tangled tale of the memo suggests that the case of whether there has been Iraqi-Al Qaeda complicity is far from closed. The Oct. 27, 2003, memo, prepared by Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith’s office, was written in response to detailed questions from the Senate Intelligence Committee about the basis for intelligence pushed by Feith and other senior Pentagon officials during the run-up to the Iraq war.
With a few, inconclusive exceptions, the memo doesn’t actually contain much “new” intelligence at all. Instead, it mostly recycles shards of old, raw data that were first assembled last year by a tiny team of floating Pentagon analysts (led by a Pennsylvania State University professor and U.S. Navy analyst Christopher Carney) whom Feith asked to find evidence of an Iraqi-Al Qaeda “connection” in order to better justify a U.S. invasion.
Within the U.S. intelligence establishment, the predominant view—then as now—is that the Feith-Carney case was murky at best. Culling through intelligence files, the Feith team indeed found multiple “reports” of alleged meetings between Iraqi officials and Al Qaeda operatives dating back to the early 1990s when Osama first set up shop in Sudan. But many of these reports were old, uncorroborated and came from sources of unknown if not dubious credibility, U.S. intelligence officials say. (Not unlike, as it has turned out, much of the “reporting” on Iraq’s ever-elusive weapons of mass destruction.) Moreover, other reports—some of which came foreign intelligence services and Iraqi defectors—were selectively presented by the Feith team and are, as one U.S. official told NEWSWEEK, “contradicted by other things.”
Consider one of the seemingly more compelling reports cited in the memo: that Farouk Hijazi, the former chief of Iraqi intelligence and then ambassador to Turkey, flew to Afghanistan in late 1998 to meet with bin Laden. As Stephen Hayes, author of The Weekly Standard piece dutifully notes, accounts of this purported Saddam overture to Osama made its way into the mainstream press at the time—including NEWSWEEK. A Feb. 6, 1999, story in the British newspaper The Guardian contended the purpose of Hijazi’s visit was to offer a presumably besieged bin Laden asylum in Iraq.
But, as Vince Cannistraro, a former CIA counterterrorism official, says, the Feith-Carney memo omits the rest of the story: that bin Laden actually rejected the Hijazi overture, concluding he did not want to be “exploited” by a regime that he has consistently viewed as “secular” and fundamentally antithetical to his vision of a strict Islamic state.
There is, moreover, compelling reason to believe bin Laden clung to this view as late as this year when Bush administration officials were making no secret of their plans to invade Iraq and topple Saddam. In a Feb. 11, 2003, audiotape released by Al-Jazeera, a voice believed to be bin Laden called on Arabs to rise up and strike at the U.S. invaders—a declaration that contributed to a Bush administration decision to ratchet up the country’s threat level at the time. But, less well publicized, bin Laden emphasized in the same tape his interest was in defending the Iraqi people, not an “infidel” like Saddam.
“The socialists and their rulers [had] lost their legitimacy a long time ago and the socialists are infidels regardless of where they are, whether in Baghdad or in Aden,” the bin Laden tape proclaimed. (The CIA later concluded the voice on the tape was “almost certainly” Osama.) Overlooked in The Weekly Standard hype, the Pentagon memo itself concedes that much of the more recent reporting about Iraqi-Al Qaeda ties is “conflicting.” It quotes one Iraq intelligence officer in U.S. custody, Khalil Ibrahim Abdallah, as saying that “the last contact” between Iraqi intelligence and Al Qaeda was in July 1999 and that it was actually Saddam, not bin Laden, who cut off the contacts. While Hayes’s story insists “the bulk of the reporting ... contradicts this claim,” the actual examples cited in the memo to buttress this point are less than persuasive.
The memo invokes the by-now hoary claim—first reported by Czech intelligence-that Mohammed Atta met with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in April 2001. But it concedes that the FBI and CIA “cannot confirm” that such a meeting actually took place. In fact, the Iraqi agent in question, Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir al-Ani, has been in U.S. custody for months and, according to U.S. intelligence sources, denies ever meeting Atta—a denial that officials tend to believe given that they have not unearthed a scintilla of evidence that Atta was even in Prague at the time of the alleged rendezvous.
The memo also cites the claims of one senior Al Qaeda operative in U.S. custody, Ibn Al-Shaykh al-Libi, who reported to his interrogators that he was “told by an Al Qaeda associate” (who is unidentified) that two Al Qaeda operatives were sent to Iraq in December 2000 for training in the use of chemical and biological weapons. (Both national-security adviser Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld later relied on al-Libi’s claims to make the same allegation.) But U.S. intelligence officials note that al-Libi’s claims are hearsay (he professed no firsthand knowledge) and that his credibility, like that of many captured Al Qaeda detainees, is sometimes spotty.
In any event, the Pentagon memo pointedly omits any reference to the interrogations of a host of other high-level Al Qaeda and Iraqi detainees—including such notables as Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Abu Zubaydah, and Hijazi himself. All of them have reportedly dismissed the idea that Al Qaeda and Saddam had any working relationship. Can there be any doubt that if any of these captives had confirmed such a relationship that Bush administration officials would have found a way to get the word out?
None of this means, of course, that all accounts of Iraqi-Al Qaeda connections should be completely dismissed. The memo, for example, makes brief reference to the intriguing case of Ahmad Hikmat Shakir, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national who, purportedly through the aid of an Iraq embassy employee, landed a job at the Kuala Lumpur airport and then served as greeter and driver for two of the September 11 hijackers, Khalid Almihdhar and Nawaf Alhazmi. The two men flew to the city for a crucial Al Qaeda planning session in January 2000. FBI documents obtained by NEWSWEEK more than a year ago show that U.S. law enforcement had a great deal of interest in interrogating Shakir in the months following September 11. After being picked up, first by Qatari intelligence and later by Jordanians, he was twice released—without the FBI ever getting a crack at him. He then flew off to Iraq, where he has never been seen since. U.S. military and intelligence officials are still looking for him to this day, sources say, and for good reason.
But all this is a far cry from solid evidence of ongoing cooperation between Saddam and Osama. The outing of the memo (a still classified document, as it happens) is likely now to become the subject of yet another Justice Department leak investigation. The CIA is expected to begin preparing a “crimes report” identifying the potential damage to national security (most likely pretty minimal). But there can be little doubt about the motive of the leaker: to shore up the Bush administration’s prewar claims and defuse the intelligence committee investigation into allegations of the misuse of intelligence. Unfortunately, for the Pentagon and the Standard, the claims detailed in the memo will do little, if anything, to advance the case.
© 2004 Newsweek, Inc.
Lander,
Once again, you have chosen a Newsweek article to attempt to refute some (NOT ALL) of the allegations submitted by credible Intelligence Sources.
Are you so brainwashed by Newsweek that you are unable to see their obvious bias toward the left? The article you use was an obvious attempt by Newsweek to argue the report I provided you. However,it fails to address certain material facts provided:
1.The existence of Ansar al-Islam and their terrorist training camp in Sargat, Iraq as well as other sites in Northeastern Iraq are acknoweledged by even your the liberal media.Please advise how this can be compared to the Lackawanna Six.
2. Several of the meetings between key Al Quaeda and Iraqi figures remain undisputed in your Newsweek article.
3.4.5.The article still does not explain Al Qaeda Senior Commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's interaction with the Government of Iraq. The following article from Matthew A. Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy should further your education:
In mapping out Iraq's links to international terrorism before the United Nations Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell highlighted the case of senior al Qaeda commander Fedel Nazzel Khalayleh, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
In fact, Zarqawi exemplifies not only the Iraq role in the web of international terror but serves as a case in point of the terror matrix itself. Zarqawi's activities on behalf of al Qaeda span the globe, from Afghanistan to Great Britain, with equally diverse links to other terrorist groups, from Ansar al-Islam in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon to al-Tawhid in Germany and Beyyiat el-Imam in Turkey. At least 116 terrorist operatives from Zarqawi's global network have already been arrested, including members in France, Italy, Spain, Britain, Germany, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
WHO IS ZARQAWI?
