Surprises/disappointments: RPs
By Todd Zola | Mastersball.com
So how'd that Alfredo Aceves deal work out for you? Did you really think this was the season Huston Street would stay healthy? Maybe you "played it safe" and drafted Mr. Reliable, Mariano Rivera.
Ah, closers, the bane of fantasy baseball's existence. Hero one day, goat the next. Yet there might be more fantasy analysis bandwidth dedicated to saves than every other stat combined.
By now, you know this common recommendation: Wait on closers. Heck, some are even proponents of punting saves altogether. Truth be told, all advice, not just that concerning closers, is completely contextual. There is no one-size-fits-all stratagem, regardless of the topic. It all depends on your league format, number of teams and scoring system, not to mention the league dynamics and your personal strengths and weaknesses as an evaluator. It's just that saves are such a specialized position that they garner more attention.
Today, saves are going under the microscope in an effort to get a leg up on the competition for next season, laying the groundwork for you to formulate the most efficient means of attacking the category next spring. I'll start by taking a peak at saves in the League of Alternative Baseball Reality and Tout Wars, look at reliever skills and unveil some data that some owners might not even realize exists, data that could go against what is conventionally accepted in the sabermetric community. Those revelations will be applied to upper-tier closers to demonstrate how the top guys do more than just get saves. Finally, I'll dissect a few surprisingly effective closers and talk about their chances of success in 2013, along with analyzing some disappointing relievers to determine whether 2013 could be a bounce-back campaign.
<offer></offer>How do league leaders fare in saves?
As a means to demonstrate just how varied the approaches can be, here is a glance at where the competing teams are situated in saves in the industry's two showcase leagues: LABR and Tout Wars. Where the team stands in the league is in the column heading with the placement in saves listed in each column.
<table><thead><tr><th> League </th><th> 1st place </th><th> 2nd place </th><th> 3rd place </th><th> 4th place </th><th> 5th place </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> LABR: 12-team American League </td><td> 9th </td><td> 3rd </td><td> 5th </td><td> 7th </td><td> 12th </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> LABR: 13-team National League </td><td> 7th </td><td> 4th </td><td>5th (tie)</td><td>5th (tie)</td><td> 2nd </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> LABR: 15-team Mixed </td><td> 8th </td><td> 7th </td><td>5th (tie)</td><td> 2nd </td><td> 13th </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Tout Wars: 12-team AL</td><td> 2nd </td><td> 11th </td><td> 8th </td><td> 10th </td><td> 3rd </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Tout Wars: 13-team NL</td><td> 1st </td><td> 3rd </td><td> 12th </td><td> 2nd </td><td> 4th </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Tout Wars: 15-team Mixed </td><td> 1st </td><td> 9th </td><td> 15th </td><td> 9th </td><td> 4th </td></tr></tbody></table>
It is interesting to note that the league leaders fare higher in the category in Tout Wars. This is likely due to Tout Wars scheduling their auctions about a week before the season, while LABR auctions about a month before Opening Day. This speaks toward the specific league dynamics, as more is known about the identity of the team's closers during the Tout Wars proceedings.
That said, the real tangible point is that there is no singular strategy that works or does not work. As is usually the case, any strategy can work if you select the right players, though the better fantasy gamer usually chooses the strategy with the best odds of being successful.
Skills: Starting pitchers versus relievers
Below is a table displaying the standard pitching skills. Expected Earned Run Average (xERA) is determined using the Gill and Reeve formula ((0.575 * H/9) + (0.94 * HR/9) + (0.28 * BB/9) - (0.01 * K/9) - Normalizing Factor). The data is current through Sept. 15.
