ere's some more direct quotes for anybody who still believe that General Clark favored the war:
CLARK:" As far as I know, I haven't seen any substantial evidence linking Saddam's regime to
the Al Qaida network, though such evidence may emerge. But nevertheless, winning the war against Al Qaida and taking actions against the weapons programs in Iraq, that's two different problems that may require two different sets of solutions. In other words, to put it back into military parlance, Iraq they're an operational level problem. We've got other operational level problems in the Middle East, like the
ongoing conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Al Qaida and the foundation of radical extremist fundamentalist Islam, that's the strategic problem."
CLARK:" I'd like to offer the following observations by way of how we could proceed. First ofall, I do believe that the United States diplomacy in the United Nations will be
strengthened if the Congress can adopt a resolution expressing U.S. determination to
act if the United Nations can not act. The use of force must remain a U.S. option under active consideration. Such congressional resolution need not, at this time, authorize the use of force."
CLARK:" We have to work this problem in a way to gain worldwide legitimacy and understanding for the concerns that we rightly feel and for our leadership. This is what U.S. leadership in the world must be. We must bring others to share our views not be too quick to rush to try to impose them even if we have the power to do so. I agree that there's a risk that the inspections would fail to provide evidence of the weapons program. They might fail, but I think we can deal with this problem as we
move along, and I think the difficulties of dealing with this outcome are more than offset by the opportunities to gain allies, support, and legitimacy in the campaign against Saddam Hussein."
CLARK:" If the efforts to resolve the problem by using the United Nations fail, either initially or ultimately, then we need to form the broadest possible coalition including our
NATO allies and the North Atlantic Council if we're going to have to bring forces to bear. We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police and judicial capabilities, emergency medical and reconstruction assistance and preparations for a transitional governing body and eventual elections, perhaps even including a new constitution."
CLARK:" So, all that having been said, the option to use force must remain on the table. It
should be used as the last resort after all diplomatic means have been exhausted unless there's information that indicates that a further delay would represent an immediate risk to the assembled forces and organizations. And, I want to underscore that I think the United States should not categorize this action as preemptive. Preemptive and that doctrine has nothing whatsoever to do with this problem."
CLARK:" We have a problem. We've got to muster the bestjudgment in this country. We've got to muster the will of the American people and
we've got to be prepared to deal with this problem, but time is on our side in the
near term and we should use it."
CLARK:" The honest truth is that the absence of intelligence is not an adequate reason to go
forward to war in and of itself, and so what we have to do is we have to build a program that builds, that encourages other nations to share our perspective."
CLARK: "But I will say this, that the administration has not proceeded heretofore in a way that would encourage its friends and allies to support it. One of the problems we have is the overhang from a number of decisions taken by the administration which have undercut its friends and allies around the world and given."
CLARK:" In the case of Kosovo, we're the strongest element there and the Albanians look tous for protection. In the case of Iraq, we're going to be infidels in a Muslim land, and
one of the things that's going to happen when you break the authority of Saddam Hussein is that you're going to have a resurgence of support for the Muslims in the region by the radical elements, both Sunni -- or both Wahhabi and Shia and they will be in there and they will be preaching anti-Americanism."
CLARK:" I'm saying there hasn't been any substantiation of the linkage of the Iraqi
regime to the events of 9/11 or the fact that they are giving weapons of mass destruction capability to Al Qaida, yes sir."
CLARK: "So, I think in this case that the doctrine of preemption and regime change had beenactually counterproductive in trying to make the case against Saddam Hussein because they tend to be misinterpreted. We've always talked within the military circles about the possibility of preemption. We've always worried about it. We worried about how you get the specific information you needed. We worried about whether the action could be effective or not. We worried about what the consequences of that would be, but it was discussed behind closed doors in a number of cases, I'm sure, and nevertheless we never felt a reason to publish a doctrine on it because the doctrine itself becomes a fact and an element in international relations.