A Palestinian-Jordanian and veteran of the Afghan war against the Soviets, Zarqawi first appeared as a terror suspect when Jordan indicted him in absentia for his role in the al Qaeda millennial bombing plot targeting the Radison SAS hotel in Amman as well as other American, Israeli, and Christian religious sites in Jordan. In 2000 he returned to Afghanistan, where he oversaw a terrorist training camp and specialized in chemical and biological weapons. European officials maintain Zarqawi is the al Qaeda coordinator for attacks there, where chemical attacks were recently thwarted in Britain, France, and Italy. In fact, Secretary Powell informed that Abuwatia (ph), a detainee who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, admitted to dispatching at least nine North African extremists to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.
Zarqawi heads Jund al-Shams, an Islamic extremist group and al Qaeda affiliate which operated primarily in Syria and Jordan, but is now believed to have moved to the Ansar al-Islam enclave in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq where he helped establish a new poison and explosive training camp. Powell noted that Zarqawi's lieutenants operate the Ansar al-Islam camp in coordination with a senior Iraqi agent "in the most senior levels of the radical organization."
TERROR TO GO
Zarqawi's own movements are themselves telling. After being wounded in the leg in Afghanistan, Zarqawi escaped to Iran. While there, he dispatched two Palestinians and a Jordanian who entered Turkey illegally from Iran on their way to conduct bombing attacks in Israel. The three, members of Beyyiat el-Imam (a group linked to al Qaeda) who fought for the Taliban and received terrorist training in Afghanistan, were intercepted and arrested by Turkish police on February 15, 2002.
From Iran Zarqawi traveled to Iraq in May 2002, where his wounded leg was amputated and the limb fitted with a prosthetic device. He spent two months recovering in Baghdad, at which time "nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there." Powell informed that "these Al Qaida affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they've now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months."
While Iraq maintained it was unaware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or other terrorists, Powell informed the Security Council that the United States passed information to Iraqi authorities on Zarqawi's location in the Iraqi capitol via a third party.
From Baghdad Zarqawi traveled to Syria, and from there to Lebanon where he met with leaders from Hezbollah and other extremists at a terror training camp in South Lebanon. In fact, Zarqawi has been definitively linked both to Hezballah as well as a terrorist cell apprehended in Germany that had been operating under the name Tawhid. German prosecutors announced that the group, tied to the recently arrested Abu Qatada in Britain but controlled by Zarqawi, was planning to attack U.S. or Israeli interests in Germany. Eight men were arrested, and raids yielded hundreds of forged passports from Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Denmark, and other countries.
While in Syria Zarqawi planned and facilitated the October assassination of Lawrence Foley, a U.S. official with the Agency for International Development. In December a Libyan and a Jordanian were arrested for the attack. Jordan's prime minister announced that the pair received funding and instructions from Zarqawi, and intended to conduct attacks against "foreign embassies, Jordanian officials, some diplomatic personnel, especially Americans and Israelis." Powell revealed that after the murder, one of the assassin's associates "left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations."
Zarqawi is now believed to have returned to the Ansar al-Islam camp in northern Iraq run by his Jund al-Shams lieutenants. Terrorists trained at the camp have plotted chemical attacks with various toxins in Britain, France, Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, and Chechnya.
THE TERROR MATRIX
The Zarqawi network highlights the matrix of relationships that define today's international terrorist threat. Indeed, international terrorism is a web linking many disparate groups. Senior U.S. and European officials have noted that although Hezbollah and al Qaeda do not appear to share operational support, they have engaged in logistical cooperation on an ad hoc and tactical basis, as well as cooperative training.
Support networks play a particularly crucial role in the matrix of relationships among terrorists. For example, over the past year, evidence has shown that the al-Taqwa banking network — which was shut down shortly after the September 11 attacks in light of its ties to al Qaeda — was a preferred conduit for transferring funds to Hamas and a host of North African terrorist groups, in addition to being established with seed money from the Muslim Brotherhood.
Moreover, state sponsors of terrorism continue to play a central role, as evidenced by the hospitality showed Zarqawi by Iran, Iraq, and Syria. For example, Syria has provided a great deal of assistance against al Qaeda, but is nevertheless believed to be supplying rockets directly to Hezbollah. Damascus should be told in no uncertain terms to direct its counterterrorism cooperation against all terrorists. Tehran continues to support Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups as well, and has given senior al Qaeda officials sanctuary in villages along its eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. And the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan, Powell announced, served as Saddam's liaison to al Qaeda from 1999 through 2001.
To ignore these links is to forfeit hope of any real progress toward constricting the operating environment in which terrorist plan, fund and execute terrorist attacks. To be effective, the war on terror must have a strategic focus on the entirety of the terror matrix. Tactically, this must translate into taking action against both operational and logistical networks, as well as targeting the full range of groups making up terror web — from Jund al-Shams, Beyyiat el-Imam and al-Tawhid to al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas — and the states that continue to support them.
4. As for your belief that everything published in Newsweek is objective, unbiased reporting, take a look at this June 2001 article from Media Reality Check:
Newsweek Boss Concedes News Media Liberals Just "Launder Our Views Through, Quote, ‘Objective Critics’" Have you noticed all of those Europeans grumbling about President George W. Bush’s environmental policies on television and in the newspapers recently? Thanks to a fit of candor from Newsweek’s Assistant Managing Editor Evan Thomas, we now know that all of the special press access given to shaggy-haired enviro-wackos is just the media’s not-so-subtle way of spanking Bush for pursuing policies they don’t like.
Thomas explained how reporters sneak bias into news stories: "We launder our views through, quote, ‘objective critics.’ And certainly the press is pretty green, the press is pretty pro-environment and I don’t think there’s any question that they, as a body, feel that Bush is wrong on the environment," he confessed on CNN’s Reliable Sources on Saturday evening. "I’m excluding the conservative press — the Weekly Standard and so forth — but generally the press is pretty green and they’re going to use the Europeans to take the Bushies to task."
Sure enough, the latest Newsweek gave lots of room to meanie-greenies who talked trash about Bush’s environmental policies. Here’s the first paragraph of Christopher Dickey’s article, published in the magazine’s June 25 international edition and available to U.S. readers on MSNBC’s web site: "Bianca Jagger, the celebrity activist, isn’t exactly a fan of George W. But she loved the U.S. president’s first European tour, looking on with pleasure from among thousands of shouting, marching protesters. They jeered him, reviled him, even mooned him. They trashed him as the ‘Toxic Texan,’ hoisted banners proclaiming ‘Bush go home,’ and burned American flags. More than a hundred were arrested and dozens injured as rioters threw stones and broke shop windows in some of the uglier violence to cloud a European summit. How would she sum up the man, from a European perspective? ‘The contemporary antichrist,’ she says." -- Rich
Or, how about this excerpt from Accuracy in Media:
Evan Thomas, Washington bureau chief, Newsweek Magazine, on Inside Washington, 11 May 1996:
Commenting on Speaker Newt Gingrich's charge that the media are biased,, Thomas stated, "This is true. There is liberal bias. About 85 percent of the reporters who cover the White House vote Democratic. They have for a long time. Particularly at the networks, at the lower levels, among the editors and the so-called infrastructure, there is a liberal bias. There is a liberal bias at Newsweek, the magazine I work for."