<table><thead><tr><th> 2012 </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Starter </td><td> .298 </td><td> 7.13 </td><td> 2.84 </td><td> 1.09 </td><td> 9.00 </td><td> 4.22 </td><td> 4.16 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Reliever </td><td> .294 </td><td> 8.36 </td><td> 3.46 </td><td> 0.90 </td><td> 8.22 </td><td> 3.64 </td><td> 3.68 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Save Situation </td><td> .280 </td><td> 9.10 </td><td> 3.26 </td><td> 0.79 </td><td> 7.41 </td><td> 3.18 </td><td> 3.05 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Get a Save </td><td> .218 </td><td> 9.68 </td><td> 2.16 </td><td> 0.24 </td><td> 4.86 </td><td> 0.85 </td><td> 0.75 </td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><thead><tr><th> 2011 </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Starter </td><td> .296 </td><td> 6.75 </td><td> 2.85 </td><td> 0.98 </td><td> 8.99 </td><td> 4.06 </td><td> 4.06 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Reliever </td><td> .291 </td><td> 7.91 </td><td> 3.63 </td><td> 0.85 </td><td> 8.21 </td><td> 3.69 </td><td> 3.69 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Save Situation </td><td> .288 </td><td> 8.65 </td><td> 3.34 </td><td> 0.81 </td><td> 7.78 </td><td> 3.43 </td><td> 3.31 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Get a Save </td><td> .220 </td><td> 9.18 </td><td> 2.27 </td><td> 0.29 </td><td> 5.08 </td><td> 1.01 </td><td> 0.97 </td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><thead><tr><th> 2010 </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Starter </td><td> .297 </td><td> 6.77 </td><td> 3.06 </td><td> 0.99 </td><td> 9.00 </td><td> 4.15 </td><td> 4.12 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Reliever </td><td> .298 </td><td> 7.87 </td><td> 3.73 </td><td> 0.90 </td><td> 8.52 </td><td> 3.93 </td><td> 3.94 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Save Situation </td><td> .292 </td><td> 8.76 </td><td> 3.48 </td><td> 0.82 </td><td> 7.91 </td><td> 3.51 </td><td> 3.44 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Get a Save </td><td> .229 </td><td> 10.45 </td><td> 2.64 </td><td> 0.35 </td><td> 5.73 </td><td> 1.08 </td><td> 1.49 </td></tr></tbody></table>
The first thing to note is that all three seasons follow the same trend, so to facilitate this discussion, I will focus on the present campaign. As the data becomes more specialized, the involved skills improve quite significantly. Intuitively, it makes sense that the superior skills will be present when a save is registered, yet it's also true that the best closers comprise this subset.
The real noteworthy aspect is how BABIP drops as the reliever becomes more skilled. This is the part that could rile the sabermetric community, as it has been drummed into our heads that a pitcher exerts limited control over whether a batted ball in play leads to an out or a hit. As the data shows, it's clear that the better relievers exhibit a larger measure of control over their hit rate as compared to the better starters, and this is not a random or sample-size anomaly. This will be relevant when deciding if a pitcher's performance is repeatable. I contend that a better-than-league-average BABIP should be expected from the elite closers, so when you see a reliever sporting what is perceived to be a normal BABIP, it's actually high compared to others at his position.
The xERA is included to show that the extremely low ERAs sported by the elite closers are a result of their elite skills and not some other element of fate. The take-home lesson is if the skills are repeatable, then the ERA is also repeatable and not subject to regression, as other analysts will suggest.
While this is more a topic for another day, it's worth noting that my contention isn't that the elite relievers are better pitchers than the upper-echelon starters, rather that it's completely situational. Their raw skills, when normalized per nine innings, are superior to that of the best starters. But the dynamics of working one inning versus six or more are completely different. The most important aspect of this data is that it's perfectly acceptable to expect a lower-than-league-average BABIP from elite relievers.
A pair with mad skills
This segues into looking at a couple of relievers who some feel deserve NL Cy Young consideration: Aroldis Chapman and Craig Kimbrel. Here are their numbers in 2012:
<table><thead><tr><th> Pitcher </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Craig Kimbrel </td><td> .247 </td><td> 16.92 </td><td> 2.28 </td><td> 0.49 </td><td> 3.74 </td><td> 1.14 </td><td> 0.31 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Aroldis Chapman </td><td> .261 </td><td> 15.83 </td><td> 2.66 </td><td> 0.53 </td><td> 4.52 </td><td>1.60</td><td> 0.92 </td></tr></tbody></table>
Folks, that's just off-the-charts sick. To fan that many batters with such exceptional walk rates is amazing. There's no doubt that, barring injury, Kimbrel will be the Opening Day closer for the Atlanta Braves next season, while there is still some question as to whether Chapman continues to anchor the Cincinnati Reds' bullpen or if they convert him back into being a starter.
