Iran Nuclear Deal Reached

[SheriffJoe]

Republicans are trashing this shitty vague deal and rightly so, but don't yet have a veto-proof majority.

As for O'Reilly, he and his wussy network could have exposed the Kenyan a long time ago, but chose to adopt Valerie Jarrett talking points and remain silent in return for interview rights with a phony president.

Even Glenn Beck was forced out because he was revealing too many secrets about Soros, Hussein etc.

Fox News is anything but "right wing" and history will reveal what utter cowards they ended up being when the chips were down.

 

[JDeuce]

Wanna know how we will confirm whether Iran cheats on the deal? It's very simple:

Yet the Stuttering Clusterfuck basically declares "I just made a deal that is unprecedented, historic, and not only is it not yet a done deal, it changes exactly nothing from Iran's perspective."

 

[SheriffJoe]

They made a 'deal' that was 10x worse than Madeleine Halfbright's deal with North Korea, and they ended up with nukes. face)(*^%

The Muslim Kenyan showed his true cards and intentions for Iran in 2009 during the Iranian Green Movement when he did absolutely NOTHING to help thousands of Iranians who were trying to overthrow that oppressive terror-sponsoring Islamo-Nazi regime.

What's spinning faster now, Hussein and Kerry or those Iranian centrifuges?

Loser!@#0

 

[SheriffJoe]

 

[The Guesser]

This is an astonishingly good Iran deal

Updated by Max Fisher on April 2, 2015, 8:48 p.m.


http://www.vox.com/2015/4/2/8337347/iran-deal-good

EU foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on the announcement of a framework deal EU Council/Pool/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images

When Aaron Stein was studying nuclear non-proliferation at Middlebury University's Monterey graduate program, the students would sometimes construct what they thought would be the best possible nuclear inspection and monitoring regimes.

Years later, Stein is now a Middle East and nuclear proliferation expert with the Royal United Services Institute. And he says that the Iran nuclear framework agreement, announced on Thursday, look an awful lot like those ideal hypotheticals he'd put together in grad school.
"When I was doing my non-proliferation training at Monterey, this is the type of inspection regime that we would dream up in our heads," he said. "We would hope that this would be the way to actually verify all enrichment programs, but thought that would never be feasible."

"If these are the parameters by which the [final agreement] will be signed, then this is an excellent deal," Stein concluded.

The framework nuclear deal establishes only the very basics; negotiators will continue to meet to try to turn them into a complete, detailed agreement by the end of June. Still, the terms in the framework, unveiled to the world after a series of late- and all-night sessions, are remarkably detailed, and almost astoundingly favorable to the United States.

Like many observers, I doubted in recent months that Iran and world powers would ever reach this stage; the setbacks and delays had simply been too many. Now, here we are, and the terms are far better than expected. There are a number of details left to be worked out, including one very big unresolved issue that could potentially sink everything. This is not over. But if this framework does indeed become a full nuclear deal in July, it would be a huge success and a great deal.

Iran gives up the bulk of its nuclear program in these terms

The framework deal requires Iran to surrender some crucial components of its nuclear program, in part or even in whole. Here are the highlights:

• Iran will give up about 14,000 of its 20,000 centrifuges
• Iran will give up all but its most rudimentary, outdated centrifuges: its first-generation IR-1s, knock-offs of 1970s European models, are all it gets to keep. It will not be allowed to build or develop newer models.
• Iran will give up 97 percent of its enriched uranium: it will hold on to only 300 kilograms of its 10,000 kilogram stockpile in its current form.
• Iran will destroy or export the core of its plutonium plant at Arak, and replace it with a new core than cannot produce weapons-grade plutonium. It will ship out all spent nuclear fuel.

Iran would simply not have much of its nuclear program left after all this.
A shorthand that people sometimes use to evaluate the size of Iran's nuclear program is its "breakout time." If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei woke up tomorrow morning and decided to kick out all of the inspectors and set his entire nuclear program toward building a nuclear warhead — to "break out" to a bomb — right now it would take him two or three months. Under the terms of the framework, his program would be so much smaller that it would take him an entire year to build a single nuclear warhead.
These terms are not abject surrender. Iran is allowed to keep a small nuclear program, and it won some concessions of its own. For example, what little uranium enrichment is allowed will be done at Iran's facility at Natanz — a hardened, reinforced-concrete structure that was once used for covert enrichment and that the US had hoped to close.
Iran will also be allowed to do some research at another hardened facility the US had wanted to close, at Fordow, though the research is restricted and will be barred from using fissile material. These are not big concessions, and they matter mostly for their symbolic value, but it's something.
Still, when you look at many of the specifics laid out in the framework, the hard numbers and timetables and the detailed proscriptions, those all tend to be quite favorable to the United States.
The core issue that the framework really nails