5. Your original futile point was that Bush has served to destroy foreign relations which did not happen under "Al Gore's command". Well, let's see what did happen under President Gore's regime."
1992 - Iraq violates UN Resolutions
686,687,688,707 & 715
1995 - Iraq violates UN Resolution 986
1999 - Iraq violates UN Resolution 1284
The fact is that under Bush's Administration, the United States and ITS COALITION OF 130 COUNTRIES successfully enforced UN Resolution 1441 which empowered the United Nations and allowed it regain some of it's lost credibilty. The alternative would have been a powerless and defunct United Nations.THAT would have been a foreign relations catastrophy!
6. Lastly, how in G-d's name can you overlook the genocide evidenced by the uncovered mass graves or the 1st hand reports of torture perpetrated by Sadaam and not comprehend the inhumane life that existed under his regime?
Are you that out there in Left Field?
[This message was edited by kwalder on February 09, 2004 at 03:15 AM.]
Once again, you have chosen a Newsweek article to attempt to refute some (NOT ALL) of the allegations submitted by credible Intelligence Sources.
Are you so brainwashed by Newsweek that you are unable to see their obvious bias toward the left? The article you use was an obvious attempt by Newsweek to argue the report I provided you. However,it fails to address certain material facts provided:
1.The existence of Ansar al-Islam and their terrorist training camp in Sargat, Iraq as well as other sites in Northeastern Iraq are acknoweledged by even your the liberal media.Please advise how this can be compared to the Lackawanna Six.
2. Several of the meetings between key Al Quaeda and Iraqi figures remain undisputed in your Newsweek article.
3.4.5.The article still does not explain Al Qaeda Senior Commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's interaction with the Government of Iraq. The following article from Matthew A. Levitt of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy should further your education:
In mapping out Iraq's links to international terrorism before the United Nations Security Council, Secretary of State Colin Powell highlighted the case of senior al Qaeda commander Fedel Nazzel Khalayleh, better known as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.
In fact, Zarqawi exemplifies not only the Iraq role in the web of international terror but serves as a case in point of the terror matrix itself. Zarqawi's activities on behalf of al Qaeda span the globe, from Afghanistan to Great Britain, with equally diverse links to other terrorist groups, from Ansar al-Islam in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon to al-Tawhid in Germany and Beyyiat el-Imam in Turkey. At least 116 terrorist operatives from Zarqawi's global network have already been arrested, including members in France, Italy, Spain, Britain, Germany, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
WHO IS ZARQAWI?
A Palestinian-Jordanian and veteran of the Afghan war against the Soviets, Zarqawi first appeared as a terror suspect when Jordan indicted him in absentia for his role in the al Qaeda millennial bombing plot targeting the Radison SAS hotel in Amman as well as other American, Israeli, and Christian religious sites in Jordan. In 2000 he returned to Afghanistan, where he oversaw a terrorist training camp and specialized in chemical and biological weapons. European officials maintain Zarqawi is the al Qaeda coordinator for attacks there, where chemical attacks were recently thwarted in Britain, France, and Italy. In fact, Secretary Powell informed that Abuwatia (ph), a detainee who graduated from Zarqawi's terrorist camp in Afghanistan, admitted to dispatching at least nine North African extremists to travel to Europe to conduct poison and explosive attacks.
Zarqawi heads Jund al-Shams, an Islamic extremist group and al Qaeda affiliate which operated primarily in Syria and Jordan, but is now believed to have moved to the Ansar al-Islam enclave in the Kurdish region of northern Iraq where he helped establish a new poison and explosive training camp. Powell noted that Zarqawi's lieutenants operate the Ansar al-Islam camp in coordination with a senior Iraqi agent "in the most senior levels of the radical organization."
TERROR TO GO
Zarqawi's own movements are themselves telling. After being wounded in the leg in Afghanistan, Zarqawi escaped to Iran. While there, he dispatched two Palestinians and a Jordanian who entered Turkey illegally from Iran on their way to conduct bombing attacks in Israel. The three, members of Beyyiat el-Imam (a group linked to al Qaeda) who fought for the Taliban and received terrorist training in Afghanistan, were intercepted and arrested by Turkish police on February 15, 2002.
From Iran Zarqawi traveled to Iraq in May 2002, where his wounded leg was amputated and the limb fitted with a prosthetic device. He spent two months recovering in Baghdad, at which time "nearly two dozen extremists converged on Baghdad and established a base of operations there." Powell informed that "these Al Qaida affiliates, based in Baghdad, now coordinate the movement of people, money and supplies into and throughout Iraq for his network, and they've now been operating freely in the capital for more than eight months."
While Iraq maintained it was unaware of the whereabouts of Zarqawi or other terrorists, Powell informed the Security Council that the United States passed information to Iraqi authorities on Zarqawi's location in the Iraqi capitol via a third party.
From Baghdad Zarqawi traveled to Syria, and from there to Lebanon where he met with leaders from Hezbollah and other extremists at a terror training camp in South Lebanon. In fact, Zarqawi has been definitively linked both to Hezballah as well as a terrorist cell apprehended in Germany that had been operating under the name Tawhid. German prosecutors announced that the group, tied to the recently arrested Abu Qatada in Britain but controlled by Zarqawi, was planning to attack U.S. or Israeli interests in Germany. Eight men were arrested, and raids yielded hundreds of forged passports from Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Denmark, and other countries.
While in Syria Zarqawi planned and facilitated the October assassination of Lawrence Foley, a U.S. official with the Agency for International Development. In December a Libyan and a Jordanian were arrested for the attack. Jordan's prime minister announced that the pair received funding and instructions from Zarqawi, and intended to conduct attacks against "foreign embassies, Jordanian officials, some diplomatic personnel, especially Americans and Israelis." Powell revealed that after the murder, one of the assassin's associates "left Jordan to go to Iraq to obtain weapons and explosives for further operations."
Zarqawi is now believed to have returned to the Ansar al-Islam camp in northern Iraq run by his Jund al-Shams lieutenants. Terrorists trained at the camp have plotted chemical attacks with various toxins in Britain, France, Georgia's Pankisi Gorge, and Chechnya.
THE TERROR MATRIX
The Zarqawi network highlights the matrix of relationships that define today's international terrorist threat. Indeed, international terrorism is a web linking many disparate groups. Senior U.S. and European officials have noted that although Hezbollah and al Qaeda do not appear to share operational support, they have engaged in logistical cooperation on an ad hoc and tactical basis, as well as cooperative training.
Support networks play a particularly crucial role in the matrix of relationships among terrorists. For example, over the past year, evidence has shown that the al-Taqwa banking network — which was shut down shortly after the September 11 attacks in light of its ties to al Qaeda — was a preferred conduit for transferring funds to Hamas and a host of North African terrorist groups, in addition to being established with seed money from the Muslim Brotherhood.
Moreover, state sponsors of terrorism continue to play a central role, as evidenced by the hospitality showed Zarqawi by Iran, Iraq, and Syria. For example, Syria has provided a great deal of assistance against al Qaeda, but is nevertheless believed to be supplying rockets directly to Hezbollah. Damascus should be told in no uncertain terms to direct its counterterrorism cooperation against all terrorists. Tehran continues to support Hezbollah and Palestinian terrorist groups as well, and has given senior al Qaeda officials sanctuary in villages along its eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan. And the Iraqi embassy in Pakistan, Powell announced, served as Saddam's liaison to al Qaeda from 1999 through 2001.
