Somewhat appropriate music for the moment
Also eek.. European issues have little to with EU and structure of things...
pretty similiar issues there.. As we got over here..
Lots of entitlements and the baby boomers have plowed all the countries under protecting the status quo for decades upon decades... live for today who cares about tomorrow type lifestyle.. Lots of vacation days and benefits... "Free" education etc.. The western lifestyle overall just one huge unsustainable bubble that slowly popping.. All allowed to further bubble the last few decades by central bankers..
2000 shoulda been end of a good run with lotsa creative destruction as we plow on through tough times and get the econoies and finances back on solid footing be ... Instead the money masters have decided to dig a deeper hole and create even more long term problems...
pretty similiar issues there.. As we got over here..
Lots of entitlements and the baby boomers have plowed all the countries under protecting the status quo for decades upon decades... live for today who cares about tomorrow type lifestyle.. Lots of vacation days and benefits... "Free" education etc.. The western lifestyle overall just one huge unsustainable bubble that slowly popping.. All allowed to further bubble the last few decades by central bankers..
2000 shoulda been end of a good run with lotsa creative destruction as we plow on through tough times and get the econoies and finances back on solid footing be ... Instead the money masters have decided to dig a deeper hole and create even more long term problems...
How long till us rolls out NIRP?
money masters have no clue what else to do but follow the Japan route..
when what they should do is normalize rates and let creative destruction take place so we can finally get through this shit and begin to get the global economy back on solid footing.. They won't though too risky and too much at stake for the elite .. Plus now that they started down this path and took us on this ride for 15+ years now things are much more dicey then they would have been if they just stood back and let it all blow up post 2000
money masters have no clue what else to do but follow the Japan route..
when what they should do is normalize rates and let creative destruction take place so we can finally get through this shit and begin to get the global economy back on solid footing.. They won't though too risky and too much at stake for the elite .. Plus now that they started down this path and took us on this ride for 15+ years now things are much more dicey then they would have been if they just stood back and let it all blow up post 2000
[h=1]Greenspan: "This Is The Worst Period I Recall; There's Nothing Like It"[/h]During a CNBC inteview today, when discussing the historic Brexit vote outcome, Alan Greenspan unleashed a fiery sermon that could have been prepared just by reading a random selection of posts from this website, the former Fed chairman told his shocked hosts that the current period, far from the raging "Obama recovery" spun every day by adaministration propaganda appratchicks and one that prompted the Fed to unleash a ridiculous rate hike cycle in December just as the US is sliding into a recession, and is instead the "worst period" he has seen, surpassing even the infamous Black Monday in severity.
"This is the worst period, I recall since I've been in public service. There's nothing like it, including the crisis — remember October 19th, 1987, when the Dow went down by a record amount 23 percent? That I thought was the bottom of all potential problems. This has a corrosive effect that will not go away. I'd love to find something positive to say."
Of course, what he is referring to was a market shock which was the result of a massive capital account imbalance resulting from the aftermath of the Louvre Accord coupled with the then trendy Portfolio Insurance (in which everyone was on the same side of the boat, much like now) and not so much an all out economic malaise. Which, however, does beg the question when a Black Monday-like market crash is coming?
Rhetorical questions aside, Greenspan was referring to the unprecedented combination of economic stagnation, deteriorating demographics, insolvent entitlement programs, social inequity and wealth division, and of course, a historic debt overhang which could and should have been cleared out in the crash of 2008 but instead was preserved to avoid wiping out the same "equityholders" who also happen to be the Fed's direct and indirect stakeowners.
To be fair, Greenspan, who in recent years has become one of the loudest advocate of gold alongside billionaires such as Druckenmiller and Soros, did not say anything our readers did not know. The former Fed chairman said that the root of the "British problem is far more widespread." He said the result of the referendum will "almost surely" lead to the Scottish National Party trying to "resurrect Scottish Independence."
Greenspan said the "euro currency is the immediate problem." While the euro and the euro zone were major steps in a movement toward European political integration, "it's failing," he said. "Brexit is not the end of the set of problems, which I always thought were going to start with the euro because the euro is a very serious problem in that the southern part of the euro zone is being funded by the northern part and the European Central Bank," Greenspan said.
He then repeated a point that has been widely accepted in recent months, namely that monetary policy - while still the only game in town - is now impotent. Greenspan said the ECB is limited in what it can do because these fundamental problems like the stagnation of real incomes don't have easy solutions. "There's a certain amount that monetary policy can do, but our problem is fundamentally fiscal," he said, adding that this is true in the United States as well as "every major country in Europe." Part of the problem is that the "developed countries are all aging very rapidly," which is leading to a higher ratio of government spending in the form of entitlements, Greenspan said.
A far bigger part of the problem is the toxic loop of monetary and fiscal policy which we have pounded the table on for years, and which S&P laid out for all to see when it said that the more monetary easing takes place, the less incentive there is for reform and actual fiscal policy.
Since we have covered everything Greenspan said extensively in the past seven years, we won't spend time repeating ourselves. Readers can watch the 90-year-old former Fed chairman admit everything we have said in the following two clips.
"This is the worst period, I recall since I've been in public service. There's nothing like it, including the crisis — remember October 19th, 1987, when the Dow went down by a record amount 23 percent? That I thought was the bottom of all potential problems. This has a corrosive effect that will not go away. I'd love to find something positive to say."
Of course, what he is referring to was a market shock which was the result of a massive capital account imbalance resulting from the aftermath of the Louvre Accord coupled with the then trendy Portfolio Insurance (in which everyone was on the same side of the boat, much like now) and not so much an all out economic malaise. Which, however, does beg the question when a Black Monday-like market crash is coming?
Rhetorical questions aside, Greenspan was referring to the unprecedented combination of economic stagnation, deteriorating demographics, insolvent entitlement programs, social inequity and wealth division, and of course, a historic debt overhang which could and should have been cleared out in the crash of 2008 but instead was preserved to avoid wiping out the same "equityholders" who also happen to be the Fed's direct and indirect stakeowners.
To be fair, Greenspan, who in recent years has become one of the loudest advocate of gold alongside billionaires such as Druckenmiller and Soros, did not say anything our readers did not know. The former Fed chairman said that the root of the "British problem is far more widespread." He said the result of the referendum will "almost surely" lead to the Scottish National Party trying to "resurrect Scottish Independence."
Greenspan said the "euro currency is the immediate problem." While the euro and the euro zone were major steps in a movement toward European political integration, "it's failing," he said. "Brexit is not the end of the set of problems, which I always thought were going to start with the euro because the euro is a very serious problem in that the southern part of the euro zone is being funded by the northern part and the European Central Bank," Greenspan said.
He then repeated a point that has been widely accepted in recent months, namely that monetary policy - while still the only game in town - is now impotent. Greenspan said the ECB is limited in what it can do because these fundamental problems like the stagnation of real incomes don't have easy solutions. "There's a certain amount that monetary policy can do, but our problem is fundamentally fiscal," he said, adding that this is true in the United States as well as "every major country in Europe." Part of the problem is that the "developed countries are all aging very rapidly," which is leading to a higher ratio of government spending in the form of entitlements, Greenspan said.
