Except it isn't "known" because it never happened, dumb fuck.
See, the UCCR was actually quoted on the matter. And in fact, more whites were stuck in 'road blocks' (there were not actual road blocks) than blacks, you fucking illiterate clown.
Keep screeching it is "known" I'm sure someone will believe you.
Just uncovered this transcript of a November 2001 phone call between Jeb Bush and the Colonel running Florida Highway Patrol!
Bush: Colonel, we need to deliver Florida to my brother George
FHP: Yes, sir!
Bush: I need you to setup roadblocks to stop blacks from voting
FHP: Ok, we can do that sir, where?
Bush: Around Seminole County
FHP: Just 1 county sir?
Bush: Yes, just 1 county
FHP: But Governor, there are precincts in Seminole where 80% of the voters are white.
Bush: Setup roadblocks there too!!
FHP: Aye-aye
Wow, Internet idiot vittard uncovered it all!
Bush: Colonel, we need to deliver Florida to my brother George
FHP: Yes, sir!
Bush: I need you to setup roadblocks to stop blacks from voting
FHP: Ok, we can do that sir, where?
Bush: Around Seminole County
FHP: Just 1 county sir?
Bush: Yes, just 1 county
FHP: But Governor, there are precincts in Seminole where 80% of the voters are white.
Bush: Setup roadblocks there too!!
FHP: Aye-aye
Wow, Internet idiot vittard uncovered it all!
That's why he spent a year talking to himself in the RR. Claimed to be a "winning handicapper" but when chips were down he couldn't even break .500.
The "should have won record" stuff was priceless.
How about when he had his big rubber room moment linking to that guy's government is good blog?
He thought that was some big BLAMMO!! moment for himself.
The problem with Obama's foreign policy is becoming clear
President Barack Obama's biggest foreign-policy failure wasn't any one particular episode.
Rather, it was the fact that he "refused to choose a clear path forward," argues Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group.
"President Obama refused to commit to any foreign-policy framework to help him make difficult decisions," Bremmer writes in his new book, "Superpower."
"His priorities have shifted with changing headlines, he has redrawn red lines to no effect, and the few commitments he has made have encouraged others to set tests of American will that the White House had no intention of passing."
.
Bremmer said Obama's incoherent foreign-policy strategy combined with his risk-averse posture ultimately translated to several flubs.
"Obama is tactical and risk averse, which you see in Syria," Bremmer told Business Insider. "He makes the misstep on the red line, and then he does everything possible, ties himself in knot contortions, that clearly hurt him strategically, to avoid getting sucked into Syria. And he's done this in Iraq, and he's done this with the Iran deal, and he's done this in lots of different ways — even in Russia.
.
President Barack Obama's biggest foreign-policy failure wasn't any one particular episode.
Rather, it was the fact that he "refused to choose a clear path forward," argues Ian Bremmer, president of the Eurasia Group.
"President Obama refused to commit to any foreign-policy framework to help him make difficult decisions," Bremmer writes in his new book, "Superpower."
"His priorities have shifted with changing headlines, he has redrawn red lines to no effect, and the few commitments he has made have encouraged others to set tests of American will that the White House had no intention of passing."
.
Bremmer said Obama's incoherent foreign-policy strategy combined with his risk-averse posture ultimately translated to several flubs.
"Obama is tactical and risk averse, which you see in Syria," Bremmer told Business Insider. "He makes the misstep on the red line, and then he does everything possible, ties himself in knot contortions, that clearly hurt him strategically, to avoid getting sucked into Syria. And he's done this in Iraq, and he's done this with the Iran deal, and he's done this in lots of different ways — even in Russia.
.
"Too little is as bad as too much. Too cautious is as bad as too reckless. It may not feel that way at first, but if, for example, the Middle East descends into a major region-wide war and our long-term interests are at risk or we are drawn in at a more dangerous moment, we will recognize just how costly mismanaged restraint can be."
.
.
In an increasingly volatile and multipolar world, Bremmer said, risk aversion isn't the way to go for a powerful nation. Not only does it confuse Americans, he said, but it also confuses US friends and adversaries.
"When I talk to foreign ministers from every country around the world, every one of our allies — they'll all tell you privately: 'My God. What does America stand for? Like, what do you guys want?' And they all want to hedge as a consequence of that," Bremmer told BI.
In other words, after a certain point, it's time to stop simply debating the options — and time to start making real choices.
.