To ignore these links is to forfeit hope of any real progress toward constricting the operating environment in which terrorist plan, fund and execute terrorist attacks. To be effective, the war on terror must have a strategic focus on the entirety of the terror matrix. Tactically, this must translate into taking action against both operational and logistical networks, as well as targeting the full range of groups making up terror web — from Jund al-Shams, Beyyiat el-Imam and al-Tawhid to al Qaeda, Hezbollah, and Hamas — and the states that continue to support them.
4. As for your belief that everything published in Newsweek is objective, unbiased reporting, take a look at this June 2001 article from Media Reality Check:
Newsweek Boss Concedes News Media Liberals Just "Launder Our Views Through, Quote, ‘Objective Critics’" Have you noticed all of those Europeans grumbling about President George W. Bush’s environmental policies on television and in the newspapers recently? Thanks to a fit of candor from Newsweek’s Assistant Managing Editor Evan Thomas, we now know that all of the special press access given to shaggy-haired enviro-wackos is just the media’s not-so-subtle way of spanking Bush for pursuing policies they don’t like.
Thomas explained how reporters sneak bias into news stories: "We launder our views through, quote, ‘objective critics.’ And certainly the press is pretty green, the press is pretty pro-environment and I don’t think there’s any question that they, as a body, feel that Bush is wrong on the environment," he confessed on CNN’s Reliable Sources on Saturday evening. "I’m excluding the conservative press — the Weekly Standard and so forth — but generally the press is pretty green and they’re going to use the Europeans to take the Bushies to task."
Sure enough, the latest Newsweek gave lots of room to meanie-greenies who talked trash about Bush’s environmental policies. Here’s the first paragraph of Christopher Dickey’s article, published in the magazine’s June 25 international edition and available to U.S. readers on MSNBC’s web site: "Bianca Jagger, the celebrity activist, isn’t exactly a fan of George W. But she loved the U.S. president’s first European tour, looking on with pleasure from among thousands of shouting, marching protesters. They jeered him, reviled him, even mooned him. They trashed him as the ‘Toxic Texan,’ hoisted banners proclaiming ‘Bush go home,’ and burned American flags. More than a hundred were arrested and dozens injured as rioters threw stones and broke shop windows in some of the uglier violence to cloud a European summit. How would she sum up the man, from a European perspective? ‘The contemporary antichrist,’ she says." -- Rich
Or, how about this excerpt from Accuracy in Media:
Evan Thomas, Washington bureau chief, Newsweek Magazine, on Inside Washington, 11 May 1996:
Commenting on Speaker Newt Gingrich's charge that the media are biased,, Thomas stated, "This is true. There is liberal bias. About 85 percent of the reporters who cover the White House vote Democratic. They have for a long time. Particularly at the networks, at the lower levels, among the editors and the so-called infrastructure, there is a liberal bias. There is a liberal bias at Newsweek, the magazine I work for."
5. Your original futile point was that Bush has served to destroy foreign relations which did not happen under "Al Gore's command". Well, let's see what did happen under President Gore's regime."
1992 - Iraq violates UN Resolutions
686,687,688,707 & 715
1995 - Iraq violates UN Resolution 986
1999 - Iraq violates UN Resolution 1284
The fact is that under Bush's Administration, the United States and ITS COALITION OF 130 COUNTRIES successfully enforced UN Resolution 1441 which empowered the United Nations and allowed it regain some of it's lost credibilty. The alternative would have been a powerless and defunct United Nations.THAT would have been a foreign relations catastrophy!
6. Lastly, how in G-d's name can you overlook the genocide evidenced by the uncovered mass graves or the 1st hand reports of torture perpetrated by Sadaam and not comprehend the inhumane life that existed under his regime?
Are you that out there in Left Field?
[This message was edited by kwalder on February 09, 2004 at 03:15 AM.]
Kwalder,
Since you're so concerned with the integrity of my sources I find it extremely odd that you chose not to list your references (twice). Assuming, of course, that you're not ashamed of listing an unreputable source to support your arguments then by all means - cite away.
Are you that far out in Rightie Field?
Since you're so concerned with the integrity of my sources I find it extremely odd that you chose not to list your references (twice). Assuming, of course, that you're not ashamed of listing an unreputable source to support your arguments then by all means - cite away.
Are you that far out in Rightie Field?
Al-Ansar's links to Al-qaida are not generally in dispute among the media (the Guardian and the BBC, leftist media, both acknowledge this fact.) However, there is as much evidence to suggest that Saddam sought to stifle this organization as there is to suggest that he was somehow connected to them (do not be foolish enough to believe that their place of residence supplies evidence of a connection -- need I remind you that several of the 9/11 hijackers had been living freely in the US for some time, with the knowledge of various gov't organizations, including the FBI.)
Al-ansar had instigated clashes with the PUK, a Kurdish military organization, whom former Iraqi PM claims to have supplied with arms to fight Al-ansar. While this scenario in many ways seems unlikely, given Saddam's disdain of the Kurds, you need to remember that Iraq was a secular country, a state that would anger Al-ansar (who opposed how the PUK were organized) and only lend strength to the stance of the PUK. Since the war, many Al-ansar members have been found in Iran, and it is now suspected that Iran may be harbouring more of them. It is almost certain, however, that Al-ansar members are leading the anti-American guerilla war in Baghdad, and not Saddam loyalists as originally believed. Long article, but explains things well.
The issue here is that many believe that Al-ansar could not have functioned without some support from the Iraqi or the Iranian government. Since they resided in Northern Iraq (a function of being Kurdish Muslims) it was easily presumed that they were supported by Saddam, thus providing the link to Al-qaida. The problem with this presumption is twofold: Al-ansar may actually have been an ally of Iran (and evidence is surfacing to support this), thus an almost automatic enemy of Saddam. This would mean that not only did the US invade the wrong country, but that it has given strength to the Al-ansar (ergo Al-qaida) cause and provided a state of war from which this group can flourish inside Iraq.
From a less technical standpoint, the argument against a Saddam/Al-qaida connection comes from the mouth of Colin Powell himself: "No concrete evidence."
So, basically, what we have here is a government entering into war on a series of 'what ifs.' I just don't see how anybody can support that position.
Al-ansar had instigated clashes with the PUK, a Kurdish military organization, whom former Iraqi PM claims to have supplied with arms to fight Al-ansar. While this scenario in many ways seems unlikely, given Saddam's disdain of the Kurds, you need to remember that Iraq was a secular country, a state that would anger Al-ansar (who opposed how the PUK were organized) and only lend strength to the stance of the PUK. Since the war, many Al-ansar members have been found in Iran, and it is now suspected that Iran may be harbouring more of them. It is almost certain, however, that Al-ansar members are leading the anti-American guerilla war in Baghdad, and not Saddam loyalists as originally believed. Long article, but explains things well.
The issue here is that many believe that Al-ansar could not have functioned without some support from the Iraqi or the Iranian government. Since they resided in Northern Iraq (a function of being Kurdish Muslims) it was easily presumed that they were supported by Saddam, thus providing the link to Al-qaida. The problem with this presumption is twofold: Al-ansar may actually have been an ally of Iran (and evidence is surfacing to support this), thus an almost automatic enemy of Saddam. This would mean that not only did the US invade the wrong country, but that it has given strength to the Al-ansar (ergo Al-qaida) cause and provided a state of war from which this group can flourish inside Iraq.
From a less technical standpoint, the argument against a Saddam/Al-qaida connection comes from the mouth of Colin Powell himself: "No concrete evidence."
So, basically, what we have here is a government entering into war on a series of 'what ifs.' I just don't see how anybody can support that position.
X..good afternoon sunshine..you must be really appalled at bill Clinton and his imperlistic agressive actins then even before 9/11...