Even though the agreement is only a framework, the summary released on Thursday goes into striking detail on an issue that was always going to be among the most crucial: inspections.
Whatever number of centrifuges Iran has or doesn't have, whatever amount of uranium it's allowed to keep or forced to give up, none of it matters unless inspectors have enough authority to hold Tehran to its end of the deal — and to convince the Iranians that they could never get away with cheating. To say that the US got favorable terms here would be quite an understatement; the Iranians, when it comes to inspections, practically gave away the farm.
"I would give it an A," Stein said of the framework. When I asked why: "Because of the inspections and transparency."
There are two reasons that inspections are so important. The first is that super-stringent inspections are a deterrent: if the Iranians know that any deviation is going to be quickly caught, they have much less incentive to try to cheat, and much more incentive to uphold their side of the deal.
The second is that, if Iran were to try a build a nuclear weapon now, it likely wouldn't use the material that's already known to the world and being monitored. Rather, the Iranians would secretly manufacture some off-the-books centrifuges, secretly mine some off-the-books uranium, and squirrel it all away to a new, secret underground facility somewhere. That would be the only way for Iran to build up enough of an arsenal such that, by the time the world found out, it would be too late to do anything about it.
Really robust inspections would be the best way stop that from happening. They would prevent Iran from sneaking off centrifuges or siphoning away uranium that could be used to build an off-the-grid nuclear weapons program, without the world finding out.
The inspections issue has not gotten much political attention. When I spoke to Jeffrey Lewis, the director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at Middlebury's Monterey Institute of International Studies, on Tuesday before the framework was announced, he seemed worried that negotiators would not focus on it much. Rather, overwhelming political focus in Washington and Tehran on issues like Iran's number of allowed centrifuges seemed likely to push inspections from the top priorities.
Lewis suggested that a top item on his wish-list would be inspections so robust that inspectors don't just get to visit enrichment sites like Natanz and Fordow, but also centrifuge factories. That, he said, "would be a big achievement."
Sure enough, come Thursday, Lewis got his wish, and then some: centrifuge factory inspections is one of the terms in the framework, and it's pretty robust. For the next 20 years, inspectors would have "continuous surveillance at Iran's centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities."
"I was shocked to read that they got them to agree to let us walk around their centrifuge production facilities. That's amazing," Stein said.
It's not just centrifuge factories. Inspectors will have access to all parts of Iran's nuclear supply chain, including its uranium mines and the mills where it processes uranium ore. Inspectors will also not just monitor but be required to pre-approve all sales to Iran of nuclear-related equipment. This provision also applies to something called "dual-use" materials, which means any equipment that could be used toward a nuclear program.
"The inspections and transparency on the rotors, and the bellows, and the uranium mines is more than I ever thought would be in this agreement," Stein added.
Other favorable items buried in the terms

Stein pointed out two details in the framework that I'd missed, both of which appeared to be pretty significant concessions by the Iranians.
First, Iran has finally agreed to comply by a rule known as Modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part to Iran's Safeguards Agreement, shorthanded as Modified Code 3.1. It says that Iran has to notify inspectors immediately on its decision to build any new facility where it plans to do nuclear work — long before construction starts.
Iran in the past has either rejected this rule or stated that it would only notify inspectors a few months before introducing nuclear material at a facility — a "cover your ass" move in case the world caught them building a new nuclear site. Tehran's promise to comply may signal that it intends to stop building such covert facilities.
Second, Stein reads the framework as including Iran's ballistic missile program — something that critics of the deal warned would be left out. Indeed, even many supporters of the negotiations have said that it would be unlikely that American negotiators could get the deal to cover ballistic missiles or other conventional weapons programs; it would simply be asking for too much in one agreement.
"It looks like they were able to expand the scope beyond just nuclear issues," Stein said. He pointed to a line in the sectionthat explains that the UN Security Council would replace its old resolutions imposing sanctions on the nuclear program with a new resolution that incorporated the finalized deal.
The line reads, "Important restrictions on conventional arms and ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution."
"The way I read that is that they address the ballistic missile issue, that that will remain in the new UN Security Council resolution," Stein said. "So you're going to keep the restrictions on ballistic missiles that are already present."
The giant gaping hole in the framework terms

Still, this is just a framework deal on the basic terms; it covers a lot, but not everything. And there is one really important topic that is referenced only vaguely: how and when the world will lift its economic sanctions on Iran.
This has been a major sticking point throughout negotiations. Iran demands that all sanctions be lifted right away; their country needs a functioning economy, they say, and if they're complying with all of the restrictions as of day-one then they shouldn't have to endure crippling sanctions on day-two. But the US and others worry, with good reason, that if they lift all sanctions immediately then Iran will have far less incentive to follow through on its commitments, as it would be very difficult to re-impose those sanctions. And Iran has cheated on such agreements before.
This is a really difficult issue; each side has to trust, to some degree, that the other side will uphold its end of the deal. And someone has to go first. After decades of enmity, that's hard.
The terms in the framework do not come near solving this issue. Iran and the world powers, apparently failing to find a solution, have largely punted.
"I read the fact sheet as confirming that they are still far apart on scheduling sanctions relief," Lewis said in an email. "Still a very large devil — a Great Satan if you will — in the details."
What the terms do say is that the US, Europe, and UN Security Council will remove their sanctions after Iran fulfills its end of the deal. But it is still very unclear how exactly that gets determined, when that happens, or whether it means the sanctions are lifted all at once, or over time.
The terms do suggest that the IAEA will have "teeth," as Stein put it, in punishing Iran if they conclude that the Iranians are not upholding their commitments. And if Iran breaks its end of the bargain, the sanctions will in theory "snap back."
Russia, though, opposes putting any sort of automatic enforcement mechanism into UN Security Council sanctions. So it's not clear if "snap back" means that sanctions will automatically trigger back into place (unlikely) or if the US would have to try to coral the necessary votes to bring them back manually (very difficult).
This was always perhaps the hardest issue. It remains the hardest issue. That the negotiators could not find anything more detailed to say is concerning.
This, so far, is about the best we could ask for

"Really, it's a very strong framework," Jeffrey Lewis said when I asked him what he thought.
"As a framework it's very good," tweeted Mark Fitzpatrick, the director of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Program at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He added, "A sharp critic of Iran and skeptic of the talks told me after the announcement that it seemed to be heavily tilted in favour of the West."