CLARK: "Since then, we've encouraged Saddam Hussein and supported him as he attacked
against Iran in an effort to prevent Iranian destabilization of the Gulf. That came back and bit us when Saddam Hussein then moved against Kuwait. We encouraged the Saudis and the Pakistanis to work with the Afghans and build an army of God, the mujahaddin, to oppose the Soviets in Afghanistan. Now we have released tens of thousands of these Holy warriors, some of whom have turned against us and formed Al Qaida. My French friends constantly remind me that these are problems that we had a hand in creating. So when it comes to creating another strategy, which is built around the intrusion into the region by U.S. forces, all the warning signs should be flashing. There are unintended consequences when force is used. Use it as a last resort. Use it multilaterally if you can. Use it unilaterally only if you must."
CLARK: "And on the other hand, I think you have to narrow it in such a way that you don't remove the resort to force as a last option consideration in this case. So, not giving a blank check but expressing an intent to sign the check when all other alternatives are exhausted."
CLARK: " So, we have the time to build up the force, work the diplomacy, achieve the leverage
before he can come up with any military alternative that's significant enough
ultimately to block us, and so that's why I say time is on our side in the near term. In the long term, no, and we don't know what the long term is. Maybe it's five years. Maybe it's four years. Maybe it's eight years. We don't know."
CLARK: "I mean this is about leadership. It's not just about a threat. So that's why I say time is on our side."
CLARK: "I hope that we're starting to do that in a very, very serious way but there are a
number of steps that have to be taken first, like engaging international organizations
and the U.N. and trying to build a framework because we don't want to put the United States armed forces if it takes I don't know how many, 50,000, 70,000initially. We don't want a bunch of young men in battle dress uniforms out there indefinitely trying to perform humanitarian assistance. That's not our job. We're not very good at it. We're also not any good at police work. Now we're doing a lot of it in place like
Kosovo and Bosnia and we have and it's been unfortunate. So we should try to do better in this case."
"CLARK: Well, I don't want to answer this in an epistemological sense. I want to answer it just in the sense of practical statesmanship."
"CLARK: I think we didn't fully appreciate the danger of Al Qaida and you know I start
from the 11th of September and work backwards --of 2001 and work backwards and say not only the intelligence communities but, you know, in the military as you well know, we have a tendency to look up the chain of command and down the chain of command and we work it from top to bottom and we do an after action review after every operation. We ask what happened, why did it happen and how can we fix it? That after action review, sir, has not been done and those who were accountable have not be held accountable."
"CLARK: Well, as I said, I don't think you can achieve a diplomatic resolution to this
without the ultimate -- without putting force on the table as the last resort and it's
got to be really on the table, and I think you know I feel very comfortable. I think I
have proved to this body that I'm willing to use -- personally that I've been able
when the time comes to pull the trigger, to pull the trigger. So you don't put that
option on the table unless you really mean it. I personally really mean that you got
to exhaust all the options first. You're giving me a hypothetical and I can't answer
(inaudible)."
"CLARK: And, Mr. Chairman, if I could just say in conclusion I've been all over this country in
the last month talking to people and nobody wants war and most people don't understand this problem. I think I do understand it because I've lived with it for a decade. Most people don't and they say they don't see the connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaida. They are worried about what the consequences will be and they do feel the United States is --somehow we've accelerated the tempo here and we've left our public behind."
"CLARK: I think that as a doctrine, it's a very difficult doctrine. It's probably a flawed
doctrine as expressed doctrinally and unfortunately it's out there in public. I heard
the West Point speech. I was concerned when I heard the speech. We've talked about this for years behind closed doors. We've always imagined gee we might send a hit team in to take out a chemical weapons factory. Suddenly, preemption becomes taking out a government and going to regime change. It's a hugely different concept. Now it's more like preventive war and the notion of starting a war to prevent one is a very difficult notion to sign up to in the
abstract so you really have to see the particulars and when you put it out there in
the abstract as this sort of operating principle, it is subject to misinterpretation,
misunderstanding, and replication by other states and it's not in our interest for
them to do that. So I am concerned about this doctrine."
"CLARK: But we're dealing here with the problem of perceptions and leadership. This is a country with global responsibilities. People look to us all over the world to set the standard, not only to be the strongest country, but to adhere to international law and support the institutions that we created in our own "
THE RECORD IS CLEAR AND CLARK HAS BEEN CONSISTENT ON THIS FROM DAY 1. END OF STORY.
[This message was edited by D2bets on January 16, 2004 at 11:49 AM.]
[This message was edited by D2bets on January 16, 2004 at 11:55 AM.]