Good evening. Earlier today, I ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors.
Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world.
Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons.
I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq; why we have acted now; and what we aim to accomplish.
Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors called UNSCOM. They are highly professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq's capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction, and to verify that Iraq does not attempt to rebuild that capability.
The inspectors undertook this mission first 7 1/2 years ago at the end of the Gulf War when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the cease-fire.
The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly. Unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decadelong war. Not only against soldiers, but against civilians, firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. And not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq.
The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again.
The United States has patiently worked to preserve UNSCOM as Iraq has sought to avoid its obligation to cooperate with the inspectors. On occasion, we've had to threaten military force, and Saddam has backed down.
Faced with Saddam's latest act of defiance in late October, we built intensive diplomatic pressure on Iraq backed by overwhelming military force in the region. The U.N. Security Council voted 15 to 0 to condemn Saddam's actions and to demand that he immediately come into compliance.
Eight Arab nations -- Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman -- warned that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the consequences of defying the U.N.
When Saddam still failed to comply, we prepared to act militarily. It was only then, at the last possible moment, that Iraq backed down. It pledged to the U.N. that it had made, and I quote, a clear and unconditional decision to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors.
I decided then to call off the attack with our airplanes already in the air because Saddam had given in to our demands. I concluded then that the right thing to do was to use restraint and give Saddam one last chance to prove his willingness to cooperate.
I made it very clear at that time what unconditional cooperation meant, based on existing U.N. resolutions and Iraq's own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning.
Now over the past three weeks, the U.N. weapons inspectors have carried out their plan for testing Iraq's cooperation. The testing period ended this weekend, and last night, UNSCOM's chairman, Richard Butler, reported the results to U.N. Secretary-General Annan.
The conclusions are stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing.
In four out of the five categories set forth, Iraq has failed to cooperate. Indeed, it actually has placed new restrictions on the inspectors.
Here are some of the particulars:
Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites. For example, it shut off access to the headquarters of its ruling party and said it will deny access to the party's other offices, even though U.N. resolutions make no exception for them and UNSCOM has inspected them in the past.
Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM's ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, Iraq obstructed UNSCOM's effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons program.
It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOM's questions.
Prior to the inspection of another site, Iraq actually emptied out the building, removing not just documents but even the furniture and the equipment.
Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by the inspectors. Indeed, we know that Iraq ordered the destruction of weapons-related documents in anticipation of an UNSCOM inspection.
So Iraq has abused its final chance.
As the UNSCOM report concludes, and again I quote, "Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament.
"In light of this experience, and in the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the Security Council with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons program."
In short, the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham.
Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance.
And so we had to act, and act now.
Let me explain why.
First, without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years.
Second, if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community -- led by the United States -- has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction, and someday -- make no mistake -- he will use it again as he has in the past.
Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspection system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.
That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team -- including the vice president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of state and the national security adviser -- I have ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors.
At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam: If you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price. We acted today because, in the judgment of my military advisers, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare.
If we had delayed for even a matter of days from Chairman Butler's report, we would have given Saddam more time to disperse his forces and protect his weapons.
Also, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim world and, therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the Middle East.
That is something we wanted very much to avoid without giving Iraq a month's head start to prepare for potential action against it.
Finally, our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now is the time to strike. I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system now and comply with the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. But we have to be prepared that he will not, and we must deal with the very real danger he poses.
So we will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people.
First, we must be prepared to use force again if Saddam takes threatening actions, such as trying to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, threatening his neighbors, challenging allied aircraft over Iraq or moving against his own Kurdish citizens.
The credible threat to use force, and when necessary, the actual use of force, is the surest way to contain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf War.
Second, so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam more than $120 billion -- resources that would have been used to rebuild his military. The sanctions system allows Iraq to sell oil for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people.
We have no quarrel with them. But without the sanctions, we would see the oil-for-food program become oil-for-tanks, resulting in a greater threat to Iraq's neighbors and less food for its people.
The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world.
The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people. Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently.
The decision to use force is never cost-free. Whenever American forces are placed in harm's way, we risk the loss of life. And while our strikes are focused on Iraq's military capabilities, there will be unintended Iraqi casualties.
Indeed, in the past, Saddam has intentionally placed Iraqi civilians in harm's way in a cynical bid to sway international opinion.
We must be prepared for these realities. At the same time, Saddam should have absolutely no doubt, if he lashes out at his neighbors, we will respond forcefully.
Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors. He will make war on his own people.
And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them.
Because we're acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future.
Let me close by addressing one other issue. Saddam Hussein and the other enemies of peace may have thought that the serious debate currently before the House of Representatives would distract Americans or weaken our resolve to face him down.
But once more, the United States has proven that although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America's vital interests, we will do so.
In the century we're leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community, fear and hope. Now, in the new century, we'll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past, but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace.
Good evening. Earlier today, I ordered America's armed forces to strike military and security targets in Iraq. They are joined by British forces. Their mission is to attack Iraq's nuclear, chemical and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors.
Their purpose is to protect the national interest of the United States, and indeed the interests of people throughout the Middle East and around the world.
Saddam Hussein must not be allowed to threaten his neighbors or the world with nuclear arms, poison gas or biological weapons.
I want to explain why I have decided, with the unanimous recommendation of my national security team, to use force in Iraq; why we have acted now; and what we aim to accomplish.
Six weeks ago, Saddam Hussein announced that he would no longer cooperate with the United Nations weapons inspectors called UNSCOM. They are highly professional experts from dozens of countries. Their job is to oversee the elimination of Iraq's capability to retain, create and use weapons of mass destruction, and to verify that Iraq does not attempt to rebuild that capability.
The inspectors undertook this mission first 7 1/2 years ago at the end of the Gulf War when Iraq agreed to declare and destroy its arsenal as a condition of the cease-fire.
The international community had good reason to set this requirement. Other countries possess weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. With Saddam, there is one big difference: He has used them. Not once, but repeatedly. Unleashing chemical weapons against Iranian troops during a decadelong war. Not only against soldiers, but against civilians, firing Scud missiles at the citizens of Israel, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Iran. And not only against a foreign enemy, but even against his own people, gassing Kurdish civilians in northern Iraq.
The international community had little doubt then, and I have no doubt today, that left unchecked, Saddam Hussein will use these terrible weapons again.
The United States has patiently worked to preserve UNSCOM as Iraq has sought to avoid its obligation to cooperate with the inspectors. On occasion, we've had to threaten military force, and Saddam has backed down.
Faced with Saddam's latest act of defiance in late October, we built intensive diplomatic pressure on Iraq backed by overwhelming military force in the region. The U.N. Security Council voted 15 to 0 to condemn Saddam's actions and to demand that he immediately come into compliance.
Eight Arab nations -- Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Oman -- warned that Iraq alone would bear responsibility for the consequences of defying the U.N.
When Saddam still failed to comply, we prepared to act militarily. It was only then, at the last possible moment, that Iraq backed down. It pledged to the U.N. that it had made, and I quote, a clear and unconditional decision to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors.
I decided then to call off the attack with our airplanes already in the air because Saddam had given in to our demands. I concluded then that the right thing to do was to use restraint and give Saddam one last chance to prove his willingness to cooperate.
I made it very clear at that time what unconditional cooperation meant, based on existing U.N. resolutions and Iraq's own commitments. And along with Prime Minister Blair of Great Britain, I made it equally clear that if Saddam failed to cooperate fully, we would be prepared to act without delay, diplomacy or warning.
Now over the past three weeks, the U.N. weapons inspectors have carried out their plan for testing Iraq's cooperation. The testing period ended this weekend, and last night, UNSCOM's chairman, Richard Butler, reported the results to U.N. Secretary-General Annan.