To expect either to repeat these metrics is unfair, especially the walk rate, considering this is the first season that either pitcher has posted a mark that low. It's also good practice to count on some regression with respect to the other skills, so let's be conservative and assume they drop some in strikeouts with a few more hits falling in, leading to the following profile:
<table><thead><tr><th> Pitcher </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Kimbrel/Chapman </td><td> 14.00 </td><td> 3.50 </td><td> 0.60 </td><td> 5.00 </td><td> 1.51 </td></tr></tbody></table>
This incorporates some significant regression across the board, and it still should result in a sub-2.00 ERA. Granted, the only pitcher who has proved capable of maintaining this level of performance for an extended period of time is Mariano Rivera, but the metrics, especially the strikeout rates enjoyed by Kimbrel and Chapman, are historically excellent. Still, my guess is that next season's projected ERA for this duo will be a little closer to 2.00 than the above 1.51 mark.
To give an idea of just how helpful numbers of this magnitude are, if you replace a closer such as, say, Joel Hanrahan, Jonathan Papelbon or Chris Perez with Kimbrel or Chapman, depending on where you are in the standings, you can amass anywhere from three to six more rotisserie points in ERA, WHIP and K's.
Don't interpret this as a plea to draft a closer early. The purpose, rather, is to demonstrate just how valuable a closer of this nature can be and suggest that it's not crazy to anticipate Kimbrel, Chapman or even a healthy Kenley Jansen to approach this level next season. Choosing whether to invest is still contextual.
On three, everyone yell "Surprise!"
The primary reason many pundits implore fantasy owners to shun saves early in a draft or not to pay for them in an auction is the emergence of several surprise closers during the season. Here's a review of a few examples that have graced fantasy rosters this summer. That said, keep in mind that for every name on this list, there are many more failed closers, such as Rafael Dolis, Ryan Cook, Henry Rodriguez, Dale Thayer and Jim Henderson. While the success of the players below might lead you to believe you can easily pick up saves during the season, there's no guarantee you will choose wisely.
Fernando Rodney, Tampa Bay Rays: Yikes, where in the name of Kyle Farnsworth did this come from? How can a guy who walked 28 batters in 32 frames last season issue half that through 68 innings in 2012? Even throwing out last season, it's hard to believe Rodney would cut his career 4.5 BB/9 rate all the way to 1.9. Other than throwing a few more two-seamers, Rodney's pitch selection and velocity have been the same as before. He has just exhibited immaculate control.
Chances are, if you are in a keeper league, you have him dirt cheap and are therefore debating whether to freeze him for next season. The Rays have a $2.5 million club option on him for next season, so there's a good chance he'll be back in Tampa. While his 9.00 K/9 is nice, it's not exceptional, and I'm suspect about his chances of matching this season's low walk rate. My inclination would be to deal him to someone who believes his 2012 gains are sustainable.
Jim Johnson, Baltimore Orioles: The knock on Johnson entering the season was that his low strikeout rate would render him susceptible to the occasional blowup, and if a couple of these occur in close proximity, his job could be in jeopardy. Great control would help mitigate this from happening, but that didn't keep the Orioles from acquiring former Rockies fireballer Matt Lindstrom in February, whetting the appetite of those who believe strikeouts are the key to closing games. Forty-three saves later, Johnson is firmly entrenched in the role.
But here's the thing: Baltimore has played, and won, an inordinate number of close games in 2012. The Orioles are 18 games over .500 but have managed to score 20 fewer runs than they have allowed. Their record in one-run games is an extremely lucky 23-8, which is the impetus for Johnson's high saves total.
This is not to say Johnson has not pitched well; it's just that he has been afforded a lucky number of opportunities. Even though lesser teams still get saves, there is little doubt Johnson's total has been buoyed by this wave of Lady Luck that has engulfed the Orioles in 2012. Don't draft him for his 2012 saves total next spring unless you get a discount. Johnson is still a guy who relies on guile and control and is therefore a candidate to struggle.