A far bigger part of the problem is the toxic loop of monetary and fiscal policy which we have pounded the table on for years, and which S&P laid out for all to see when it said that the more monetary easing takes place, the less incentive there is for reform and actual fiscal policy.
Since we have covered everything Greenspan said extensively in the past seven years, we won't spend time repeating ourselves. Readers can watch the 90-year-old former Fed chairman admit everything we have said in the following two clips.
Greenspan explained everything back in 1966 while we still were on gold standard..
-----------
In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is necessary first to understand the specific role of gold in a free society.
Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It is that commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is universally acceptable to all participants in an exchange economy as payment for their goods or services, and can, therefore, be used as a standard of market value and as a store of value, i.e., as a means of saving.
The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division of labor economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective value which was generally acceptable as money, they would have to resort to primitive barter or be forced to live on self-sufficient farms and forgo the inestimable advantages of specialization. If men had no means to store value, i.e., to save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be possible.
What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in an economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of exchange should be durable. In a primitive society of meager wealth, wheat might be sufficiently durable to serve as a medium, since all exchanges would occur only during and immediately after the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to store. But where store-of-value considerations are important, as they are in richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be a durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen because it is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same as every other and it can be blended or formed in any quantity. Precious jewels, for example, are neither homogeneous nor divisible. More important, the commodity chosen as a medium must be a luxury. Human desires for luxuries are unlimited and, therefore, luxury goods are always in demand and will always be acceptable. Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not in a prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as money, but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were considered a luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and high unit value. Having a high unit value, such a good is easily portable; for instance, an ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of pig iron.
In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media of exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities would fulfill the foregoing conditions. However, one of the commodities will gradually displace all others, by being more widely acceptable. Preferences on what to hold as a store of value will shift to the most widely acceptable commodity, which, in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift is progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of exchange. The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for the same reasons that a money economy is superior to a barter economy: it makes exchanges possible on an incalculably wider scale.
Whether the single medium is gold, silver, seashells, cattle, or tobacco is optional, depending on the context and development of a given economy. In fact, all have been employed, at various times, as media of exchange. Even in the present century, two major commodities, gold and silver, have been used as international media of exchange, with gold becoming the predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses and being relatively scarce, has significant advantages over all other media of exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been virtually the sole international standard of exchange. If all goods and services were to be paid for in gold, large payments would be difficult to execute and this would tend to limit the extent of a society's divisions of labor and specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a medium of exchange is the development of a banking system and credit instruments (bank notes and deposits) which act as a substitute for, but are convertible into, gold.
A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and thus to create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to the production requirements of the economy. Individual owners of gold are induced, by payments of interest, to deposit their gold in a bank (against which they can draw checks). But since it is rarely the case that all depositors want to withdraw all their gold at the same time, the banker need keep only a fraction of his total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the banker to loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security of his deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is not arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and to the status of his investments.
When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally available. But when the business ventures financed by bank credit are less profitable and slow to pay off, bankers soon find that their loans outstanding are excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin to curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates. This tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires the existing borrowers to improve their profitability before they can obtain credit for further expansion. Thus, under the gold standard, a free banking system stands as the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth. When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all nations, an unhampered free international gold standard serves to foster a world-wide division of labor and the broadest international trade. Even though the units of exchange (the dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from country to country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of the different countries act as one — so long as there are no restraints on trade or on the movement of capital. Credit, interest rates, and prices tend to follow similar patterns in all countries. For example, if banks in one country extend credit too liberally, interest rates in that country will tend to fall, inducing depositors to shift their gold to higher-interest paying banks in other countries. This will immediately cause a shortage of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing tighter credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest rates again.
A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard have not as yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the banking system in the United States (and in most of the world) was based on gold and even though governments intervened occasionally, banking was more free than controlled. Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion, banks became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest rates rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went into a sharp, but short-lived recession. (Compared with the depressions of 1920 and 1932, the pre-World War I business declines were mild indeed.) It was limited gold reserves that stopped the unbalanced expansions of business activity, before they could develop into the post-World War I type of disaster. The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.
But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if shortage of bank reserves was causing a business decline — argued economic interventionists — why not find a way of supplying increased reserves to the banks so they never need be short! If banks can continue to loan money indefinitely — it was claimed — there need never be any slumps in business. And so the Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private bankers, but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and supported. Credit extended by these banks is in practice (though not legally) backed by the taxing power of the federal government. Technically, we remained on the gold standard; individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued to be used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit extended by the Federal Reserve banks ("paper reserves") could serve as legal tender to pay depositors.
When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous, however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain who had been losing gold to us because the Bank of England refused to allow interest rates to rise when market forces dictated (it was politically unpalatable). The reasoning of the authorities involved was as follows: if the Federal Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks, interest rates in the United States would fall to a level comparable with those in Great Britain; this would act to stop Britain's gold loss and avoid the political embarrassment of having to raise interest rates. The "Fed" succeeded; it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world, in the process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock market, triggering a fantastic speculative boom. Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted to sop up the excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom. But it was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching and a consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a result, the American economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than absorb the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in 1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.
With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued, Britain's abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the gold standard in any form — from a growing number of welfare-state advocates — was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare expenditures on a large scale.
Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can support is determined by the economy's tangible assets, since every credit instrument is ultimately a claim on some tangible asset. But government bonds are not backed by tangible wealth, only by the government's promise to pay out of future tax revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial markets. A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government deficit spending under a gold standard is severely limited. The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. They have created paper reserves in the form of government bonds which — through a complex series of steps — the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what was formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond or of a bank deposit created by paper reserves believes that he has a valid claim on a real asset. But the fact is that there are now more claims outstanding than real assets. The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods. When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for welfare or other purposes with the money proceeds of the government bonds financed by bank credit expansion.
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.
-----------
Gold and Economic Freedom
by Alan Greenspan
An almost hysterical antagonism toward the gold standard is one issue which unites statists of all persuasions. They seem to sense — perhaps more clearly and subtly than many consistent defenders of laissez-faire — that gold and economic freedom are inseparable, that the gold standard is an instrument of laissez-faire and that each implies and requires the other.In order to understand the source of their antagonism, it is necessary first to understand the specific role of gold in a free society.
Money is the common denominator of all economic transactions. It is that commodity which serves as a medium of exchange, is universally acceptable to all participants in an exchange economy as payment for their goods or services, and can, therefore, be used as a standard of market value and as a store of value, i.e., as a means of saving.
The existence of such a commodity is a precondition of a division of labor economy. If men did not have some commodity of objective value which was generally acceptable as money, they would have to resort to primitive barter or be forced to live on self-sufficient farms and forgo the inestimable advantages of specialization. If men had no means to store value, i.e., to save, neither long-range planning nor exchange would be possible.