The Arms Control Association issued a statement saying that the "historic" agreement "promises to lead to one of the most consequential and far-reaching nuclear nonproliferation achievements in recent decades."
Everyone is very careful to note that this is a provisional framework. It could fall apart before it becomes a full, final deal. The negotiators, between now and the end-of-June deadline, could get bogged down in details like sanctions relief. It will be hard and it could fail.
But we do have something substantial and important in this framework. The terms in the agreement are just about the best that we could hope for — even better, in some ways, than many had thought possible. The concessions from Iran are painful and many; the concessions by the US minor and few; the details surprisingly robust.

President Obama is framing the deal, somewhat defensively, as the best alternative to war. Indeed it is that. But it is also the start of what could become a substantial and long-term curb to Iran's nuclear program, a major step toward reducing the hostility between Iran and the West, and thus a potentially transformative change for the region.

 

[The Guesser]

[h=1]A Promising Nuclear Deal With Iran[/h] By THE EDITORIAL BOARDAPRIL 2, 2015



The preliminary agreement between Iran and the major powers is a significant achievement that makes it more likely Iran will never be a nuclear threat. President Obama said it would “cut off every pathway that Iran could take to develop a nuclear weapon.”

Officials said some important issues have not been resolved, like the possible lifting of a United Nations arms embargo, and writing the technical sections could also cause problems before the deal’s finalization, expected by June 30. Even so, the agreement announced on Thursday after eight days of negotiations appears more specific and comprehensive than expected.

It would roll back Iran’s nuclear program sufficiently so that Iran could not quickly produce a nuclear weapon, and ensure that, if Iran cheated, the world would have at least one year to take preventive action, including reimposing sanctions. In return, the United States, the European Union and the United Nations would lift sanctions crippling Iran’s economy, though the timing of such a move is yet another uncertainty.

Iran would shut down roughly two-thirds of the 19,000 centrifuges producing uranium that could be used to fuel a bomb and agree not to enrich uranium over 3.67 percent (a much lower level than is required for a bomb) for at least 15 years. The core of the reactor at Arak, which officials feared could produce plutonium, another key ingredient for making a weapon, would be dismantled and replaced, with the spent fuel shipped out of Iran.

Mr. Obama, speaking at the White House, insisted he was not relying on trust to ensure Iran’s compliance but on “the most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program.”

There is good reason for skepticism about Iran’s intentions. Although it pledged not to acquire nuclear weapons when it ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, it pursued a secret uranium enrichment program for two decades. By November 2013, when serious negotiations with the major powers began, Iran was enriching uranium at a level close to bomb-grade.

However, Iran has honored an interim agreement with the major powers, in place since January 2014, by curbing enrichment and other major activities.
By opening a dialogue between Iran and America, the negotiations have begun to ease more than 30 years of enmity. Over the long run, an agreement could make the Middle East safer and offer a path for Iran, the leading Shiite country, to rejoin the international community.

The deal, if signed and carried out, would vindicate the political risks taken by President Hassan Rouhani of Iran and President Obama to engage after decades of estrangement starting from the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

Talking to adversaries — as President Ronald Reagan did in nuclear weapons negotiations with the Soviets and President Richard Nixon did in his opening to China — is something American leaders have long pursued as a matter of practical necessity and prudence.

Yet in today’s poisonous political climate, Mr. Obama’s critics have gone to extraordinary lengths to undercut him and any deal. Their belligerent behavior is completely out of step with the American public, which overwhelmingly favors a negotiated solution with Iran, unquestionably the best approach.

Sunni Arab nations and Israel are deeply opposed to any deal, fearing that it would strengthen Iran’s power in the region. This agreement addresses the nuclear program, the most urgent threat, and does not begin to tackle Iran’s disruptive role in Syria and elsewhere. Iran is widely seen as a threat; whether it can get beyond that will depend on whether its leaders choose to be less hostile to its neighbors, including Israel.

 

[The Guesser]

[h=1]Iran nuclear framework agreement: Not a bad deal[/h] [h=2]Israel will have a hard time fighting this agreement, or portraying it as bad; if Iran upholds the terms, its nuclear threat will be severely mitigated.[/h] By Barak Ravid 01:02 03.04.15

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Thursday night’s dramatic declaration of a framework nuclear agreement between Iran and the world powers surprised almost everyone outside of the locked negotiating rooms at the hotel in Lausanne, Switzerland, including the doubtful, cynical journalists waiting outside those rooms over the past eight days for the results. Also surprised, though they’ll never admit it, were many officials, including Israelis, who have vehemently attacked the emerging deal in recent months.
In contrast to the messages conveyed in Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech at Congress, the Israeli government’s public position over the last two years and the Pavlovian response that came out of Jerusalem on Thursday night, the framework agreement is not a bad deal at all. In-depth examination of the details shows that the deal includes many positive aspects that preserve Israeli security interests and answer some of Jerusalem’s concerns.

Iran perhaps scored some victories in terms of the narrative. Its rights, as it sees them, were respected by the world powers, and Iran can declare that its nuclear facilities won’t be closed, that uranium enrichment will continue, and that the humiliating sanctions will be lifted. But the world powers made significant achievements of their own on the real practical issues.
The framework agreement levels many restrictions on the Iranian nuclear program for generations to come. The Israeli government’s claims that in a decade, Iran’s nuclear program will be normalized in the eyes of the world, and that the Islamic Republic could then do as it wishes, have turned out to be baseless.