Ernesto Frieri, Los Angeles Angels: Acquired by the Angels from the Padres in early May, Frieri didn't take long to attain a piece of the closer gig. While the Halos still play the matchups with their closers, the hard-throwing Frieri is the head of the committee. Since leaving San Diego, Frieri has ratcheted his strikeouts to near Kimbrel/Chapman levels, but his BB/9 rate is nearly double that of the dynamic duo. Frieri could pull a Rodney and drop the walks, but there's just as good a chance the whiffs fall back. The other problem with Frieri is he is a fly ball pitcher and is thus prone to the long ball. Even if he is awarded the job next spring, Frieri carries too much risk to invest top dollar on him, despite an attractive strikeout rate. He is the kind of guy I like to use to gauge the closer market rather than supplying my staff with saves.
Tyler Clippard, Washington Nationals: If you played in a league in which solid middle relievers are useful, Clippard's 2012 success is no surprise, at least in terms of effectiveness. The surprise could be the Nationals sacrificing his ability to throw multiple innings leading to the ninth. But with the injury to Drew Storen and the ineffectiveness of Henry Rodriguez, the surprising NL East leaders had no choice but to hand the reins to their skilled setup man, and he has not disappointed.
What keeps Clippard from being elite is his inconsistent control. Like Frieri, he is a fly ball pitcher, but he has not been burned by the long ball nearly as much. Clippard's track record is more impressive than any of the examples thus far. If I had him at a price of a solid setup man in a keeper league, I would seriously consider keeping him, figuring at worse I break even with an excellent chance of getting some saves, especially if Clippard excels in the playoffs. On the other hand, I would be wary of paying a full closer price for him in 2013. The track record for his skills is solid, but that does not always translate into success as a closer.
Tom Wilhelmsen, Seattle Mariners: After bouts of injury woes and ineffectiveness, Brandon League ceded the Mariners' closing duties to Wilhelmsen. For a stretch, it was assumed the M's would give the gig back to League once he was healthy in order to build up his trade value, but the team did the right thing and kept the better option in the role. Wilhelmsen has the classic closer profile, fanning 9.8 batters per nine innings while walking a respectable 3.5 per nine.
There could be some owners who are slightly concerned that he is a bit older than many first-year closers (turning 29 in December), but this is not that unusual for a closer and should not detract you from having him firmly on your radar next spring. Wilhelmsen is likely going to get a bad team discount, but he has a good chance at getting 30 saves this season, providing another example that losing teams can still provide ample save opportunities.
What happened?
Those preaching to wait on saves have their fair share of exhibits to state their case, as there were, as always, a plethora of disappointments this season. Here's a look at a few:
Heath Bell, Miami Marlins: If I had a nickel for every time someone wrote, "The Marlins have 27 million reasons to keep Bell in the closer role" or something to that effect. ... Truth be told, I contributed a few dollars' worth myself, as I just did not believe Miami would make Bell a setup guy.
For a while, I and the others were spot on. After early struggles, Bell was stripped of his closer duties in late May, only to be given the job back almost immediately. At this point, his owners looked like geniuses, as Bell went on a tear, but by mid-July, the wildness had returned, and Steve Cishek wrested the job from Bell. It's worth noting, though, that since then, Bell has sported a respectable 3.33 ERA and 1.31 WHIP. More importantly, his 8.5 K/9 and 2.6 BB/9 are promising. How or where is unclear, but if Bell is again given a chance to close, he could be worth a roll of the dice.
John Axford, Milwaukee Brewers: This year, Axford's entrance music could be Lou Reed's "Walk on the Wild Side." Axford has reversed a three-year trend of a declining walk rate in a big way; his BB/9 has ballooned to 5.34, up from a fine 3.05 mark last season. His approach is the same; he is just missing his spots. Axford was relieved of his closing responsibility earlier this season, only to get the job back after none of his replacements could get anyone out either. While it's true he has not blown a save since Aug. 10, converting 11 saves over a 14-inning stretch, he has walked an unsightly 11 batters in this span. In other words, Axford is still wild; he has just been lucky not to blow any saves. If a fellow owner looks at his recent success in terms of conversions and wants to pay full price for him next spring, let them. Axford does not have a sufficient track record to assume the walks will again drop to 2011 levels.