What medium of exchange will be acceptable to all participants in an economy is not determined arbitrarily. First, the medium of exchange should be durable. In a primitive society of meager wealth, wheat might be sufficiently durable to serve as a medium, since all exchanges would occur only during and immediately after the harvest, leaving no value-surplus to store. But where store-of-value considerations are important, as they are in richer, more civilized societies, the medium of exchange must be a durable commodity, usually a metal. A metal is generally chosen because it is homogeneous and divisible: every unit is the same as every other and it can be blended or formed in any quantity. Precious jewels, for example, are neither homogeneous nor divisible. More important, the commodity chosen as a medium must be a luxury. Human desires for luxuries are unlimited and, therefore, luxury goods are always in demand and will always be acceptable. Wheat is a luxury in underfed civilizations, but not in a prosperous society. Cigarettes ordinarily would not serve as money, but they did in post-World War II Europe where they were considered a luxury. The term "luxury good" implies scarcity and high unit value. Having a high unit value, such a good is easily portable; for instance, an ounce of gold is worth a half-ton of pig iron.
In the early stages of a developing money economy, several media of exchange might be used, since a wide variety of commodities would fulfill the foregoing conditions. However, one of the commodities will gradually displace all others, by being more widely acceptable. Preferences on what to hold as a store of value will shift to the most widely acceptable commodity, which, in turn, will make it still more acceptable. The shift is progressive until that commodity becomes the sole medium of exchange. The use of a single medium is highly advantageous for the same reasons that a money economy is superior to a barter economy: it makes exchanges possible on an incalculably wider scale.
Whether the single medium is gold, silver, seashells, cattle, or tobacco is optional, depending on the context and development of a given economy. In fact, all have been employed, at various times, as media of exchange. Even in the present century, two major commodities, gold and silver, have been used as international media of exchange, with gold becoming the predominant one. Gold, having both artistic and functional uses and being relatively scarce, has significant advantages over all other media of exchange. Since the beginning of World War I, it has been virtually the sole international standard of exchange. If all goods and services were to be paid for in gold, large payments would be difficult to execute and this would tend to limit the extent of a society's divisions of labor and specialization. Thus a logical extension of the creation of a medium of exchange is the development of a banking system and credit instruments (bank notes and deposits) which act as a substitute for, but are convertible into, gold.
A free banking system based on gold is able to extend credit and thus to create bank notes (currency) and deposits, according to the production requirements of the economy. Individual owners of gold are induced, by payments of interest, to deposit their gold in a bank (against which they can draw checks). But since it is rarely the case that all depositors want to withdraw all their gold at the same time, the banker need keep only a fraction of his total deposits in gold as reserves. This enables the banker to loan out more than the amount of his gold deposits (which means that he holds claims to gold rather than gold as security of his deposits). But the amount of loans which he can afford to make is not arbitrary: he has to gauge it in relation to his reserves and to the status of his investments.
When banks loan money to finance productive and profitable endeavors, the loans are paid off rapidly and bank credit continues to be generally available. But when the business ventures financed by bank credit are less profitable and slow to pay off, bankers soon find that their loans outstanding are excessive relative to their gold reserves, and they begin to curtail new lending, usually by charging higher interest rates. This tends to restrict the financing of new ventures and requires the existing borrowers to improve their profitability before they can obtain credit for further expansion. Thus, under the gold standard, a free banking system stands as the protector of an economy's stability and balanced growth. When gold is accepted as the medium of exchange by most or all nations, an unhampered free international gold standard serves to foster a world-wide division of labor and the broadest international trade. Even though the units of exchange (the dollar, the pound, the franc, etc.) differ from country to country, when all are defined in terms of gold the economies of the different countries act as one — so long as there are no restraints on trade or on the movement of capital. Credit, interest rates, and prices tend to follow similar patterns in all countries. For example, if banks in one country extend credit too liberally, interest rates in that country will tend to fall, inducing depositors to shift their gold to higher-interest paying banks in other countries. This will immediately cause a shortage of bank reserves in the "easy money" country, inducing tighter credit standards and a return to competitively higher interest rates again.
A fully free banking system and fully consistent gold standard have not as yet been achieved. But prior to World War I, the banking system in the United States (and in most of the world) was based on gold and even though governments intervened occasionally, banking was more free than controlled. Periodically, as a result of overly rapid credit expansion, banks became loaned up to the limit of their gold reserves, interest rates rose sharply, new credit was cut off, and the economy went into a sharp, but short-lived recession. (Compared with the depressions of 1920 and 1932, the pre-World War I business declines were mild indeed.) It was limited gold reserves that stopped the unbalanced expansions of business activity, before they could develop into the post-World War I type of disaster. The readjustment periods were short and the economies quickly reestablished a sound basis to resume expansion.
But the process of cure was misdiagnosed as the disease: if shortage of bank reserves was causing a business decline — argued economic interventionists — why not find a way of supplying increased reserves to the banks so they never need be short! If banks can continue to loan money indefinitely — it was claimed — there need never be any slumps in business. And so the Federal Reserve System was organized in 1913. It consisted of twelve regional Federal Reserve banks nominally owned by private bankers, but in fact government sponsored, controlled, and supported. Credit extended by these banks is in practice (though not legally) backed by the taxing power of the federal government. Technically, we remained on the gold standard; individuals were still free to own gold, and gold continued to be used as bank reserves. But now, in addition to gold, credit extended by the Federal Reserve banks ("paper reserves") could serve as legal tender to pay depositors.
When business in the United States underwent a mild contraction in 1927, the Federal Reserve created more paper reserves in the hope of forestalling any possible bank reserve shortage. More disastrous, however, was the Federal Reserve's attempt to assist Great Britain who had been losing gold to us because the Bank of England refused to allow interest rates to rise when market forces dictated (it was politically unpalatable). The reasoning of the authorities involved was as follows: if the Federal Reserve pumped excessive paper reserves into American banks, interest rates in the United States would fall to a level comparable with those in Great Britain; this would act to stop Britain's gold loss and avoid the political embarrassment of having to raise interest rates. The "Fed" succeeded; it stopped the gold loss, but it nearly destroyed the economies of the world, in the process. The excess credit which the Fed pumped into the economy spilled over into the stock market, triggering a fantastic speculative boom. Belatedly, Federal Reserve officials attempted to sop up the excess reserves and finally succeeded in braking the boom. But it was too late: by 1929 the speculative imbalances had become so overwhelming that the attempt precipitated a sharp retrenching and a consequent demoralizing of business confidence. As a result, the American economy collapsed. Great Britain fared even worse, and rather than absorb the full consequences of her previous folly, she abandoned the gold standard completely in 1931, tearing asunder what remained of the fabric of confidence and inducing a world-wide series of bank failures. The world economies plunged into the Great Depression of the 1930's.