The conclusions are stark, sobering and profoundly disturbing.
In four out of the five categories set forth, Iraq has failed to cooperate. Indeed, it actually has placed new restrictions on the inspectors.
Here are some of the particulars:
Iraq repeatedly blocked UNSCOM from inspecting suspect sites. For example, it shut off access to the headquarters of its ruling party and said it will deny access to the party's other offices, even though U.N. resolutions make no exception for them and UNSCOM has inspected them in the past.
Iraq repeatedly restricted UNSCOM's ability to obtain necessary evidence. For example, Iraq obstructed UNSCOM's effort to photograph bombs related to its chemical weapons program.
It tried to stop an UNSCOM biological weapons team from videotaping a site and photocopying documents and prevented Iraqi personnel from answering UNSCOM's questions.
Prior to the inspection of another site, Iraq actually emptied out the building, removing not just documents but even the furniture and the equipment.
Iraq has failed to turn over virtually all the documents requested by the inspectors. Indeed, we know that Iraq ordered the destruction of weapons-related documents in anticipation of an UNSCOM inspection.
So Iraq has abused its final chance.
As the UNSCOM report concludes, and again I quote, "Iraq's conduct ensured that no progress was able to be made in the fields of disarmament.
"In light of this experience, and in the absence of full cooperation by Iraq, it must regrettably be recorded again that the commission is not able to conduct the work mandated to it by the Security Council with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons program."
In short, the inspectors are saying that even if they could stay in Iraq, their work would be a sham.
Saddam's deception has defeated their effectiveness. Instead of the inspectors disarming Saddam, Saddam has disarmed the inspectors.
This situation presents a clear and present danger to the stability of the Persian Gulf and the safety of people everywhere. The international community gave Saddam one last chance to resume cooperation with the weapons inspectors. Saddam has failed to seize the chance.
And so we had to act, and act now.
Let me explain why.
First, without a strong inspection system, Iraq would be free to retain and begin to rebuild its chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs in months, not years.
Second, if Saddam can cripple the weapons inspection system and get away with it, he would conclude that the international community -- led by the United States -- has simply lost its will. He will surmise that he has free rein to rebuild his arsenal of destruction, and someday -- make no mistake -- he will use it again as he has in the past.
Third, in halting our air strikes in November, I gave Saddam a chance, not a license. If we turn our backs on his defiance, the credibility of U.S. power as a check against Saddam will be destroyed. We will not only have allowed Saddam to shatter the inspection system that controls his weapons of mass destruction program; we also will have fatally undercut the fear of force that stops Saddam from acting to gain domination in the region.
That is why, on the unanimous recommendation of my national security team -- including the vice president, the secretary of defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the secretary of state and the national security adviser -- I have ordered a strong, sustained series of air strikes against Iraq.
They are designed to degrade Saddam's capacity to develop and deliver weapons of mass destruction, and to degrade his ability to threaten his neighbors.
At the same time, we are delivering a powerful message to Saddam: If you act recklessly, you will pay a heavy price. We acted today because, in the judgment of my military advisers, a swift response would provide the most surprise and the least opportunity for Saddam to prepare.
If we had delayed for even a matter of days from Chairman Butler's report, we would have given Saddam more time to disperse his forces and protect his weapons.
Also, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan begins this weekend. For us to initiate military action during Ramadan would be profoundly offensive to the Muslim world and, therefore, would damage our relations with Arab countries and the progress we have made in the Middle East.
That is something we wanted very much to avoid without giving Iraq a month's head start to prepare for potential action against it.
Finally, our allies, including Prime Minister Tony Blair of Great Britain, concurred that now is the time to strike. I hope Saddam will come into cooperation with the inspection system now and comply with the relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. But we have to be prepared that he will not, and we must deal with the very real danger he poses.
So we will pursue a long-term strategy to contain Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction and work toward the day when Iraq has a government worthy of its people.
First, we must be prepared to use force again if Saddam takes threatening actions, such as trying to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction or their delivery systems, threatening his neighbors, challenging allied aircraft over Iraq or moving against his own Kurdish citizens.
The credible threat to use force, and when necessary, the actual use of force, is the surest way to contain Saddam's weapons of mass destruction program, curtail his aggression and prevent another Gulf War.
Second, so long as Iraq remains out of compliance, we will work with the international community to maintain and enforce economic sanctions. Sanctions have cost Saddam more than $120 billion -- resources that would have been used to rebuild his military. The sanctions system allows Iraq to sell oil for food, for medicine, for other humanitarian supplies for the Iraqi people.
We have no quarrel with them. But without the sanctions, we would see the oil-for-food program become oil-for-tanks, resulting in a greater threat to Iraq's neighbors and less food for its people.
The hard fact is that so long as Saddam remains in power, he threatens the well-being of his people, the peace of his region, the security of the world.
The best way to end that threat once and for all is with a new Iraqi government -- a government ready to live in peace with its neighbors, a government that respects the rights of its people. Bringing change in Baghdad will take time and effort. We will strengthen our engagement with the full range of Iraqi opposition forces and work with them effectively and prudently.
The decision to use force is never cost-free. Whenever American forces are placed in harm's way, we risk the loss of life. And while our strikes are focused on Iraq's military capabilities, there will be unintended Iraqi casualties.
Indeed, in the past, Saddam has intentionally placed Iraqi civilians in harm's way in a cynical bid to sway international opinion.
We must be prepared for these realities. At the same time, Saddam should have absolutely no doubt, if he lashes out at his neighbors, we will respond forcefully.
Heavy as they are, the costs of action must be weighed against the price of inaction. If Saddam defies the world and we fail to respond, we will face a far greater threat in the future. Saddam will strike again at his neighbors. He will make war on his own people.
And mark my words, he will develop weapons of mass destruction. He will deploy them, and he will use them.
Because we're acting today, it is less likely that we will face these dangers in the future.
Let me close by addressing one other issue. Saddam Hussein and the other enemies of peace may have thought that the serious debate currently before the House of Representatives would distract Americans or weaken our resolve to face him down.
But once more, the United States has proven that although we are never eager to use force, when we must act in America's vital interests, we will do so.
In the century we're leaving, America has often made the difference between chaos and community, fear and hope. Now, in the new century, we'll have a remarkable opportunity to shape a future more peaceful than the past, but only if we stand strong against the enemies of peace.
One of the most common errors made by the public in supporting Bush's case for war is that 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend.' (Or vice-versa.) Patriot, do not make that same mistake when you presume that my utter rage with Bush over this invasion immediately leads me to have a love-affair with Clinton. In truth, I consider American politics to be among the most elitist and corrupt abuses of power in the world. Your government is supported by corporations more than it is supported by people -- a very sad state, indeed. Human rights seems almost to be an afterthought.
However, Bush might just be the worst thing going on this planet right now, and I can't think of anyone (American, that is) who could do a worse job than he has. Would I take Clinton over Bush? Yes. Would I take Clinton over the most right-wing current Canadian politician? Not on your life.
However, Bush might just be the worst thing going on this planet right now, and I can't think of anyone (American, that is) who could do a worse job than he has. Would I take Clinton over Bush? Yes. Would I take Clinton over the most right-wing current Canadian politician? Not on your life.
JP: you, officially, are an idiot.
The last time Canada's 'freedoms' were threatened was by your republic. We defended ourselves quite well, thank you, and kicked your asses. Since that time, our freedoms have not been threatened (oh, here comes a 'but the Germans!' statement, I'm sure) unless, of course, you think that your fear-making machinists south of the border have actually penetrated the Canadian psyche and led us to beleive that Vietnam, Cambodia, Korea, Panama, Iraq, etc. will one day come and get our helpless asses because of our close geographic proximity to their principle enemy.