"When I talk to foreign ministers from every country around the world, every one of our allies — they'll all tell you privately: 'My God. What does America stand for? Like, what do you guys want?' And they all want to hedge as a consequence of that," Bremmer told BI.
In other words, after a certain point, it's time to stop simply debating the options — and time to start making real choices.
.
Of course not. Not only never been to, but never heard of, which compounds the lie even more. But that's what these vile creatures do. Lie, ignore it when they are exposed, and move on to the next lie, rinse repeat over and over. They have the nerve to complain about politicians lying, when they make even a slime like Hillary seem honest.
Actually, You are proven wrong about EVERYTHING day in day out, month in month out, year in year out, both down here, and up in offshore when your blind homerism comes out about the Pats. Even a pathetic a creature as Lying Ace is schooling your ass on that. You continue to be the forum laughingstock, and when you go to the bank about something, everyone sane knows to go the other way.
[h=1]Jeb Bush Says His Brother Was Misled Into War by Faulty Intelligence. That's Not What Happened.[/h]
By David Corn | Tue May. 19, 2015 10:09 AM EDT
Social Title:
Jeb Bush says his brother was misled into war by faulty intelligence. That’s not what happened.
Last week, Jeb Bush stepped in it. It took the all-but-announced Republican presidential candidate several attempts to answer the most obvious question: Knowing what we know now, would you have launched the Iraq War? Yes, I would have, he initially declared, noting he would not dump on his brother for initiating the unpopular war. "So would almost everyone that was confronted with the intelligence they got," Bush said. In a subsequent and quickly offered back-pedaling remark—on his way to saying he would have made "different decisions"—Bush emphasized that a main problem with the Bush-Cheney invasion was "mistakes as it related to faulty intelligence in the lead-up to the war." And as his Republican rivals jumped on Bush, they, too, blamed bad intelligence for causing the war. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), insisting that he would not have favored the war (if he knew there were no weapons of mass destruction), commented, "President Bush has said that he regrets that the intelligence was faulty." And former CEO Carly Fiorina noted, "The intelligence was clearly wrong. And so had we known that the intelligence was wrong, no, I would not have gone in."
But here's the truth Jeb Bush and the others are hiding or eliding: George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, & Co. were not misled by lousy intelligence; they used lousy intelligence to mislead the public.
Throughout the run-up to the war, Bush, Cheney, and their lieutenants repeatedly stated assertions to justify the war that were not supported by the intel. They also hyped or mischaracterized existing intelligence to bolster their case for war. The book I wrote with Michael Isikoff, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War [1], chronicles the elaborate Bush-Cheney campaign to misuse and misrepresent the intelligence. Certainly, there was some information within the intelligence community (which turned out to be wrong) indicating that Saddam Hussein was trying to revive programs to develop biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. As the Bush White House was selling the possibility of war, the intelligence agencies did quickly produce a National Intelligence Estimate in October 2002 that said Iraq had "continued its weapons of mass destruction program." But there was other intelligence and analysis—some of it mentioned in that intelligence estimate—casting plenty of doubt on this. In fact, on many of the key elements of the Bush administration's case for war, the intelligence was, at best, iffy. Yet in this post-9/11 period, Bush and Cheney frequently declared there was no uncertainty: Saddam was pursuing WMD to threaten the United States, and, worse, he was in league with Al Qaeda.
Here are a few examples of how Bush and Cheney cooked the books:
The Iraq war at its heart was not an intelligence failure. Bush, Cheney, and their comrades were hell-bent on invading Iraq—not because of inaccurate intelligence, but because of their own assumptions and desires. The war did not happen because of bad intel. Consequently, asking whether the invasion should have happened knowing what is now known is an irrelevant exercise. For the Bush-Cheney gang, it truly did not matter what the intelligence said. They were not victims. They were the perps.
Source URL: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/05/jeb-bush-marco-rubio-iraq-war-intelligence
By David Corn | Tue May. 19, 2015 10:09 AM EDT
Social Title:
Jeb Bush says his brother was misled into war by faulty intelligence. That’s not what happened.
Last week, Jeb Bush stepped in it. It took the all-but-announced Republican presidential candidate several attempts to answer the most obvious question: Knowing what we know now, would you have launched the Iraq War? Yes, I would have, he initially declared, noting he would not dump on his brother for initiating the unpopular war. "So would almost everyone that was confronted with the intelligence they got," Bush said. In a subsequent and quickly offered back-pedaling remark—on his way to saying he would have made "different decisions"—Bush emphasized that a main problem with the Bush-Cheney invasion was "mistakes as it related to faulty intelligence in the lead-up to the war." And as his Republican rivals jumped on Bush, they, too, blamed bad intelligence for causing the war. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), insisting that he would not have favored the war (if he knew there were no weapons of mass destruction), commented, "President Bush has said that he regrets that the intelligence was faulty." And former CEO Carly Fiorina noted, "The intelligence was clearly wrong. And so had we known that the intelligence was wrong, no, I would not have gone in."