With a logic reminiscent of a generation earlier, statists argued that the gold standard was largely to blame for the credit debacle which led to the Great Depression. If the gold standard had not existed, they argued, Britain's abandonment of gold payments in 1931 would not have caused the failure of banks all over the world. (The irony was that since 1913, we had been, not on a gold standard, but on what may be termed "a mixed gold standard"; yet it is gold that took the blame.) But the opposition to the gold standard in any form — from a growing number of welfare-state advocates — was prompted by a much subtler insight: the realization that the gold standard is incompatible with chronic deficit spending (the hallmark of the welfare state). Stripped of its academic jargon, the welfare state is nothing more than a mechanism by which governments confiscate the wealth of the productive members of a society to support a wide variety of welfare schemes. A substantial part of the confiscation is effected by taxation. But the welfare statists were quick to recognize that if they wished to retain political power, the amount of taxation had to be limited and they had to resort to programs of massive deficit spending, i.e., they had to borrow money, by issuing government bonds, to finance welfare expenditures on a large scale.
Under a gold standard, the amount of credit that an economy can support is determined by the economy's tangible assets, since every credit instrument is ultimately a claim on some tangible asset. But government bonds are not backed by tangible wealth, only by the government's promise to pay out of future tax revenues, and cannot easily be absorbed by the financial markets. A large volume of new government bonds can be sold to the public only at progressively higher interest rates. Thus, government deficit spending under a gold standard is severely limited. The abandonment of the gold standard made it possible for the welfare statists to use the banking system as a means to an unlimited expansion of credit. They have created paper reserves in the form of government bonds which — through a complex series of steps — the banks accept in place of tangible assets and treat as if they were an actual deposit, i.e., as the equivalent of what was formerly a deposit of gold. The holder of a government bond or of a bank deposit created by paper reserves believes that he has a valid claim on a real asset. But the fact is that there are now more claims outstanding than real assets. The law of supply and demand is not to be conned. As the supply of money (of claims) increases relative to the supply of tangible assets in the economy, prices must eventually rise. Thus the earnings saved by the productive members of the society lose value in terms of goods. When the economy's books are finally balanced, one finds that this loss in value represents the goods purchased by the government for welfare or other purposes with the money proceeds of the government bonds financed by bank credit expansion.
In the absence of the gold standard, there is no way to protect savings from confiscation through inflation. There is no safe store of value. If there were, the government would have to make its holding illegal, as was done in the case of gold. If everyone decided, for example, to convert all his bank deposits to silver or copper or any other good, and thereafter declined to accept checks as payment for goods, bank deposits would lose their purchasing power and government-created bank credit would be worthless as a claim on goods. The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.
This is the shabby secret of the welfare statists' tirades against gold. Deficit spending is simply a scheme for the confiscation of wealth. Gold stands in the way of this insidious process. It stands as a protector of property rights. If one grasps this, one has no difficulty in understanding the statists' antagonism toward the gold standard.
The financial policy of the welfare state requires that there be no way for the owners of wealth to protect themselves.
Or to put it another way, if you want your wealth to keep up, you must make your money go to work, just like ordinary people need to go to work.
The option to sit on your money and do fuck-all has a cost in a modern industrial society, your wealth will erode
Or to put it another way, if you want your wealth to keep up, you must make your money go to work, just like ordinary people need to go to work.
The option to sit on your money and do fuck-all has a cost in a modern industrial society, your wealth will erode
Bottom line is under current system elections and politics is all just noise in grand scheme of things.. And completely meaningless.. The global elite will continue to get richer..
unelected officials (central bankers globally) are the most powerful people in the world now pulling the strings .. And now they can creat and do whatever they want with basically unlimited resources now that it's backed by nothing.. Politicians haven't a clue what's going on for most part..
loved a us politician asking Yellen recently if propping stock market was now Feds 3rd mandate one of the few that gets it..,
unelected officials (central bankers globally) are the most powerful people in the world now pulling the strings .. And now they can creat and do whatever they want with basically unlimited resources now that it's backed by nothing.. Politicians haven't a clue what's going on for most part..
loved a us politician asking Yellen recently if propping stock market was now Feds 3rd mandate one of the few that gets it..,
An interesting historical moment yesterday
For once, the Turkeys DIDN'T vote for Christmas.
----------------------------------------------
Next round of Scotland break up from UK voting being talked about already
It really needs to happen while Britain is still within the EU too, which gives them 2 years tops.
That means Scotland can transfer directly into the EU system if it votes yes to independence.
If Scotland waits until after the UK leaves then it has to enter as an outsider trying to get into the EU which is much harder.
It's a legal bullshit thing which needs clarification, since the UK is in the EU, not Scotland
But Scotland is a full UK partner... yada yada yada
We live in interesting times.
For once, the Turkeys DIDN'T vote for Christmas.
----------------------------------------------
Next round of Scotland break up from UK voting being talked about already
It really needs to happen while Britain is still within the EU too, which gives them 2 years tops.
That means Scotland can transfer directly into the EU system if it votes yes to independence.
If Scotland waits until after the UK leaves then it has to enter as an outsider trying to get into the EU which is much harder.
It's a legal bullshit thing which needs clarification, since the UK is in the EU, not Scotland
But Scotland is a full UK partner... yada yada yada
We live in interesting times.
The REAL situation once the elite get over the shock of rejection is a back door EU membership, which a majority of MPs would be in favour of in Parliament
---------------
"There is a precedent, it is the Norwegian model of European Economic Area, that would allow Britain to keep access to the single market but by committing to implement all EU rules," he said.
"It would be a bit paradoxical to leave the EU and apply all EU rules, but that is one solution if Britain wants to keep access to the single market."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36628595
-----------------
The big sticking point of course, will be immigration, but the wheels of commerce will be pouring lubricating oil onto the political machinery on both sides of the channel to help lubricate a smooth transition.
So in reality... not a heck of a lot could change, and the status quo whores continue as usual
plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
---------------
"There is a precedent, it is the Norwegian model of European Economic Area, that would allow Britain to keep access to the single market but by committing to implement all EU rules," he said.
"It would be a bit paradoxical to leave the EU and apply all EU rules, but that is one solution if Britain wants to keep access to the single market."
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-36628595
-----------------
The big sticking point of course, will be immigration, but the wheels of commerce will be pouring lubricating oil onto the political machinery on both sides of the channel to help lubricate a smooth transition.
So in reality... not a heck of a lot could change, and the status quo whores continue as usual
plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose
If the Norwegian model is so flawed, why is it so popular in Norway?
If the Norwegian model is so flawed (Editorial, 29 October), why is it so popular in Norway? David Cameron and many others have been eager to stress the limitations of the so-called Norwegian model, where my native country maintains close ties to the EU through the European Economic Area (EEA) without being a formal member. It is correct that the Norwegian model would not address many common concerns about Britain’s EU membership. Norway is obliged through the terms of the EEA to comply with much EU legislation, pay substantial EU contributions, and must maintain an open labour market without controls on immigration from the EU. But critics of the alleged flaws of the Norwegian model rarely bother to engage with the fact it appears to be popular in Norway.