Correct, the limitations on the number of centrifuges Iran will be allowed to operate will expire in 10 years’ time. It would have been preferable if that timeframe was longer. However, over the next 15 years, Iran won’t be able to enrich uranium past 3.5 percent, and at that level, it cannot be used for nuclear weapons. The most the Iranians could do with such uranium would be to use it for peaceful purposes, or leave it in storage, collecting dust.

Also, the tight, invasive oversight of Iran’s nuclear program as defined by the framework, which will certainly be fleshed out in the final agreement, includes allowing UN inspectors into every Iranian nuclear facility, as well as uranium mines and storage facilities for a period of between 20 and 25 years.
One positive aspect of the agreement is that Iran agreed to sign and ratify the additional protocol of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows the UN to conduct surprise inspections at any facility suspected of housing nuclear activity. The significance is that it will be very difficult for Iran to develop a nuclear program in secret, and if it tries to do so, it will likely be uncovered. Attempts to limit or obstruct inspectors would constitute a gross violation of the agreement, which could lead to reinstatement of the international sanctions.

The agreement includes stipulations that are less easy for Israel to swallow, like the permission to continue research and development of advanced centrifuges, or the removal of economic sanctions and the sanctions leveled by the UN Security Council. But those are not the most critical clauses of the agreement, and they are definitely not ones that cannot be mitigated in a discreet, intimate and non-confrontational dialogue with the Obama administration.
Israel will have a hard time fighting this agreement, or portraying it as bad. One of the reasons for this is that it’s clear to anyone that reads the agreement will understand that if Iran indeed upholds it, the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapon will be severely reduced over the next two decades, at least. Also, it is now clear that the military strike that Netanyahu was pushing for will not be able to achieve the same things as the agreement. It’s doubtful if Netanyahu, who tried to enlist Congress’ support against the agreement, will be able to find 13 Democratic senators who would vote against Obama.

 

[The Guesser]

[h=2]A Better-Than-Expected Nuclear Deal[/h]By David Ignatius - April 3, 2015

WASHINGTON -- The most compelling argument President Obama made for the nuclear framework deal with Iran was also the simplest one: The pact, once concluded, would be preferable to any realistic alternative.
It's not a perfect agreement, and certainly not a permanent solution to the threat an aggressive Iran poses for Israel and other nations in the Middle East. But the framework delivered more than many skeptics had feared. The problem is that the enervating bargaining will continue for another three months (at least) before the accord is final.

Obama defended the deal by invoking the early arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union, which had far more loopholes and potential dangers than the Iran pact. But those U.S.-Soviet accords, as Obama said, "made our world safer." From Switzerland, a sleep-deprived but determined Secretary of State John Kerry stressed that the agreement was better than the "unacceptable" status quo.

What's worrisome is that this deal still isn't done: There's no final handshake. All the late-night sessions and threats to break off the talks weren't enough to get Iran to commit formally to the terms the U.S. laid out in a meticulous, four-page list of "parameters" for a binding "joint comprehensive plan." The Iranians instead postponed that signoff to another day, after the final, final negotiations.
One signal of the incompleteness of what was announced Thursday was the mismatch between the detail-rich U.S. fact sheet and the thin, page-and-a-half statement read jointly by European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif. "We can now restart drafting the text and annexes [of the final agreement], guided by the solutions developed in these days," the joint EU-Iranian document said. That hardly sounded like hitting the "done" button.
The key U.S. point of leverage, if I read these documents accurately, is that economic sanctions against Iran won't be removed until the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N.'s nuclear watchdog, verifies "implementation by Iran of its key nuclear commitments" after the final deal is struck. Thus, it shouldn't seem to be in Iran's interest to stall.

A troubling aspect of the deal, in terms of leverage, is that once initial Iranian compliance is verified, all U.S. and U.N. economic and financial sanctions related to the nuclear issue would be lifted, and a new U.N. resolution would be drafted to guide future Iranian compliance. Yes, there's a so-called "snap-back" provision that would allow sanctions to be re-imposed if Iran were found to be violating the agreement. But that's a formula for a potential U.N. nightmare.
The U.S. had hoped for something more stringent: A calibrated reduction in sanctions, in which Iran would have to earn each additional concession. That was seen as a constraint on Iranian behavior, and it was repeatedly stressed by Kerry to the Iranians. It's hard to be sure, because information is still fragmentary, but the U.S. seems to have softened its terms on this key issue. That's worrisome.
The tentative terms of the deal, as described in the American "parameters" memo, actually exceed what many had thought possible. The Iranians would be allowed to operate 5,060 centrifuges for the next 10 years, rather than the 6,000 or 6,500 that earlier leaks had suggested. For 15 years, enrichment would be banned at the hardened, underground facility at Fordow, longer than some had expected. The Iranians could enrich some uranium at Natanz, but only to the 3.67 percent level, vastly below weapons grade, and the stockpile of enriched material would be capped at 300 kilograms for 15 years.

Iranian research (or at least the fruits of it) would also be capped. About 1,000 advanced IR-2 centrifuges would be removed from Natanz, and no other advanced centrifuges could enrich uranium anywhere for at least 10 years. A heavy-water reactor at Arak would be reconfigured so it couldn't produce bomb fuel.
Perhaps the most important part of the framework involves inspection and verification plans. Here, too, the U.S. seems to have obtained most of what it wanted. The IAEA could permanently monitor all of Iran's nuclear facilities, using an intrusive measure known as the "additional protocol." Inspection of Iran's mines, mills and other elements of its nuclear supply chain would continue for 25 years. It's a tougher package, in terms of preventing Iranian breakout, than many critics feared.