Jose Valverde, Detroit Tigers: While few figured Valverde would repeat his perfect 49-for-49 saves effort in 2011, Valverde's 2012 campaign still is disappointing for those who paid top dollar or invested a high draft pick in him. Most notable is his drop in K/9 rate, which is down to a mark (6.4) well below league average. Valverde has shaved a few walks off his ledger, but the lower whiff rate has hurt the strikeout column and affected his ERA.
Valverde likely will finish somewhere in the neighborhood of 35 saves, which is what can reasonably be expected from any full-time closer. But his weak peripherals hurt the other categories. The real question is what 2013 will bring. Valverde will be 35 next Opening Day and has been a workhorse of a closer, throwing more pitches than most. I am taking the drop in K's as a bad sign and will avoid Papa Grande next season.
Jonny Venters, Braves: Venters makes the disappointing list as a setup man because the extent of his slide has been monumental. Venters' peripheral numbers were expected to be in the Kimbrel/Chapman territory, which means other than contributing in saves, he would boost a staff several roto points. He went for low-double digit dollars in many NL-only auctions before the season and was one of only a handful of nonclosing relievers taken in mixed leagues. He was at the head of the list of those owners who favor the all-reliever strategy. Long story short, that hasn't worked out.
Venters has been victimized by some exceptionally poor luck on batted balls, especially grounders, hiding the fact that his ground ball rate is higher than normal. In addition, 27.3 percent of the fly balls he has issued have cleared the fences. Think about that: One out of every four fly balls he has given up has left the park. That's just ridiculous. Venters does not allow many balls to be lofted, but that's often what leads to his success, including a paucity of home runs allowed.
But here's a good sign: Since July 4, Venters has not allowed any long balls. His strikeouts are down a bit, as he is sporting a pedestrian (for him) 20/11 K/BB split in 20 1/3 innings since Independence Day. But he also was dealing with an elbow injury - including a DL stint in July because of it - which likely influenced his performance.
If you were looking to add Venters this season, he should be on your radar again next season. The good thing is you're going to get him at a discount. The bad thing is that he is not likely to amass the innings totals he reached in 2010 and 2011, tempering the potential impact his ratios and strikeouts offer.
By Todd Zola | Mastersball.com
So how'd that Alfredo Aceves deal work out for you? Did you really think this was the season Huston Street would stay healthy? Maybe you "played it safe" and drafted Mr. Reliable, Mariano Rivera.
Ah, closers, the bane of fantasy baseball's existence. Hero one day, goat the next. Yet there might be more fantasy analysis bandwidth dedicated to saves than every other stat combined.
By now, you know this common recommendation: Wait on closers. Heck, some are even proponents of punting saves altogether. Truth be told, all advice, not just that concerning closers, is completely contextual. There is no one-size-fits-all stratagem, regardless of the topic. It all depends on your league format, number of teams and scoring system, not to mention the league dynamics and your personal strengths and weaknesses as an evaluator. It's just that saves are such a specialized position that they garner more attention.
Today, saves are going under the microscope in an effort to get a leg up on the competition for next season, laying the groundwork for you to formulate the most efficient means of attacking the category next spring. I'll start by taking a peak at saves in the League of Alternative Baseball Reality and Tout Wars, look at reliever skills and unveil some data that some owners might not even realize exists, data that could go against what is conventionally accepted in the sabermetric community. Those revelations will be applied to upper-tier closers to demonstrate how the top guys do more than just get saves. Finally, I'll dissect a few surprisingly effective closers and talk about their chances of success in 2013, along with analyzing some disappointing relievers to determine whether 2013 could be a bounce-back campaign.
<offer></offer>How do league leaders fare in saves?
As a means to demonstrate just how varied the approaches can be, here is a glance at where the competing teams are situated in saves in the industry's two showcase leagues: LABR and Tout Wars. Where the team stands in the league is in the column heading with the placement in saves listed in each column.