Although the EEC/EU referendums in 1972 and 1994 returned relatively small “no” majorities of 52.2% and 53.3%, current opinion surveys indicate that almost 75% are opposed to EU membership while over 60% express support for remaining in the EEA. One plausible interpretation is that many see the current model as striking an appropriate balance between benefits of ties and retaining autonomy over certain policy areas such as fisheries, regional policy, energy and foreign affairs. The Norwegian model may not be the most appropriate template for alternatives for British membership, given the vast difference between the countries, beyond just their size. But both UK and EU politicians could benefit from trying to understand how its popularity may inform reform efforts.
Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch
Department of Government, University of Essex
• The populations of both Iceland and Norway would comfortably fit into London with a couple of million to spare, so the influence of either to negotiate financial terms that suit their respective countries is strictly limited. Both need the EU more than Brussels need them. The UK can wield the type of power to broker suitable conditions from outside the union. German and French car manufacturers, for instance, would be severely affected if Brussels attempted to add tariffs on the UK. Turkeys, as they say, do not vote for Christmas.
Anthony James Sokol
Banbury, Oxfordshire
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...l-is-so-flawed-why-is-it-so-popular-in-norway
If the Norwegian model is so flawed (Editorial, 29 October), why is it so popular in Norway? David Cameron and many others have been eager to stress the limitations of the so-called Norwegian model, where my native country maintains close ties to the EU through the European Economic Area (EEA) without being a formal member. It is correct that the Norwegian model would not address many common concerns about Britain’s EU membership. Norway is obliged through the terms of the EEA to comply with much EU legislation, pay substantial EU contributions, and must maintain an open labour market without controls on immigration from the EU. But critics of the alleged flaws of the Norwegian model rarely bother to engage with the fact it appears to be popular in Norway.
Although the EEC/EU referendums in 1972 and 1994 returned relatively small “no” majorities of 52.2% and 53.3%, current opinion surveys indicate that almost 75% are opposed to EU membership while over 60% express support for remaining in the EEA. One plausible interpretation is that many see the current model as striking an appropriate balance between benefits of ties and retaining autonomy over certain policy areas such as fisheries, regional policy, energy and foreign affairs. The Norwegian model may not be the most appropriate template for alternatives for British membership, given the vast difference between the countries, beyond just their size. But both UK and EU politicians could benefit from trying to understand how its popularity may inform reform efforts.
Professor Kristian Skrede Gleditsch
Department of Government, University of Essex
• The populations of both Iceland and Norway would comfortably fit into London with a couple of million to spare, so the influence of either to negotiate financial terms that suit their respective countries is strictly limited. Both need the EU more than Brussels need them. The UK can wield the type of power to broker suitable conditions from outside the union. German and French car manufacturers, for instance, would be severely affected if Brussels attempted to add tariffs on the UK. Turkeys, as they say, do not vote for Christmas.
Anthony James Sokol
Banbury, Oxfordshire
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2...l-is-so-flawed-why-is-it-so-popular-in-norway
[h=1]Odds of a Rate Cut Now Higher Than a Rate Hike[/h]
ENLARGE
Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen adjusts her glasses as she testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, June 22, 2016, before the House Financial Services Committee hearing on U.S. monetary policy. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta) Published Credit: Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated Press Photo: Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated Press
ByJohn Carney
Jun 24, 2016 2:01 pm ET
The Fed is more likely to cut rates than raise them—at least until December.
That’s the message from the federal funds futures market, according to the CME Group’s FedWatch tool.
Futures prices moved sharply following the Brexit vote. The implied probability of a rate raise in September fells from 30.2$ to 0.0% on Friday. The probability of a higher benchmark rate in November fell from 35.7% to zero. The probability of a higher rate in December fell from 56.2% down to just 22.7%.
By contrast, the probability that the Fed will cut rates has risen from zero to 4.8% for the July, September, and November meetings. Even as far out as December and February 2017, the probability the Fed’s benchmark rate is 2.6%.
Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen adjusts her glasses as she testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, June 22, 2016, before the House Financial Services Committee hearing on U.S. monetary policy. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta) Published Credit: Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated Press Photo: Manuel Balce Ceneta/Associated Press
ByJohn Carney
Jun 24, 2016 2:01 pm ET
The Fed is more likely to cut rates than raise them—at least until December.
That’s the message from the federal funds futures market, according to the CME Group’s FedWatch tool.
Futures prices moved sharply following the Brexit vote. The implied probability of a rate raise in September fells from 30.2$ to 0.0% on Friday. The probability of a higher benchmark rate in November fell from 35.7% to zero. The probability of a higher rate in December fell from 56.2% down to just 22.7%.
By contrast, the probability that the Fed will cut rates has risen from zero to 4.8% for the July, September, and November meetings. Even as far out as December and February 2017, the probability the Fed’s benchmark rate is 2.6%.
[h=1]Is the world turning Japanese?[/h]
APAs the Group of Seven leaders meet in Japan this week to discuss stabilising global growth, one of the key concerns will be whether developed nations are facing an inevitable future of low or no growth.
It's called the "Japanese Disease". A cycle of low growth and low prices for more than two decades.
The Japanese government has tried everything to get growth rates and prices up again: negative interest rates, structural reforms and fiscal stimulus - but nothing appears to be working so far.
[h=2]Boom[/h]It wasn't so long ago that Japan was the poster-child for economic success, and the envy of its neighbours. The 1980s and 90s were characterised by innovation and overseas expansion for Japanese corporates, and a massive real estate boom at home.
So what went wrong? And is this the inevitable future for developed and mature economies?
In many ways, Japan became a victim of its own success, says Yasunori Nishiyama, head of healthcare innovation at Mitsui Chemicals. And he should know. He's in charge of marketing Japanese healthcare products to the US, and it hasn't been easy.
"Companies that have a long history in Japan don't like big changes," he says. "They worry about the size of the risk they're facing. Japan is suffering from the trap of its own success, and our past successes have made us too conservative."
[h=2]Sitting on a fortune[/h]I have heard the same sentiments from pretty much every expert and academic I met while covering the G7 meetings in Japan this week. Monetary policy - even tools as unconventional as negative interest rates - isn't going to revitalise Japan's economy on its own.
Fiscal stimulus - government spending - isn't going to do that either. Corporate Japan must do more - it is sitting on piles of cash and not making enough new investments, creating jobs or raising wages fast enough.
But here's the rub - Japan Inc IS investing - just not at home. Companies have been investing overseas, because it's cheaper, and they feel the domestic economy has peaked. Consumers aren't buying their products at home, which means prices aren't going up.
But it's a vicious cycle. Consumers don't buy because they don't feel confident about the economy, companies don't make profits, they don't invest in new jobs or raise wages, consumers don't spend money - you get the picture.
AFPJapanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe Staked his credibility on turning the economy around[h=2]Barely there[/h]So what now? Japan has been trying to get out of this vicious cycle for 20 years now and has failed. Boosting economic growth has been the promise of successive governments and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has staked his credibility on turning Japan's economy around. Growth has inched up - but barely, and is likely to grow by just 0.2% next year, according to BNP Paribas' latest forecast.