Zarif's characterization of the deal was far different from Kerry's or Obama's. But such spin-doctoring is to be expected in any negotiation. This looks like a pretty good deal. I just wish it were signed.


davidignatius@washpost.com

 

[The Guesser]

[h=1]In the land of the inevitable critics[/h] [h=2]Israel’s nuclear experts side with Netanyahu in opposing Obama on the framework deal with Iran: But is it a worse option than the risk of another Middle East war?[/h] By Ilene Prusher 10:10 03.04.15

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I live in the land of the inevitable critics.
That is the term U.S. President Barack Obama used in his speech following the announcement of a deal – or rather, a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) that is supposed to gel into what could actually be called a deal by June.
“So when you hear the inevitable critics of the deal sound off, ask them a simple question: Do you really think that this verifiable deal, if fully implemented, backed by the world’s major powers, is a worse option than the risk of another war in the Middle East?” Obama posed. “Is it worse than doing what we’ve done for almost two decades with Iran moving forward with its nuclear program and without robust inspections?”
In Israel, the inevitable critics include not just Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but also members of the security establishment, the academic community and even members of the left-leaning opposition who are supposed to jump at every opportunity to tear down the man they tried but failed to beat at the polls just over two weeks ago. For example, Yair Lapid, the head the centrist Yesh Atid party, may not be willing to join Netanyahu’s government, but says on this issue, differences disappear.
"On the Iranian nuclear issue there is no opposition and coalition,” Lapid said in reaction to the deal. “We are all concerned that the Iranians will circumvent the deal and Israel must protect its own security interests. There is no basis to the determination that today Iran was prevented from attaining a nuclear weapon. Israel needs to work with the United States and the international community to ensure there is no Iranian fraud, something which would threaten Israel's security and that of the world."
MK Omer Bar-Lev, the Zionist Union point person on defense issues, said that the one-year period that Iran would now be limited were it to weaponize its nuclear capabilities – referred as a “breakout time” – did little to assuage anyone in Israel. Rather, Israel should now try to convince Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, to insist on a longer timeframe in the final negotiations in the next three months.
“If we can convince them to work on these small details, maybe we can get to a point where there will be an expansion of that time period, and perhaps we can get something that is less bad than what we’re seeing here,” Bar-Lev said in an interview with Channel One.
Obama took the bold step of going to the heart of the inevitable criticism.
“It’s no secret that the Israeli prime minister and I don’t agree about whether the United States should move forward with a peaceful resolution to the Iranian issue. If in fact Prime Minister Netanyahu is looking for the most effective way to ensure Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon, this is the best option. And I believe our nuclear experts can confirm that.”
But Israel’s nuclear experts confirm something else. It’s hard to find one of them who things the framework constitutes a good deal.
Dr. Ephraim Asculai, a former member of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and an expert who served as a senior member of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission for over 40 years, says that what’s not been mentioned that troubles him most.
“Iran has been developing, according to the IAEA, a nuclear explosive mechanism, and that is a serious issue I haven’t heard a word about in any statement,” says Asculai, now a Senior Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University. Moreover, he said, he would have expected a more aggressive inspections regime, and for Iran to be left with far fewer centrifuges.
“This deal is not enough. It doesn't give the right for inspectors to look anywhere in Iran at any time, and Iran is a huge country - it can set up a mechanism anywhere,” he says. “The number of centrifuges that are going to be permitted is not a small one – keeping 5,000 to 6,000 centrifuges is a quite large,” he says. “The number should have been much less to give some assurance.” Finally, one year of breakout time hardly reassures anyone in Israel.
“I think it is too short a period to deal with this problem, because by the time you discover it, it takes a long time to do something about it,” Asculai adds. “I think that President Obama depends too much on intelligence to uncover any wrongdoing. Unfortunately, intelligence has been known to fail – and we know that Iran is very good at concealing what it’s up to.”
This is not just the land of inevitable critics but the land of people who see their country as the place most likely to be the target of an Iranian bomb, and an Iran that is still arguing for Israel to be wiped out. Mohammad Reza Naqdi, the commander of the Basij militia of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard, said earlier this week that “Erasing Israel off the map is non-negotiable,” coming in as if on cue with a statement that can only fed Israeli fears that someone in the Islamic Republic may make good on that threat someday.
Obama further tried to address that, ringing all the right bells. He said that the U.S. would continue to be concerned about Iranian behavior “so long as Iran continues its sponsorship of terrorism, its support for proxies who destabilize the Middle East, its threats against America’s friends and allies, like Israel.” He added: “So make no mistake, we will remain vigilant in countering those actions and standing with our allies.”
These are not the words of an American president heralding a brand-new era of relations with Iran. By making clear that the U.S. still sees Iran as a sponsor of terrorism and specifically mentioning threats to Israel, he sent the message that Iran isn’t exactly going to be treated like a country that has truly turned a new leaf – yet. Rather, he sounded more like a cop in a movie, pointing to a recalcitrant ex-con who just got out on parole and warning, “I’m watchin’ you.”
As one critic of the deal described it to me, the whole process was flawed. If the sanctions had been much more severe, then the West could have obtained a better deal because the Iranians would have been persuaded that their continuing economic isolation was too costly and would not be easily reversed. Under this pressure, this critic reasons, they would have had to concede on more fronts – for example being forced to close facilities that Israel had hope to see shuttered, such as the underground facility in Fordow. That not a single facility will be closed is a failure in Netanyahu’s eyes. And in the words of Iran’s Javad Zarif, “the proud people of Iran would never accept that.” He added: “We will continue enriching, we will continue research and development, our heavy water reactor will be modernized and we will continue the Fordow facility.”
To return to Obama’s “simple” question: is the deal a worse option than the risk of another war in the Middle East? Put that way, I think we know the answer. Reading between the lines, this deal is the lesser of several evils. Netanyahu insists that this is a fallacy. The alternative is not war, but a better deal. But he must know that the better deal of his dreams was made up of non-starters for the Iranians, and was probably not achievable. But then, he has always been in good at drawing red lines, and never very good at negotiating and meeting his foes half way.