<table><thead><tr><th> League </th><th> 1st place </th><th> 2nd place </th><th> 3rd place </th><th> 4th place </th><th> 5th place </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> LABR: 12-team American League </td><td> 9th </td><td> 3rd </td><td> 5th </td><td> 7th </td><td> 12th </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> LABR: 13-team National League </td><td> 7th </td><td> 4th </td><td>5th (tie)</td><td>5th (tie)</td><td> 2nd </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> LABR: 15-team Mixed </td><td> 8th </td><td> 7th </td><td>5th (tie)</td><td> 2nd </td><td> 13th </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Tout Wars: 12-team AL</td><td> 2nd </td><td> 11th </td><td> 8th </td><td> 10th </td><td> 3rd </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Tout Wars: 13-team NL</td><td> 1st </td><td> 3rd </td><td> 12th </td><td> 2nd </td><td> 4th </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Tout Wars: 15-team Mixed </td><td> 1st </td><td> 9th </td><td> 15th </td><td> 9th </td><td> 4th </td></tr></tbody></table>
It is interesting to note that the league leaders fare higher in the category in Tout Wars. This is likely due to Tout Wars scheduling their auctions about a week before the season, while LABR auctions about a month before Opening Day. This speaks toward the specific league dynamics, as more is known about the identity of the team's closers during the Tout Wars proceedings.
That said, the real tangible point is that there is no singular strategy that works or does not work. As is usually the case, any strategy can work if you select the right players, though the better fantasy gamer usually chooses the strategy with the best odds of being successful.
Skills: Starting pitchers versus relievers
Below is a table displaying the standard pitching skills. Expected Earned Run Average (xERA) is determined using the Gill and Reeve formula ((0.575 * H/9) + (0.94 * HR/9) + (0.28 * BB/9) - (0.01 * K/9) - Normalizing Factor). The data is current through Sept. 15.
<table><thead><tr><th> 2012 </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Starter </td><td> .298 </td><td> 7.13 </td><td> 2.84 </td><td> 1.09 </td><td> 9.00 </td><td> 4.22 </td><td> 4.16 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Reliever </td><td> .294 </td><td> 8.36 </td><td> 3.46 </td><td> 0.90 </td><td> 8.22 </td><td> 3.64 </td><td> 3.68 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Save Situation </td><td> .280 </td><td> 9.10 </td><td> 3.26 </td><td> 0.79 </td><td> 7.41 </td><td> 3.18 </td><td> 3.05 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Get a Save </td><td> .218 </td><td> 9.68 </td><td> 2.16 </td><td> 0.24 </td><td> 4.86 </td><td> 0.85 </td><td> 0.75 </td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><thead><tr><th> 2011 </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Starter </td><td> .296 </td><td> 6.75 </td><td> 2.85 </td><td> 0.98 </td><td> 8.99 </td><td> 4.06 </td><td> 4.06 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Reliever </td><td> .291 </td><td> 7.91 </td><td> 3.63 </td><td> 0.85 </td><td> 8.21 </td><td> 3.69 </td><td> 3.69 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Save Situation </td><td> .288 </td><td> 8.65 </td><td> 3.34 </td><td> 0.81 </td><td> 7.78 </td><td> 3.43 </td><td> 3.31 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Get a Save </td><td> .220 </td><td> 9.18 </td><td> 2.27 </td><td> 0.29 </td><td> 5.08 </td><td> 1.01 </td><td> 0.97 </td></tr></tbody></table>
<table><thead><tr><th> 2010 </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Starter </td><td> .297 </td><td> 6.77 </td><td> 3.06 </td><td> 0.99 </td><td> 9.00 </td><td> 4.15 </td><td> 4.12 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Reliever </td><td> .298 </td><td> 7.87 </td><td> 3.73 </td><td> 0.90 </td><td> 8.52 </td><td> 3.93 </td><td> 3.94 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Save Situation </td><td> .292 </td><td> 8.76 </td><td> 3.48 </td><td> 0.82 </td><td> 7.91 </td><td> 3.51 </td><td> 3.44 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Get a Save </td><td> .229 </td><td> 10.45 </td><td> 2.64 </td><td> 0.35 </td><td> 5.73 </td><td> 1.08 </td><td> 1.49 </td></tr></tbody></table>
The first thing to note is that all three seasons follow the same trend, so to facilitate this discussion, I will focus on the present campaign. As the data becomes more specialized, the involved skills improve quite significantly. Intuitively, it makes sense that the superior skills will be present when a save is registered, yet it's also true that the best closers comprise this subset.