And yet, most Japanese people will tell you, despite this low growth - things aren't so bad.
Here's why:
Japan enjoys a relatively high standard of living, with an enviable quality of life, as Martin Feldstein of Project Syndicate points out in this piece: Unemployment is low, public transport is efficient and reliable.
And although working hours can be pretty dire, Prime Minister Abe is trying to address that. GDP per capita - basically how much the country produces divided by the number of people in the country - was at $36,000 in 2011-15 in comparison with the US's $54,000.
Not too shabby.
So perhaps the lesson in all of this, as world leaders gather in Kashikojima, or the aptly named Island of Wisdom as Prime Minister Abe describes it in his latest op-ed in the WSJ is that IF developed countries are facing a future of low or no growth, and shrinking populations, then perhaps governments should focus on improving living standards and not simply chase high economic growth rates.
It's called the "Japanese Disease". A cycle of low growth and low prices for more than two decades.
The Japanese government has tried everything to get growth rates and prices up again: negative interest rates, structural reforms and fiscal stimulus - but nothing appears to be working so far.
[h=2]Boom[/h]It wasn't so long ago that Japan was the poster-child for economic success, and the envy of its neighbours. The 1980s and 90s were characterised by innovation and overseas expansion for Japanese corporates, and a massive real estate boom at home.
So what went wrong? And is this the inevitable future for developed and mature economies?
In many ways, Japan became a victim of its own success, says Yasunori Nishiyama, head of healthcare innovation at Mitsui Chemicals. And he should know. He's in charge of marketing Japanese healthcare products to the US, and it hasn't been easy.
"Companies that have a long history in Japan don't like big changes," he says. "They worry about the size of the risk they're facing. Japan is suffering from the trap of its own success, and our past successes have made us too conservative."
[h=2]Sitting on a fortune[/h]I have heard the same sentiments from pretty much every expert and academic I met while covering the G7 meetings in Japan this week. Monetary policy - even tools as unconventional as negative interest rates - isn't going to revitalise Japan's economy on its own.
Fiscal stimulus - government spending - isn't going to do that either. Corporate Japan must do more - it is sitting on piles of cash and not making enough new investments, creating jobs or raising wages fast enough.
But here's the rub - Japan Inc IS investing - just not at home. Companies have been investing overseas, because it's cheaper, and they feel the domestic economy has peaked. Consumers aren't buying their products at home, which means prices aren't going up.
But it's a vicious cycle. Consumers don't buy because they don't feel confident about the economy, companies don't make profits, they don't invest in new jobs or raise wages, consumers don't spend money - you get the picture.
And yet, most Japanese people will tell you, despite this low growth - things aren't so bad.
Here's why:
Japan enjoys a relatively high standard of living, with an enviable quality of life, as Martin Feldstein of Project Syndicate points out in this piece: Unemployment is low, public transport is efficient and reliable.
And although working hours can be pretty dire, Prime Minister Abe is trying to address that. GDP per capita - basically how much the country produces divided by the number of people in the country - was at $36,000 in 2011-15 in comparison with the US's $54,000.
Not too shabby.
So perhaps the lesson in all of this, as world leaders gather in Kashikojima, or the aptly named Island of Wisdom as Prime Minister Abe describes it in his latest op-ed in the WSJ is that IF developed countries are facing a future of low or no growth, and shrinking populations, then perhaps governments should focus on improving living standards and not simply chase high economic growth rates.
The media is still avoiding that dreaded word, EEA
The European Economic Area is the compromise everyone needs and our hubris ridden over educated liberal elite are going to have to embrace that compromise the electorate have now demanded.
At the moment we have all the mincing boys and drama queens resigning in a hissy fit over this shock result, hopefully they will be replaced with intelligent pragmatic negotiators who can take advantage of this amazing moment
Angela Merkel is the only fully functioning braincell in Europe I have seen so far, but it's early days
The dreaded EEA word.... (omg EEA) has only been mentioned in a single BBC article so far, which is truly pathetic.
The European Economic Area is the compromise everyone needs and our hubris ridden over educated liberal elite are going to have to embrace that compromise the electorate have now demanded.
At the moment we have all the mincing boys and drama queens resigning in a hissy fit over this shock result, hopefully they will be replaced with intelligent pragmatic negotiators who can take advantage of this amazing moment
Angela Merkel is the only fully functioning braincell in Europe I have seen so far, but it's early days
The dreaded EEA word.... (omg EEA) has only been mentioned in a single BBC article so far, which is truly pathetic.
[h=1]Brexit: Britain’s welcome revival of nationhood[/h]The “leave” campaign won the referendum on withdrawing Britain from the European Union because the arguments on which the “remain” side relied made leave’s case. The remain campaign began with a sham, was monomaniacal with its Project Fear and ended in governmental thuggishness.
The sham was Prime Minister David Cameron’s attempt to justify remain by negotiating E.U. concessions regarding Britain’s subservience to the E.U. This dickering for scraps of lost sovereignty underscored Britain’s servitude and achieved so little that Remainers rarely mentioned it during their campaign.
Project Fear was the relentless and ultimately ludicrous parade of Cassandras, “experts” all, warning that Britain, after more than a millennium of sovereign existence, and now with the world’s fifth-largest economy, would endure myriad calamities were it to end its 23-year membership in the E.U. Remain advocates rarely even feigned enthusiasm for the ramshackle, sclerotic E.U. Instead, they implausibly promised that if Brexit were rejected, Britain — although it would then be without the leverage of the threat to leave — would nevertheless somehow negotiate substantially better membership terms than Cameron managed when Brexit was an option.
Voters were not amused by the Cameron government’s threat of what critics called a Punishment Budget to inflict pain on pensioners (e.g., no more free bus passes) and others because Brexit might cause the gross domestic product to contract 9.5 percent and home prices might plummet 18 percent. Voters did not like being told that they really had no choice. And that it was too late to escape from entanglement in the E.U.’s ever-multiplying tentacles. And that the very viscosity of the E.U.’s statism guarantees its immortality.
Voters chose the optimism of Brexit. Sixty years after Britain’s humiliation in the Suez debacle, Britain has a spring in its step, confident that it will flourish when Brussels no longer controls 60 to 70 percent of the British government’s actions. Britain was last conquered by an invading army in 1066. In 2016, it repelled an attempted conquest by the E.U.’s nomenklatura .
By breaking the leftward-clicking ratchet that moves steadily, and only, toward more “pooled” sovereignty and centralization of power, Brexit refutes the progressive narrative that history has an inexorable trajectory that “experts” discern and before which all must bow. The E.U.’s contribution to this fable is its vow to pursue “ever-closer union.” Yes, ever .
To understand why Brexit could and should be the beginning of an existential crisis for the E.U., look across the English Channel, to France. There, King Clovis recently was invoked 1505 years after his death in 511.