The Obama administration has a fundamentally different way of looking at the world – engagement is its calling card. A diplomatic solution with an intense inspections regime – what Obama termed the “most robust and intrusive inspections and transparency regime ever negotiated for any nuclear program in history” – is indeed far better than any alternative. Increased sanctions was not slowing down Iran’s nuclear program and not have changed the course of history. Military action might have set Iran back a few years at best, at the cost of untold numbers of lives and unpredictable fallout. And with so many facilities in so many places, not only was that a recklessly belligerent idea on which even Netanyahu was reluctant to push the button, but it’s hard to imagine a scenario in which Israel or any of Iran’s neighbors would have been better off. The inevitable critics may be able to boast about how bad the deal is and how much better it could have been, but they have yet to produce an alternative that doesn’t leave us with visions of a mushroom cloud over the Mediterranean.

 

[The Guesser]

Lots of Sanity. And then Bibi:
[h=2]While the Western nations welcomed the deal, US' ally Israel criticised it saying it was a "historic mistake".[/h] 03 Apr 2015 02:52 GMT | Politics, Middle East, Iran, Barack Obama, Hassan Rouhani

Iran and global powers have sealed a deal on plans to curb Tehran's chances for getting a nuclear bomb, laying the ground for a new relationship between the Islamic republic and the West.
Though the agreement was hailed as a major breakthrough in a 12-year standoff between Iran, Europe and the United States, world leaders toned down their reactions, underlining a lack of trust in Tehran and scepticism in some quarters that the hard-fought deal could last.
Here are some of the quotes from the main protagonists in the talks between Iran and P5+1, made up of the United States, Britain, France, China, Russia and Germany:
US president Barack Obama
This framework would cut off every pathway that Iran could take to develop a nuclear weapon. I am convinced that if this framework leads to a final comprehensive deal, it will make our country, our allies and our world safer.
This deal is not based on trust. It's based on unprecedented verification.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
The effect of this will be, when we implement our measures there won't be no sanctions against the Islamic republic of Iran.
And that I think would be a major step forward. We have stopped a cycle that was not in the interest of anybody, not in the interest of non-proliferation.
We have built mutual distrust in the past...So what I hope is that through courageous implementation of this some of that trust could be remedied. But that is for us all to wait and see.
US Secretary of State John Kerry
Diplomacy had paid off, insisting that "simply demanding that Iran capitulate makes a nice sound bite, but it's not a policy".
If we find at any point that Iran is not complying with this agreement, the sanctions can snap back into place.
"In return for Iran's future cooperation, we and our international partners will provide relief in phases from the sanctions that have impacted Iran's economy.
British Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond
This is well beyond what many of us thought possible even 18 months ago and a good basis for what I believe could be a very good deal. But there is still more work to do
Russian foreign ministry
This deal contains the principal put forward by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which is Iran's unconditional right to a peaceful nuclear programme.
German Chancellor Angela Merkel
The international community had never "been so close to an agreement preventing Iran from having nuclear weapons".

French President Francoi Hollande
France will be watchful ... to ensure that a credible, verifiable agreement be established under which the international community can be sure Iran will not be in a position to have access to nuclear arms.
UN chief Ban Ki-moon
The deal will pave the way to bolstering "peace and stability" in the Middle East and allow cooperation on the "many serious challenges (countries) face" in the region.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
The accord is a "historic mistake".
The final deal based on this agreement "would threaten the survival of Israel".
[COLOR=#8e8e8e !important]Source:[/COLOR] [COLOR=#212121 !important]Agencies[/COLOR]

 

[Acebb]

Note that guesser is on the same side as these people:

[h=2]Iran's chief nuclear negotiator receives hero's welcome in Tehran[/h]

What a pathetic scumbag.

History will note that Obama gave Iran a nuclear weapon.

 

[russ1945]

[h=1]Iranian deal silent on fate of U.S. prisoners held by Tehran[/h]Kerry vows to push for release of three still in jail


Jason Rezaian, an Iranian-American correspondent for The Washington Post, smiles as he attends a presidential campaign of President Hassan Rouhani in Tehran on April 11, 2013. The reporter has been detained in Iran for more than four months and was ... more >


By David R. Sands - The Washington Times - Thursday, April 2, 2015
While President Obama and his aides hailed the nuclear deal struck withIran as a diplomatic coup, the accord was silent on a major bilateral irritant between Washington and Tehran — the fate of three American prisoners being held in Iranian jails.
The three are journalist Jason Rezaian, who has written for the Washington Post and other publications; Christian pastor Saeed Abedini; and former U.S. Marine Amir Hekmati.
Secretary of State John Kerry, the lead U.S. negotiator at the marathon talks in Lausanne, Switzerland, insisted the U.S. side brings up the prisoners’ fate in every bilateral meeting with Iranian leaders.
He told reporters in Lausanne on Thursday the Obama administration would continue to press for the prisoners’ release, arguing the nuclear agreement may make the task easier.
“I’m not going to go into any details except to say to you that that conversation is continuing,” Mr. Kerry told reporters at a press availability Thursday. “We have a very specific process in place to try to deal with it, and we call on Iran again today, in light of [this agreement], to release these Americans and let them get home with their families.”
The American Center for Law and Justice has championed the case of Mr. Abedini, who has been held in Iran since 2012 on charges of organizing private Christian services in Iranian homes.