The real noteworthy aspect is how BABIP drops as the reliever becomes more skilled. This is the part that could rile the sabermetric community, as it has been drummed into our heads that a pitcher exerts limited control over whether a batted ball in play leads to an out or a hit. As the data shows, it's clear that the better relievers exhibit a larger measure of control over their hit rate as compared to the better starters, and this is not a random or sample-size anomaly. This will be relevant when deciding if a pitcher's performance is repeatable. I contend that a better-than-league-average BABIP should be expected from the elite closers, so when you see a reliever sporting what is perceived to be a normal BABIP, it's actually high compared to others at his position.
The xERA is included to show that the extremely low ERAs sported by the elite closers are a result of their elite skills and not some other element of fate. The take-home lesson is if the skills are repeatable, then the ERA is also repeatable and not subject to regression, as other analysts will suggest.
While this is more a topic for another day, it's worth noting that my contention isn't that the elite relievers are better pitchers than the upper-echelon starters, rather that it's completely situational. Their raw skills, when normalized per nine innings, are superior to that of the best starters. But the dynamics of working one inning versus six or more are completely different. The most important aspect of this data is that it's perfectly acceptable to expect a lower-than-league-average BABIP from elite relievers.
A pair with mad skills
This segues into looking at a couple of relievers who some feel deserve NL Cy Young consideration: Aroldis Chapman and Craig Kimbrel. Here are their numbers in 2012:
<table><thead><tr><th> Pitcher </th><th> BABIP </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> ERA </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Craig Kimbrel </td><td> .247 </td><td> 16.92 </td><td> 2.28 </td><td> 0.49 </td><td> 3.74 </td><td> 1.14 </td><td> 0.31 </td></tr><tr class="last"><td> Aroldis Chapman </td><td> .261 </td><td> 15.83 </td><td> 2.66 </td><td> 0.53 </td><td> 4.52 </td><td>1.60</td><td> 0.92 </td></tr></tbody></table>
Folks, that's just off-the-charts sick. To fan that many batters with such exceptional walk rates is amazing. There's no doubt that, barring injury, Kimbrel will be the Opening Day closer for the Atlanta Braves next season, while there is still some question as to whether Chapman continues to anchor the Cincinnati Reds' bullpen or if they convert him back into being a starter.
To expect either to repeat these metrics is unfair, especially the walk rate, considering this is the first season that either pitcher has posted a mark that low. It's also good practice to count on some regression with respect to the other skills, so let's be conservative and assume they drop some in strikeouts with a few more hits falling in, leading to the following profile:
<table><thead><tr><th> Pitcher </th><th> K/9 </th><th> BB/9 </th><th> HR/9 </th><th> H/9 </th><th> xERA </th></tr></thead><tbody><tr class="last"><td> Kimbrel/Chapman </td><td> 14.00 </td><td> 3.50 </td><td> 0.60 </td><td> 5.00 </td><td> 1.51 </td></tr></tbody></table>
This incorporates some significant regression across the board, and it still should result in a sub-2.00 ERA. Granted, the only pitcher who has proved capable of maintaining this level of performance for an extended period of time is Mariano Rivera, but the metrics, especially the strikeout rates enjoyed by Kimbrel and Chapman, are historically excellent. Still, my guess is that next season's projected ERA for this duo will be a little closer to 2.00 than the above 1.51 mark.
To give an idea of just how helpful numbers of this magnitude are, if you replace a closer such as, say, Joel Hanrahan, Jonathan Papelbon or Chris Perez with Kimbrel or Chapman, depending on where you are in the standings, you can amass anywhere from three to six more rotisserie points in ERA, WHIP and K's.
Don't interpret this as a plea to draft a closer early. The purpose, rather, is to demonstrate just how valuable a closer of this nature can be and suggest that it's not crazy to anticipate Kimbrel, Chapman or even a healthy Kenley Jansen to approach this level next season. Choosing whether to invest is still contextual.
On three, everyone yell "Surprise!"