Before a particular battle, Clovis promised that if the God to whom his Christian wife prayed would grant him victory, he would become a Christian. He won the battle and converted. Recently, Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s once and perhaps future president, said France was “born of the baptism of Clovis,” it has a Christian tradition and remains “a country of churches, cathedrals, abbeys and shrines.”
Actually, 71 percent of the French say religion is unimportant to them and fewer than 4.5 percent attend weekly church services. But Sarkozy was aligning himself with the palpable desire in France and elsewhere in Europe to resist the cultural homogenization that is an intended consequence of the E.U.’s pressure for the “harmonization” of the laws and policies of its 28 disparate member nations.
[COLOR=rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.65098)]Opinions newsletter
Thought-provoking opinions and commentary, in your inbox daily.
[/COLOR]
In Paris these days there are marches by a group called Generation Identitaire, described as the “hipster right.” It aims to rally “young French and Europeans who are proud of their . . . heritage.” A recent statement on its website declared that “Islamist attacks” and “the migrant invasion” made 2015 “a turning point in the history of our country.” The statement continued: “The French have been silent for too long. . . . It is time to show our determination to live on our land, under our laws, our values and with respect to our identity.” Sarkozy, the son of Greek and Hungarian immigrants, sympathizes.
Euroskepticism is rising dramatically in many E.U. nations. There might be other referendums. Or the E.U. might seek to extinguish this escape mechanism. A poll in Sweden indicated that it might follow Britain out. In France, there could be a campaign for Frexit.
Such was the remain side’s intellectual sloth, it wielded the threadbare aspersion that advocating withdrawal amounted to embracing “isolationism.” Actually, Brexit was the choice for Britain’s international engagement as a nation . The revival of nationhood is a prerequisite for the reinvigoration of self-government through reclaimed national sovereignty. Hence June 23, 2016, is now among the most important dates in postwar European history.
The sham was Prime Minister David Cameron’s attempt to justify remain by negotiating E.U. concessions regarding Britain’s subservience to the E.U. This dickering for scraps of lost sovereignty underscored Britain’s servitude and achieved so little that Remainers rarely mentioned it during their campaign.
Project Fear was the relentless and ultimately ludicrous parade of Cassandras, “experts” all, warning that Britain, after more than a millennium of sovereign existence, and now with the world’s fifth-largest economy, would endure myriad calamities were it to end its 23-year membership in the E.U. Remain advocates rarely even feigned enthusiasm for the ramshackle, sclerotic E.U. Instead, they implausibly promised that if Brexit were rejected, Britain — although it would then be without the leverage of the threat to leave — would nevertheless somehow negotiate substantially better membership terms than Cameron managed when Brexit was an option.
Voters were not amused by the Cameron government’s threat of what critics called a Punishment Budget to inflict pain on pensioners (e.g., no more free bus passes) and others because Brexit might cause the gross domestic product to contract 9.5 percent and home prices might plummet 18 percent. Voters did not like being told that they really had no choice. And that it was too late to escape from entanglement in the E.U.’s ever-multiplying tentacles. And that the very viscosity of the E.U.’s statism guarantees its immortality.
Voters chose the optimism of Brexit. Sixty years after Britain’s humiliation in the Suez debacle, Britain has a spring in its step, confident that it will flourish when Brussels no longer controls 60 to 70 percent of the British government’s actions. Britain was last conquered by an invading army in 1066. In 2016, it repelled an attempted conquest by the E.U.’s nomenklatura .
By breaking the leftward-clicking ratchet that moves steadily, and only, toward more “pooled” sovereignty and centralization of power, Brexit refutes the progressive narrative that history has an inexorable trajectory that “experts” discern and before which all must bow. The E.U.’s contribution to this fable is its vow to pursue “ever-closer union.” Yes, ever .
To understand why Brexit could and should be the beginning of an existential crisis for the E.U., look across the English Channel, to France. There, King Clovis recently was invoked 1505 years after his death in 511.
Before a particular battle, Clovis promised that if the God to whom his Christian wife prayed would grant him victory, he would become a Christian. He won the battle and converted. Recently, Nicolas Sarkozy, France’s once and perhaps future president, said France was “born of the baptism of Clovis,” it has a Christian tradition and remains “a country of churches, cathedrals, abbeys and shrines.”
Actually, 71 percent of the French say religion is unimportant to them and fewer than 4.5 percent attend weekly church services. But Sarkozy was aligning himself with the palpable desire in France and elsewhere in Europe to resist the cultural homogenization that is an intended consequence of the E.U.’s pressure for the “harmonization” of the laws and policies of its 28 disparate member nations.
[COLOR=rgba(0, 0, 0, 0.65098)]Opinions newsletter
Thought-provoking opinions and commentary, in your inbox daily.
[/COLOR]
In Paris these days there are marches by a group called Generation Identitaire, described as the “hipster right.” It aims to rally “young French and Europeans who are proud of their . . . heritage.” A recent statement on its website declared that “Islamist attacks” and “the migrant invasion” made 2015 “a turning point in the history of our country.” The statement continued: “The French have been silent for too long. . . . It is time to show our determination to live on our land, under our laws, our values and with respect to our identity.” Sarkozy, the son of Greek and Hungarian immigrants, sympathizes.
Euroskepticism is rising dramatically in many E.U. nations. There might be other referendums. Or the E.U. might seek to extinguish this escape mechanism. A poll in Sweden indicated that it might follow Britain out. In France, there could be a campaign for Frexit.
Such was the remain side’s intellectual sloth, it wielded the threadbare aspersion that advocating withdrawal amounted to embracing “isolationism.” Actually, Brexit was the choice for Britain’s international engagement as a nation . The revival of nationhood is a prerequisite for the reinvigoration of self-government through reclaimed national sovereignty. Hence June 23, 2016, is now among the most important dates in postwar European history.
[h=1]That sinking feeling: Beijing dropping by up to 4 inches a year, study shows[/h]By Euan McKirdy, CNN
Updated 2:31 AM ET, Sun June 26, 2016
Study shows Beijing is sinking at an alarming rate due to demand on the city's water table.
[h=3]Story highlights[/h]
Hong Kong (CNN)Beijing residents have put up with choking smog, trash-filled rivers and toxic running tracks. Now they have another concern -- sinking.
An international study led by Beijing-based researchers has discovered that the city is dropping by as much as 11 centimeters (4 inches) in some districts per year.
Using satellite imagery and GPS data, the team analyzed topographical trends from 2003 to 2010 and found that the city, which has a population of over 20 million, was sinking at an alarming rate.
Its central districts are among the worst affected, the study says. The main subsidence bowls are distributed over the Chaoyang, Changping, Shunyi and Tongzhou districts. Chaoyang, in the eastern suburbs, is the worst affected, with subsidence of 11 cm per year.
Beijing is ranked as the fifth most water-stressed city in the world, the study notes, and as China continues to urbanize, the stress on subterranean aquifers is only set to worsen.
Living a nightmare in China's city of sinkholes
In Beijing, groundwater is the main water source -- two thirds -- for everything from industrial and agricultural use to household consumption. China media outlet Sina estimates that the capital requires 3.5 billion liters of water per year.