But here's the truth Jeb Bush and the others are hiding or eliding: George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, & Co. were not misled by lousy intelligence; they used lousy intelligence to mislead the public.
Throughout the run-up to the war, Bush, Cheney, and their lieutenants repeatedly stated assertions to justify the war that were not supported by the intel. They also hyped or mischaracterized existing intelligence to bolster their case for war. The book I wrote with Michael Isikoff, Hubris: The Inside Story of Spin, Scandal, and the Selling of the Iraq War [1], chronicles the elaborate Bush-Cheney campaign to misuse and misrepresent the intelligence. Certainly, there was some information within the intelligence community (which turned out to be wrong) indicating that Saddam Hussein was trying to revive programs to develop biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. As the Bush White House was selling the possibility of war, the intelligence agencies did quickly produce a National Intelligence Estimate in October 2002 that said Iraq had "continued its weapons of mass destruction program." But there was other intelligence and analysis—some of it mentioned in that intelligence estimate—casting plenty of doubt on this. In fact, on many of the key elements of the Bush administration's case for war, the intelligence was, at best, iffy. Yet in this post-9/11 period, Bush and Cheney frequently declared there was no uncertainty: Saddam was pursuing WMD to threaten the United States, and, worse, he was in league with Al Qaeda.
Here are a few examples of how Bush and Cheney cooked the books:
- In an August 2002 speech that kicked off the administration's campaign for war against Iraq, Cheney asserted, "Simply stated, there's no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends, against our allies, and against us." But earlier in the year, Vice Adm. Thomas Wilson, the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, had told Congress that Iraq possessed only "residual" amounts of WMD. There was no confirmed intelligence at this point establishing that Saddam had revived a major WMD operation. As Cheney made this claim, Anthony Zinni, a former commander in chief of US Central Command, was on the stage. He was stunned to hear Cheney say that Iraq was actively pursuing WMD. As he later recalled, [2] "It was a shock. It was a total shock. I couldn't believe the vice president was saying this, you know? In doing work with the CIA on Iraq WMD, through all the briefings I heard at Langley, I never saw one piece of credible evidence that there was an ongoing program." In other words, bad intelligence did not cause Cheney to make this categorical, bold, and frightening statement. He just did it.
- In September 2002, Cheney insisted there was "very clear evidence" Saddam was developing nuclear weapons: Iraq's acquisition of aluminum tubes that were to be used to enrich uranium for bombs. But Cheney and the Bush White House did not tell the public that there was a heated dispute within the intelligence community about this supposed evidence. The top scientific experts in the government had concluded these tubes were not suitable for a nuclear weapons program. But one CIA analyst—who was not a scientific expert—contended the tubes were smoking-gun proof that Saddam was working to produce nuclear weapons. The Bush-Cheney White House embraced this faulty piece of evidence and ignored the more-informed analysis. Bush and Cheney were cherry-picking—choosing bad intelligence over good—and not paying attention to better information that cut the other way.
- Cheney repeatedly referred publicly to a report that maintained that 9/11 ringleader Mohamed Atta had met secretly in Prague with an Iraqi intelligence officer—even though the CIA and FBI had dismissed this allegation. This is a damning example of Cheney citing discredited intelligence to score points. Intelligence experts had said there was nothing to this tale, but Cheney kept on mentioning the alleged Atta-Iraq connection to suggest Iraq was involved with the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission later reconfirmed that this report of a Prague meeting was bunk.
- The Atta allegation was part of a wider effort mounted by the Bush-Cheney administration to link Saddam to 9/11. In November 2002, Bush said Saddam "is a threat because he's dealing with Al Qaeda." Weeks earlier, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had claimed he had "bullet-proof" evidence that Saddam was tied to Osama bin Laden. In March 2003, Cheney asserted that Saddam had a "long-standing relationship" with Al Qaeda. The intelligence did not show this. As the 9/11 Commission later concluded, there had been no intelligence confirming significant contacts between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Once again, Bush and Cheney were not being fooled by flawed intelligence; they were were pushing disinformation.