You represent what is truly wrong with your country today -- a desperate need to pull your head out of your ass and get over yourself.
The last time Canada's 'freedoms' were threatened was by your republic. We defended ourselves quite well, thank you, and kicked your asses. Since that time, our freedoms have not been threatened (oh, here comes a 'but the Germans!' statement, I'm sure) unless, of course, you think that your fear-making machinists south of the border have actually penetrated the Canadian psyche and led us to beleive that Vietnam, Cambodia, Korea, Panama, Iraq, etc. will one day come and get our helpless asses because of our close geographic proximity to their principle enemy.
You represent what is truly wrong with your country today -- a desperate need to pull your head out of your ass and get over yourself.
Landie,
I did disclose my sources:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>-Matthew A. Levitt of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy
-Media Reality Check
-Accuracy in Media <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>You obviously just like to argue even when you're on the losing side.
Let me ask you how you propose to prevent another 9/11 incident? How would you root out terrorists and prevent them from following through with their plans? Where would you propose to attack them before they attack us? Do you have a strategy which would make us more secure or are you just showing disrespect for the President because he represents a more conservative view than yours?
I did disclose my sources:
<BLOCKQUOTE class="ip-ubbcode-quote"><font size="-1">quote:</font><HR>-Matthew A. Levitt of the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy
-Media Reality Check
-Accuracy in Media <HR></BLOCKQUOTE>You obviously just like to argue even when you're on the losing side.
Let me ask you how you propose to prevent another 9/11 incident? How would you root out terrorists and prevent them from following through with their plans? Where would you propose to attack them before they attack us? Do you have a strategy which would make us more secure or are you just showing disrespect for the President because he represents a more conservative view than yours?
Landie,
Just to keep you up to date on Al Qaeda Senior Commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's latest activities, this is from the New York Times today.
February 9, 2004
U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict
By DEXTER FILKINS
AGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 8 — American officials here have obtained a detailed proposal that they conclude was written by an operative in Iraq to senior leaders of Al Qaeda, asking for help to wage a "sectarian war" in Iraq in the next months.
The Americans say they believe that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who has long been under scrutiny by the United States for suspected ties to Al Qaeda, wrote the undated 17-page document. Mr. Zarqawi is believed to be operating here in Iraq.
The document was made available to The New York Times on Sunday, with an accompanying translation made by the military. A reporter was allowed to see the Arabic and English versions and to write down large parts of the translation.
The memo says extremists are failing to enlist support inside the country, and have been unable to scare the Americans into leaving. It even laments Iraq's lack of mountains in which to take refuge.
Yet mounting an attack on Iraq's Shiite majority could rescue the movement, according to the document. The aim, the document contends, is to prompt a counterattack against the Arab Sunni minority.
Such a "sectarian war" will rally the Sunni Arabs to the religious extremists, the document argues. It says a war against the Shiites must start soon — at "zero hour" — before the Americans hand over sovereignty to the Iraqis. That is scheduled for the end of June.
The American officials in Baghdad said they were confident the account was credible and said they had independently corroborated Mr. Zarqawi's authorship. If it is authentic, it offers an inside account of the insurgency and its frustrations, and bears out a number of American assumptions about the strength and nature of religious extremists — but it also charts out a battle to come.
The document would also constitute the strongest evidence to date of contacts between extremists in Iraq and Al Qaeda. But it does not speak to the debate about whether there was a Qaeda presence in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era, nor is there any mention of a collaboration with Hussein loyalists.
Yet other interpretations may be possible, including that it was written by some other insurgent, but one who exaggerated his involvement.
Still, a senior United States intelligence official in Washington said, "I know of no reason to believe the letter is bogus in any way." He said the letter was seized in a raid on a known Qaeda safe house in Baghdad, and did not pass through Iraqi groups that American intelligence officials have said in the past may have provided unreliable information.
Without providing further specifics, the senior intelligence officer said there was additional information pointing to the idea that Al Qaeda was considering mounting or had already mounted attacks on Shiite targets in Iraq.
"This is not the only indication of that," the official said. The intercepted letter also appears to be the strongest indication since the American invasion last March that Mr. Zarqawi remains active in plotting attacks, the official said.
According to the American officials here, the Arabic-language document was discovered in mid-January when a Qaeda suspect was arrested in Iraq. Under interrogation, the Americans said, the suspect identified Mr. Zarqawi as the author of the document. The man arrested was carrying it on a CD to Afghanistan, the Americans said, and intended to deliver it to people they described as the "inner circle" of Al Qaeda's leadership. That presumably refers to Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The Americans declined to identify the suspect. But the discovery of the disc coincides with the arrest of Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani described by American officials at the time as a courier for the Qaeda network. Mr. Ghul is believed to be the first significant member of that network to have been captured inside Iraq.
The document is written with a rhetorical flourish. It calls the Americans "the biggest cowards that God has created," but at the same time sees little chance that they will be forced from Iraq.
"So the solution, and only God knows, is that we need to bring the Shia into the battle," the writer of the document said. "It is the only way to prolong the duration of the fight between the infidels and us. If we succeed in dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death at the hands" of Shiites.
The author offers his services and those of his followers to the recipients of the letter, who American officials contend are Al Qaeda's leaders.
"You noble brothers, leaders of the jihad, we do not consider ourselves people who compete against you, nor would we ever aim to achieve glory for ourselves like you did," the writer says. "So if you agree with it, and are convinced of the idea of killing the perverse sects, we stand ready as an army for you to work under your guidance and yield to your command."
In the period before the war, Bush administration officials argued that Mr. Zarqawi constituted the main link between Al Qaeda and Mr. Hussein's government. Last February at the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network, headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants."
Around that time, the Americans believed that Mr. Zarqawi was holed up in the mountains at the Iranian border with Ansar al Islam, a group linked to Al Qaeda that is suspected of mounting attacks against American forces in Iraq.
In the document, the writer indicated that he had directed about 25 suicide bombings inside Iraq. That conforms with an American view that suicide bombings were more likely to be carried out by Iraqi religious extremists and foreigners than by Hussein allies.
"We were involved in all the martyrdom operations — in terms of overseeing, preparing and planning — that took place in this country," the writer of the document says. "Praise be to Allah, I have completed 25 of these operations, some of them against the Shia and their leaders, the Americans and their military, and the police, the military and the coalition forces."
But the writer details the difficulties that he and his comrades have been experiencing, both in combating American forces and in enlisting supporters. The Americans are an easy target, according to the author, who nonetheless claims to be impressed by the Americans' resolve. After significant losses, he writes, "America, however, has no intention of leaving, no matter how many wounded nor how bloody it becomes."
The Iraqis themselves, the writer says, have not been receptive to taking holy warriors into their homes.
"Many Iraqis would honor you as a guest and give you refuge, for you are a Muslim brother," according to the document. "However, they will not allow you to make their home a base for operations or a safe house."
The writer contends that the American efforts to set up Iraqi security services have succeeded in depriving the insurgents of allies, particularly in a country where kinship networks are extensive.
"The problem is you end up having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and appearance," the document says. "When the Americans withdraw, and they have already started doing that, they get replaced by these agents who are intimately linked to the people of this region."
With some exasperation, the author writes: "We can pack up and leave and look for another land, just like what has happened in so many lands of jihad. Our enemy is growing stronger day after day, and its intelligence information increases.
"By God, this is suffocation!" the writer says.