ACLJ said in a statement U.S. officials should press now even harder for his release.
“In the wake of President Obama’s announcement that a framework for a deal with Iran has been reached on nuclear negotiations, it is critical that our government use this unique opportunity – as our two nations continue to sit at the negotiating table over the next few weeks and months – to bring Pastor Saeed and the other wrongfully imprisoned Americans home to their families,” the statement said.

 

[russ1945]

Benghazi, Bergdahl, and the Bomb

Column: President Obama’s stories haven’t held up before. How is the Iran deal any different?


EMAIL

AP​

BY: Matthew Continetti
April 3, 2015 5:00 am

President Obama strode to the lectern in the Rose Garden Thursday to announce a “historic” agreement between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thepreliminary deal made in Lausanne, Switzerland, the president said, “cuts off every pathway Iran could take to develop a nuclear weapon.” I hope he’s right.
But I’m not counting on it. The president has a terrible record of initial public pronouncements on national security. He has a habit of confidently stating things that turn out not to be true. Three times in the last four years he has appeared in the Rose Garden and made assertions that were later proven to be false. He and his national security team have again and again described a world that does not correspond to reality. No reason to assume these concessions to Iran will be any different.
The U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, was attacked on September 11, 2012. Four Americans were killed, including our ambassador. Obama delivered remarks on the attack in the Rose Garden the following day. “No acts of terror will ever shake the resolve of this great nation,” he said. What he didn’t say was that the killings in Benghazi specifically were a “terrorist attack” or “terrorism.” On 60 Minutes, when asked if he believed Benghazi was a “terrorist attack,” the president replied, “It’s too early to know how this came about.” On September 14, neither the president nor Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called what had happened a terrorist attack. On September 15, Obama referred to Benghazi as a “tragic attack.” On September 16, Susan Rice, then U.N. ambassador, called it a “spontaneous attack.”
By September 24, when Obama recorded a campaign interview with The View, he again refused to say Benghazi was an attack by terrorists. “We’re still doing an investigation,” he told Joy Behar. It was not until two days later that administration officials began referring to Benghazi as a terrorist attack—something the Libyan government had been saying since September 13.
The story originally put out by the White House, that Benghazi was the result of spontaneous anger at an Internet video offensive to Muslim extremists, fell apart in a matter of days. Yet the White House persisted in its false description of reality, declining to confirm what was widely accepted as a premeditated terrorist assault on a U.S. compound, and chose to ascribe responsibility for the events in question to anti-Islamic bias. The evidence continues to mount that Ansar al-Sharia, the Qaeda affiliate in lawless Libya, was behind the events of September 11, 2012, not the stupid video.
In August 2013 President Obama announced in the Rose Garden that Syrian dictator Bashar Assad had crossed the “red line” by gassing his own people. “Now, after careful deliberation, I have decided that the United States should take military action against Syrian regime targets,” the president said. Then he punted the issue to Congress. But no action against Syrian regime targets was ever taken, because the president reversed himself and accepted a Russian proposal to ship Assad’s WMD out of Syria. “This initiative has the potential to remove the threat of chemical weapons without the use of force, particularly because Russia is one of Assad’s strongest allies,” Obama said in a September 10, 2013, televised address. Almost two years later, Assad is dropping barrel bombs filled with chlorine gas on civilians. Success.
Last May, President Obama again walked purposefully to a lectern in the Rose Garden, and informed the world that he had released five Taliban commanders from Guantanamo Bay in exchange for Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl, who had been held prisoner by the Islamic militia for almost half a decade. “Right now,” the president said, “our top priority is making sure that Bowe gets the care and support that he needs and that he can be reunited with his family as soon as possible.”
Criticism of the prisoner swap was immediate, and intensified when Bergdahl’s platoon-mates said he had deserted his post. The White House, as usual, struck back against the critics and repeated its story. On June 2, Susan Rice, now national security adviser, went on This Week with George Stephanopoulos and said Bergdahl “served the United States with honor and distinction.”
The Government Accountability Office concluded that the Obama administration’s actions were illegal. Bergdahl himself was kept isolated as the Army reviewed the circumstances of his capture by the enemy. Completed in the fall of 2014, the report by Brigadier General Kenneth Dahl still has not been released to the public.
Last week, however, the Army charged Bergdahl with desertion and misbehavior before the enemy. Has the White House reevaluated its trade? Of course not. On the contrary: Pentagon officials suggested on background that Bergdahl wasn’t a deserter, he was a whistleblower!
Three stories that collapsed under the weight of the evidence, three instances of the White House doggedly sticking to its policy line despite everything. This president’s resistance to events in the actual world of space and time is more than ideology, however. It’s also good politics: By refusing to concede the facts of the case, Obama is able to hold his base and stay on offense against his true adversaries: Republicans, conservatives, and Bibi Netanyahu.
And now we have the Iran story. Iran, the president says, will reduce its centrifuges, dilute its enriched uranium, open its nuclear sites to inspectors, and turn its fortified underground reactor into a “research” facility in exchange for sanctions relief. The only alternatives, Obama goes on, are bombing Iran or ending negotiations and re-imposing sanctions. “If, in fact, Prime Minister Netanyahu is looking for the most effective way to ensure Iran doesn’t get a nuclear weapon, this is the best option. And I believe our nuclear experts can confirm that.”
Sure they can. Though I believe other nuclear experts, such as Charles Duelfer, can also confirm that this agreement has major holes, such as the spotty effectiveness of inspections and the failure to get Iran to disclose fully the possible military dimensions of its nuclear program. And there’s always the tricky issue of sanctions relief: The United States says the process of lifting sanctions will be gradual and contingent on Iranian compliance, but Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif says it will beimmediate.
What the president and Secretary of State John Kerry unveiled Thursday was another fancy, another fairy-tale, another fable about what might happen in an ideal world where enemies and allies share common interests and objectives, autocratic and theocratic regimes adhere to compacts, and moral sincerity is more important than results. Best be skeptical—these so-called triumphs of Obama’s diplomacy have a way of falling to pieces like ancient parchment. And keep in mind this rule: When the president enters the Rose Garden, run for cover.