The primary reason many pundits implore fantasy owners to shun saves early in a draft or not to pay for them in an auction is the emergence of several surprise closers during the season. Here's a review of a few examples that have graced fantasy rosters this summer. That said, keep in mind that for every name on this list, there are many more failed closers, such as Rafael Dolis, Ryan Cook, Henry Rodriguez, Dale Thayer and Jim Henderson. While the success of the players below might lead you to believe you can easily pick up saves during the season, there's no guarantee you will choose wisely.
Chances are, if you are in a keeper league, you have him dirt cheap and are therefore debating whether to freeze him for next season. The Rays have a $2.5 million club option on him for next season, so there's a good chance he'll be back in Tampa. While his 9.00 K/9 is nice, it's not exceptional, and I'm suspect about his chances of matching this season's low walk rate. My inclination would be to deal him to someone who believes his 2012 gains are sustainable.
But here's the thing: Baltimore has played, and won, an inordinate number of close games in 2012. The Orioles are 18 games over .500 but have managed to score 20 fewer runs than they have allowed. Their record in one-run games is an extremely lucky 23-8, which is the impetus for Johnson's high saves total.
This is not to say Johnson has not pitched well; it's just that he has been afforded a lucky number of opportunities. Even though lesser teams still get saves, there is little doubt Johnson's total has been buoyed by this wave of Lady Luck that has engulfed the Orioles in 2012. Don't draft him for his 2012 saves total next spring unless you get a discount. Johnson is still a guy who relies on guile and control and is therefore a candidate to struggle.
What keeps Clippard from being elite is his inconsistent control. Like Frieri, he is a fly ball pitcher, but he has not been burned by the long ball nearly as much. Clippard's track record is more impressive than any of the examples thus far. If I had him at a price of a solid setup man in a keeper league, I would seriously consider keeping him, figuring at worse I break even with an excellent chance of getting some saves, especially if Clippard excels in the playoffs. On the other hand, I would be wary of paying a full closer price for him in 2013. The track record for his skills is solid, but that does not always translate into success as a closer.
There could be some owners who are slightly concerned that he is a bit older than many first-year closers (turning 29 in December), but this is not that unusual for a closer and should not detract you from having him firmly on your radar next spring. Wilhelmsen is likely going to get a bad team discount, but he has a good chance at getting 30 saves this season, providing another example that losing teams can still provide ample save opportunities.
What happened?
Those preaching to wait on saves have their fair share of exhibits to state their case, as there were, as always, a plethora of disappointments this season. Here's a look at a few:
For a while, I and the others were spot on. After early struggles, Bell was stripped of his closer duties in late May, only to be given the job back almost immediately. At this point, his owners looked like geniuses, as Bell went on a tear, but by mid-July, the wildness had returned, and Steve Cishek wrested the job from Bell. It's worth noting, though, that since then, Bell has sported a respectable 3.33 ERA and 1.31 WHIP. More importantly, his 8.5 K/9 and 2.6 BB/9 are promising. How or where is unclear, but if Bell is again given a chance to close, he could be worth a roll of the dice.
Valverde likely will finish somewhere in the neighborhood of 35 saves, which is what can reasonably be expected from any full-time closer. But his weak peripherals hurt the other categories. The real question is what 2013 will bring. Valverde will be 35 next Opening Day and has been a workhorse of a closer, throwing more pitches than most. I am taking the drop in K's as a bad sign and will avoid Papa Grande next season.
Venters has been victimized by some exceptionally poor luck on batted balls, especially grounders, hiding the fact that his ground ball rate is higher than normal. In addition, 27.3 percent of the fly balls he has issued have cleared the fences. Think about that: One out of every four fly balls he has given up has left the park. That's just ridiculous. Venters does not allow many balls to be lofted, but that's often what leads to his success, including a paucity of home runs allowed.
But here's a good sign: Since July 4, Venters has not allowed any long balls. His strikeouts are down a bit, as he is sporting a pedestrian (for him) 20/11 K/BB split in 20 1/3 innings since Independence Day. But he also was dealing with an elbow injury - including a DL stint in July because of it - which likely influenced his performance.
If you were looking to add Venters this season, he should be on your radar again next season. The good thing is you're going to get him at a discount. The bad thing is that he is not likely to amass the innings totals he reached in 2010 and 2011, tempering the potential impact his ratios and strikeouts offer.