But there is still time to mount a war against the Shiites, thereby to set off a wider war, he writes, if attacks are well under way before the turnover of sovereignty in June. After that, the writer suggests, any attacks on Shiites will be viewed as Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence that will find little support among the people.
"We have to get to the zero hour in order to openly begin controlling the land by night, and after that by day, God willing," the writer says. "The zero hour needs to be at least four months before the new government gets in place."
That is the timetable, the author concludes, because, after that, "How can we kill their cousins and sons?"
"The Americans will continue to control from their bases, but the sons of this land will be the authority," the letter states. "This is the democracy. We will have no pretexts."
Douglas Jehl contributed reporting from Washington for this article.
Remember, Landie, ignorance is no excuse for you to take assinine positions despite mounting evidence to the contrary!
[This message was edited by kwalder on February 09, 2004 at 02:40 PM.]
Just to keep you up to date on Al Qaeda Senior Commander Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's latest activities, this is from the New York Times today.
February 9, 2004
U.S. Says Files Seek Qaeda Aid in Iraq Conflict
By DEXTER FILKINS
AGHDAD, Iraq, Feb. 8 — American officials here have obtained a detailed proposal that they conclude was written by an operative in Iraq to senior leaders of Al Qaeda, asking for help to wage a "sectarian war" in Iraq in the next months.
The Americans say they believe that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian who has long been under scrutiny by the United States for suspected ties to Al Qaeda, wrote the undated 17-page document. Mr. Zarqawi is believed to be operating here in Iraq.
The document was made available to The New York Times on Sunday, with an accompanying translation made by the military. A reporter was allowed to see the Arabic and English versions and to write down large parts of the translation.
The memo says extremists are failing to enlist support inside the country, and have been unable to scare the Americans into leaving. It even laments Iraq's lack of mountains in which to take refuge.
Yet mounting an attack on Iraq's Shiite majority could rescue the movement, according to the document. The aim, the document contends, is to prompt a counterattack against the Arab Sunni minority.
Such a "sectarian war" will rally the Sunni Arabs to the religious extremists, the document argues. It says a war against the Shiites must start soon — at "zero hour" — before the Americans hand over sovereignty to the Iraqis. That is scheduled for the end of June.
The American officials in Baghdad said they were confident the account was credible and said they had independently corroborated Mr. Zarqawi's authorship. If it is authentic, it offers an inside account of the insurgency and its frustrations, and bears out a number of American assumptions about the strength and nature of religious extremists — but it also charts out a battle to come.
The document would also constitute the strongest evidence to date of contacts between extremists in Iraq and Al Qaeda. But it does not speak to the debate about whether there was a Qaeda presence in Iraq during the Saddam Hussein era, nor is there any mention of a collaboration with Hussein loyalists.
Yet other interpretations may be possible, including that it was written by some other insurgent, but one who exaggerated his involvement.
Still, a senior United States intelligence official in Washington said, "I know of no reason to believe the letter is bogus in any way." He said the letter was seized in a raid on a known Qaeda safe house in Baghdad, and did not pass through Iraqi groups that American intelligence officials have said in the past may have provided unreliable information.
Without providing further specifics, the senior intelligence officer said there was additional information pointing to the idea that Al Qaeda was considering mounting or had already mounted attacks on Shiite targets in Iraq.
"This is not the only indication of that," the official said. The intercepted letter also appears to be the strongest indication since the American invasion last March that Mr. Zarqawi remains active in plotting attacks, the official said.
According to the American officials here, the Arabic-language document was discovered in mid-January when a Qaeda suspect was arrested in Iraq. Under interrogation, the Americans said, the suspect identified Mr. Zarqawi as the author of the document. The man arrested was carrying it on a CD to Afghanistan, the Americans said, and intended to deliver it to people they described as the "inner circle" of Al Qaeda's leadership. That presumably refers to Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The Americans declined to identify the suspect. But the discovery of the disc coincides with the arrest of Hassan Ghul, a Pakistani described by American officials at the time as a courier for the Qaeda network. Mr. Ghul is believed to be the first significant member of that network to have been captured inside Iraq.
The document is written with a rhetorical flourish. It calls the Americans "the biggest cowards that God has created," but at the same time sees little chance that they will be forced from Iraq.
"So the solution, and only God knows, is that we need to bring the Shia into the battle," the writer of the document said. "It is the only way to prolong the duration of the fight between the infidels and us. If we succeed in dragging them into a sectarian war, this will awaken the sleepy Sunnis who are fearful of destruction and death at the hands" of Shiites.
The author offers his services and those of his followers to the recipients of the letter, who American officials contend are Al Qaeda's leaders.
"You noble brothers, leaders of the jihad, we do not consider ourselves people who compete against you, nor would we ever aim to achieve glory for ourselves like you did," the writer says. "So if you agree with it, and are convinced of the idea of killing the perverse sects, we stand ready as an army for you to work under your guidance and yield to your command."
In the period before the war, Bush administration officials argued that Mr. Zarqawi constituted the main link between Al Qaeda and Mr. Hussein's government. Last February at the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell said, "Iraq today harbors a deadly terrorist network, headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda lieutenants."
Around that time, the Americans believed that Mr. Zarqawi was holed up in the mountains at the Iranian border with Ansar al Islam, a group linked to Al Qaeda that is suspected of mounting attacks against American forces in Iraq.
In the document, the writer indicated that he had directed about 25 suicide bombings inside Iraq. That conforms with an American view that suicide bombings were more likely to be carried out by Iraqi religious extremists and foreigners than by Hussein allies.
"We were involved in all the martyrdom operations — in terms of overseeing, preparing and planning — that took place in this country," the writer of the document says. "Praise be to Allah, I have completed 25 of these operations, some of them against the Shia and their leaders, the Americans and their military, and the police, the military and the coalition forces."
But the writer details the difficulties that he and his comrades have been experiencing, both in combating American forces and in enlisting supporters. The Americans are an easy target, according to the author, who nonetheless claims to be impressed by the Americans' resolve. After significant losses, he writes, "America, however, has no intention of leaving, no matter how many wounded nor how bloody it becomes."
The Iraqis themselves, the writer says, have not been receptive to taking holy warriors into their homes.
"Many Iraqis would honor you as a guest and give you refuge, for you are a Muslim brother," according to the document. "However, they will not allow you to make their home a base for operations or a safe house."
The writer contends that the American efforts to set up Iraqi security services have succeeded in depriving the insurgents of allies, particularly in a country where kinship networks are extensive.
"The problem is you end up having an army and police connected by lineage, blood and appearance," the document says. "When the Americans withdraw, and they have already started doing that, they get replaced by these agents who are intimately linked to the people of this region."
With some exasperation, the author writes: "We can pack up and leave and look for another land, just like what has happened in so many lands of jihad. Our enemy is growing stronger day after day, and its intelligence information increases.
"By God, this is suffocation!" the writer says.
But there is still time to mount a war against the Shiites, thereby to set off a wider war, he writes, if attacks are well under way before the turnover of sovereignty in June. After that, the writer suggests, any attacks on Shiites will be viewed as Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence that will find little support among the people.
"We have to get to the zero hour in order to openly begin controlling the land by night, and after that by day, God willing," the writer says. "The zero hour needs to be at least four months before the new government gets in place."
That is the timetable, the author concludes, because, after that, "How can we kill their cousins and sons?"
"The Americans will continue to control from their bases, but the sons of this land will be the authority," the letter states. "This is the democracy. We will have no pretexts."
Douglas Jehl contributed reporting from Washington for this article.
Remember, Landie, ignorance is no excuse for you to take assinine positions despite mounting evidence to the contrary!
[This message was edited by kwalder on February 09, 2004 at 02:40 PM.]
