I don't really have anything to say but I found this article a good read, maybe it helps you a little bit...
IPO Price is a Balancing Act
more in
Deals India »
By SAMITA SAWARDEKAR
LinkedIn's stunning debut on listing led to many charging bankers on the deal with mispricing initial share sales at the cost of the issuer. While lately the chatter has shifted to the gall of Groupon, the daily deals site, to value itself at nearly $20 billion.
A
New York Times piece summed up the LinkedIn criticism succinctly. The contention was that the bankers underpriced LinkedIn at $45 (since the stock more than doubled on the first day of listing) and this mispricing was intentionally done to favor the banks' investor clients.
While bankers are an easy whipping target, the LinkedIn instance only goes to show, once again, that valuation is an inexact science. And, pricing of an initial public offering depends on a variety of factors which change with market dynamics.
View Full Image
Justin Sullivan/Getty Images The LinkedIn headquarters in Mountain View, California.
An initial public offer pricing, by its very nature, is a delicate balancing act between issuer and investors, both important constituencies of an investment banker. Bankers don't want to overprice deal and loose their investor base but at the same time they don't want to underprice deals and loose their fee-paying issuer clients. The challenge is to balance these conflicting interests and build a long-term sustainable capital markets practice.
To achieve this balance, bankers use a process called book-building. Typically, in the run-up to an offer, the management accompanied by its bankers goes on the road to explain its story to key investors. Post such "road shows", investors are asked to indicate their interest in the deal and their willingness to participate at a certain valuation. This process of book-building is used to "discover" the price, with bankers adjusting the price upwards or downwards depending on the demand for the stock.
However, this process is not perfect and hardly foolproof.
While it reflects demand from a finite number of investors, which the investment banks are in touch with, it's not possible to cover the entire lot of investors who can and do participate in the secondary market.
At the same time, it's not uncommon for investors to change their mind based on market dynamics. In good times, it can lead to a significant increase in demand as the herd mentality kicks in and the frenzy for the stock builds up.
Bankers also look at the composition of the book while making allocations and fixing the price. Ideally, one would want a good mix of long-only funds and hedge funds. Long-only funds tend take a more fundamental view on stocks and are long-term investors as opposed to hedge funds who impart liquidity to the counter but are momentum-driven and can enter and exit the stock in a jiffy.
So, it makes sense to fix a price that reflects the demand from long-only funds, which in a bull market, is typically lower than what hedge funds will be willing to play.
It also makes sense for an issuer to leave something on the table for investors, especially if you expect to tap the market for funds again. Most large initial share sales tend to involve minimal dilution of 5% to 10% and issuers, by letting the price trade up and investors make money, are able to create a loyal investor base that would allow them to tap the market and raise funds in the future.
A case in point is MakeMyTrip, the Indian online travel site. The company raised $70 million in its initial share sale last September. The IPO was priced at $14 and the stock traded up to $43, subsequently settling down to trade around $25. Last month, MakeMyTrip completed its second share sale.
Internet companies, particularly social networking sites, have certainly caught investor fancy. With valuations sky-rocketing, questions are being raised about the building frothiness in the market and its sustainability.
Take LinkedIn itself. The bankers priced, LinkedIn with $243 million in sales and $3.4 million of earnings in 2010, at 17 times sales multiple, which normally is anything but low. Goldman Sachs, an early investor in LinkedIn, chose to sell its entire stake in the initial share sale, something that the global bank would hardly do if it believed the deal was underpriced.
In this column, we had talked last week about why stocks crash post initial share sale. LinkedIn is at the opposite end of the spectrum. Critics would do better to consider the implications of such exuberance, which is a far more worrisome trend.