- At a press conference at the end of 2002, Bush declared, "We don't know whether or not [Saddam] has a nuclear weapon." He clearly was suggesting that Saddam might already possess these dangerous weapons. Yet no intelligence at the time indicated that the Iraqi dictator had by then developed such weapons. The administration also insisted Saddam had been shopping for uranium in Africa, even though the intelligence on this point was dubious.
The Iraq war at its heart was not an intelligence failure. Bush, Cheney, and their comrades were hell-bent on invading Iraq—not because of inaccurate intelligence, but because of their own assumptions and desires. The war did not happen because of bad intel. Consequently, asking whether the invasion should have happened knowing what is now known is an irrelevant exercise. For the Bush-Cheney gang, it truly did not matter what the intelligence said. They were not victims. They were the perps.
Source URL: http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/05/jeb-bush-marco-rubio-iraq-war-intelligence
Blair said we should be proud of the war
Asked by the inquiry chairman, Sir John Chilcot, whether he had any regrets, he replied: "Responsibility but not a regret for removing Saddam Hussein. I think that he was a monster. I believe he threatened not just the region but the world. And in the circumstances that we faced then, but I think even if you look back now, it was better to deal with this threat, to remove him from office."
He added: "I had to take this decision as Prime Minister. It was a huge responsibility and there is not a single day that passes by that I don't reflect and think about that responsibility." He insisted that the war, which cost the lives of 179 British soldiers, was justified despite the failure to uncover any weapons of mass destruction
Mr Blair admitted making mistakes in preparing for the aftermath of the invasion and in presenting the case for war. But he was otherwise unrepentant about joining the US-led military action in March 2003, making plain he was preparing to send British troops into Iraq long before the invasion began. Although weapons of mass destruction were never uncovered in Iraq, Mr Blair argued that Saddam "retained absolutely the intent and the intellectual know-how to restart a nuclear and a chemical weapons programme". He repeatedly singled out Iran as he warned the current generation of world leaders that they face a similar dilemma today, adding that his fears at the time – that failed or highly repressive states with WMD "become porous, they construct all sorts of different alliances with people" – were even stronger now "as a result of what Iran particularly is doing"
Mr Blair told the inquiry he believed the "calculus of risk" posed by rogue states changed completely following the attacks of 11 September 2001.
Before then the international community had relied on a "hoping for the best" strategy of containing Saddam Hussein through targeted sanctions and enforcing a no-fly zone over Iraq.
But he admitted that it was the "risk calculation" that had altered since 9/11, rather than the intelligence about WMDs.
Apparently contradicting assertions at the time about the "growing" threat from Saddam, Mr Blair said: "It wasn't that objectively [Saddam] had done more ... It was that our perception of the risk had shifted."
I understand your point, I just disagree with it. In order to defeat this enemy, and help prevent them springing up continuously, it certainly helps to understand their origins, why they came to be, what you can do to avoid it again and again. ISIS was created by our reckless War in Iraq. ISIS will not be defeated by bombing them into submission. You can't bomb ideas away.
I understand your point, I just disagree with it. In order to defeat this enemy, and help prevent them springing up continuously, it certainly helps to understand their origins, why they came to be, what you can do to avoid it again and again. ISIS was created by our reckless War in Iraq. ISIS will not be defeated by bombing them into submission. You can't bomb ideas away.
Names of the Islamic State
Six Islamic State (IS) Iterations
from 1999 - 2014
The Islamic State (IS) is currently in its 6th iteration. The below list tracks the dates for each iteration of the group.
1999 - Original Formation
al-Tawhid & al-Jihad
• Original group formed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
• Used the flag in the top left and logo on top right
17 Oct. 2004 - Name Change & Reorganization
al-Qaeda in the Land of Two Rivers (AQLTR) [a.k.a. al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)]
• Name changed when al-Zarqawi pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda
• Used logo on top right
Jan. 2006 - Name Change & Reorganization
Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC)
• Rebranded to put an Iraqi face on the group
• All logos for group changed, begun using logo on bottom left
Oct. 2006 - Name Change & Reorganization
Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)
• New branding to mark the announcement of the Islamic State of Iraq
• Began using black jihadi flag
8 Apr. 2013 - Name Change & Reorganization
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) [a.k.a. Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)]
• New branding to mark the expansion of the Islamic State into Syria.
• Continued using black jihadi flag
29 Jun. 2014 - Name Change & Reorganization
Islamic State (IS)
• Announced formation of Islamic Caliphate with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the Caliph
• Continued using black jihadi flag