As the water, which has accumulated over thousands of years, is extracted in increasingly greater volumes, the now-dried up soil compacts. The rapid sinking could affect buildings and public works projects, including the city's rail network.
China has long had problems managing its voracious consumption of water. Five years ago, historic droughts in southern China caused billions of dollars in losses to agriculture and left millions of people and animals short of drinking water.
Massive infrastructure projects to divert water, particularly in the north of China, have been undertaken to relieve shortages in some of the country's most stricken regions.
The study was published this month and supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Updated 2:31 AM ET, Sun June 26, 2016
Study shows Beijing is sinking at an alarming rate due to demand on the city's water table.
[h=3]Story highlights[/h]
- The thirsty city has depleted its groundwater, leading to the sinking
- Its central districts are among the most affected
Hong Kong (CNN)Beijing residents have put up with choking smog, trash-filled rivers and toxic running tracks. Now they have another concern -- sinking.
An international study led by Beijing-based researchers has discovered that the city is dropping by as much as 11 centimeters (4 inches) in some districts per year.
Using satellite imagery and GPS data, the team analyzed topographical trends from 2003 to 2010 and found that the city, which has a population of over 20 million, was sinking at an alarming rate.
Its central districts are among the worst affected, the study says. The main subsidence bowls are distributed over the Chaoyang, Changping, Shunyi and Tongzhou districts. Chaoyang, in the eastern suburbs, is the worst affected, with subsidence of 11 cm per year.
Beijing is ranked as the fifth most water-stressed city in the world, the study notes, and as China continues to urbanize, the stress on subterranean aquifers is only set to worsen.
Living a nightmare in China's city of sinkholes
In Beijing, groundwater is the main water source -- two thirds -- for everything from industrial and agricultural use to household consumption. China media outlet Sina estimates that the capital requires 3.5 billion liters of water per year.
As the water, which has accumulated over thousands of years, is extracted in increasingly greater volumes, the now-dried up soil compacts. The rapid sinking could affect buildings and public works projects, including the city's rail network.
China has long had problems managing its voracious consumption of water. Five years ago, historic droughts in southern China caused billions of dollars in losses to agriculture and left millions of people and animals short of drinking water.
Massive infrastructure projects to divert water, particularly in the north of China, have been undertaken to relieve shortages in some of the country's most stricken regions.
The study was published this month and supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China.
Refreshing to say the least after decades of fear mongering from the big government status quo whores... A step in ten right direction.. Long way to go..
---------
Boris Johnson Emerges, Explains What "The Only Change" As A Result Of Brexit Will Be
With both David Cameron and George Osborne having vaporized and seemingly no one ready (or willing) to take charge in this transition period in which Cameron is no longer the effective PM, yet is unwilling to trigger Article 50, many have been looking to the presumptive next PM, Boris Johnson, to emerge and say a few encouraging words, which he seemingly evaded most of the weekend. However, at 10pm local time, a long overdue BoJo Op-ed graced the pages of the pro-Brexit telegraph, in which the former London mayor says that he "cannot stress too much that Britain is part of Europe – and always will be", writes that he believes "that this climate of apprehension is understandable, given what people were told during the campaign, but based on a profound misunderstanding about what has really taken place", but the key statement, and the one all of the understandably confused "Leave" voters will be looking for is Johnson's explanation of what he thinks will change. To wit:
Among the other notable Johnson claims is that Britain will continue to have access to the European Union's single market despite voting to leave the bloc, adding that Britain could now forge a relationship with the EU based on free trade and partnership rather than a federal system, and that Britain would also be able to do free trade deals with growth economies outside the EU.
"There will continue to be free trade, and access to the single market," Johnson wrote in a regular column for the Daily Telegraph newspaper, adding that there was "no great rush" for Britain to extricate itself from the EU.
He did not set out any details of how the arrangement would work, but suggested Britain would not accept free movement, saying the government would be able to implement an immigration policy which suited the needs of business and industry.
Johnson said the negative consequences of Brexit were being "wildly overdone" and that Bank of England governor Mark Carney, who came under fire from some Brexit campaigners ahead of the referendum for flagging the risks of leaving the bloc, should continue in his job.
"The economy is in good hands," he said, praising 'In' campaigners Prime Minister David Cameron and finance minister George Osborne for the work they have done to reduce public spending. "Most sensible people can see that Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has done a superb job - and now that the referendum is over, he will be able to continue his work without being in the political firing-line."
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Boris Johnson Emerges, Explains What "The Only Change" As A Result Of Brexit Will Be
With both David Cameron and George Osborne having vaporized and seemingly no one ready (or willing) to take charge in this transition period in which Cameron is no longer the effective PM, yet is unwilling to trigger Article 50, many have been looking to the presumptive next PM, Boris Johnson, to emerge and say a few encouraging words, which he seemingly evaded most of the weekend. However, at 10pm local time, a long overdue BoJo Op-ed graced the pages of the pro-Brexit telegraph, in which the former London mayor says that he "cannot stress too much that Britain is part of Europe – and always will be", writes that he believes "that this climate of apprehension is understandable, given what people were told during the campaign, but based on a profound misunderstanding about what has really taken place", but the key statement, and the one all of the understandably confused "Leave" voters will be looking for is Johnson's explanation of what he thinks will change. To wit:
The only change – and it will not come in any great rush – is that the UK will extricate itself from the EU’s extraordinary and opaque system of legislation: the vast and growing corpus of law enacted by a European Court of Justice from which there can be no appeal. This will bring not threats, but golden opportunities for this country – to pass laws and set taxes according to the needs of the UK.
It remains to be seen if he can convince the Leave - and certainly Remain - camps (the latter, we doubt), especially since nowhere in the op-ed is the all important topic of Article 50 invoked, and more importantly, who and when will trigger it, perhaps the only issue which the markets demand clarity on at this moment.
Among the other notable Johnson claims is that Britain will continue to have access to the European Union's single market despite voting to leave the bloc, adding that Britain could now forge a relationship with the EU based on free trade and partnership rather than a federal system, and that Britain would also be able to do free trade deals with growth economies outside the EU.
"There will continue to be free trade, and access to the single market," Johnson wrote in a regular column for the Daily Telegraph newspaper, adding that there was "no great rush" for Britain to extricate itself from the EU.
He did not set out any details of how the arrangement would work, but suggested Britain would not accept free movement, saying the government would be able to implement an immigration policy which suited the needs of business and industry.
Johnson said the negative consequences of Brexit were being "wildly overdone" and that Bank of England governor Mark Carney, who came under fire from some Brexit campaigners ahead of the referendum for flagging the risks of leaving the bloc, should continue in his job.
"The economy is in good hands," he said, praising 'In' campaigners Prime Minister David Cameron and finance minister George Osborne for the work they have done to reduce public spending. "Most sensible people can see that Bank of England Governor Mark Carney has done a superb job - and now that the referendum is over, he will be able to continue his work without being in the political firing-line."