And there’s always the tricky issue of sanctions relief: The United States says the process of lifting sanctions will be gradual and contingent on Iranian compliance, but Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif says it will be immediate. (from the above) '

 

[SheriffJoe]

Pinhead.

 

[SheriffJoe]

PM Benjamin Netanyahu makes a powerful statement:

“I just came from a meeting of the Israeli cabinet. We discussed the proposed framework for a deal with Iran.The cabinet is united in strongly opposing the proposed deal.
This deal would pose a grave danger to the region and to the world and would threaten the very survival of the State of Israel.
The deal would not shut down a single nuclear facility in Iran, would not destroy a single centrifuge in Iran and will not stop R&D on Iran’s advanced centrifuges.
On the contrary. The deal would legitimize Iran’s illegal nuclear program. It would leave Iran with a vast nuclear infrastructure. A vast nuclear infrastructure remains in place.
The deal would lift sanctions almost immediately and this at the very time that Iran is stepping up its aggression and terror in the region and beyond the region.
In a few years, the deal would remove the restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program, enabling Iran to have a massive enrichment capacity that it could use to produce many nuclear bombs within a matter of months.
The deal would greatly bolster Iran’s economy. It would give Iran thereby tremendous means to propel its aggression and terrorism throughout the Middle East.
Such a deal does not block Iran’s path to the bomb.
Such a deal paves Iran’s path to the bomb.
And it might very well spark a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East and it would greatly increase the risks of terrible war.
Now, some say that the only alternative to this bad deal is war.
That’s not true.
There is a third alternative – standing firm, increasing the pressure on Iran until a good deal is achieved.
And finally let me say one more thing.
Iran is a regime that openly calls for Israel’s destruction and openly and actively works towards that end.
Just two days ago, in the midst of the negotiations in Lausanne, the commander of the Basij security forces in Iran said this: “The destruction of Israel is non-negotiable.”
Well, I want to make clear to all. The survival of Israel is non-negotiable.
Israel will not accept an agreement which allows a country that vows to annihilate us to develop nuclear weapons, period.
In addition, Israel demands that any final agreement with Iran will include a clear and unambiguous Iranian recognition of Israel’s right to exist.”
​

 

[festeringZit]

PM Benjamin Netanyahu makes a powerful statement:

Well, I want to make clear to all. The survival of Israel is non-negotiable.

Israel will not accept an agreement which allows a country that vows to annihilate us to develop nuclear weapons, period.

In addition, Israel demands that any final agreement with Iran will include a clear and unambiguous Iranian recognition of Israel’s right to exist.

​

I'm glad Netanyahu isn't a pansy-ass retard fool like Obama and Kerry.

 

[SheriffJoe]

I'm glad Netanyahu isn't a pansy-ass retard fool like Obama and Kerry.

"Well, I want to make clear to all. The survival of Israel is non-negotiable.”

I'm sure Spammy's pages and pages of anti-Bibi editorials will make all the difference, just like last time.

 

[Dave007inVegas]

My Dad always warned me, "Avoid dealing with schtick dreck." (just wanted to make Dave google )

Asshole On the other hand your father seems like a wise man.

 

[ScottL]

"Well, I want to make clear to all. The survival of Israel is non-negotiable.”

I'm sure Spammy's pages and pages of anti-Bibi editorials will make all the difference, just like last time.

Ironically he pretty much nuked the thread

 

[Dave007inVegas]

That went well. Don’t you think?

http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015...nouncing-deal-wont-publicly-agree-to-4-pages/

Friday on MSNBC’s “The Rundown with José Díaz-Balart,” Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA) argued since the Iranians are already “backing away from” the four pages put out yesterday by the White House, believing they would agree to a complex final deal with thousands of page in June would be difficult.

“If Obama says they’ve agreed to it but they won’t acknowledge that, then they’re backing away from it, renouncing it,” he continued. “At least they’re not embracing it in public. If they can’t go to the Revolutionary Guard and say these four pages, we have agreed to, then how are they going to be able to go to the same generals in June and say here are the thousand pages. In fact, Zarif who negotiated this agreement is already saying president’s fact sheet is not accurate, and what’s missing from the four pages is an Iranian signature, or at least a statement by Iran that these are the points they agreed to.”

'Houston, we have a problem' or maybe 'Beam me up Scotty' is more appropriate.