“It’s a thin line … ”
There is a joke among poker players regarding the answer to any question about the game. We always like to say, “It depends.” While this is obviously a cop-out to some degree, there is a great deal of truth in it. After all, any game that is worth playing rarely has simple answers to even apparently simple questions. You are a Monopoly expert, and somebody asks you, “I own Boardwalk, and another player has offered to buy it from me for $600. Should I sell?” Well, does that player own Park Place? How much cash do you have? How close are you to hitting Boardwalk? And so on, and so on.
And so it is with poker. Virtually everything is dependent on the situation. A tiny change in the playing scenario (such as being penultimate to act instead of last) can change a “zig” to a “zag.” And you have to be alert to them to be a successful poker player. If you do the “obvious” thing all the time, it may mean that you’re not paying sufficient attention to the nuances of the game and the particular hand.
One such interesting situation came up for me recently in an online $15-$30 (limit) game. As is my wont, I had been taking notes on the players as I saw the opportunity, and had them on about four or five of the players at my table. And then, the hand broke out …
I was in the big blind with A-K offsuit. The under-the-gun (UTG) player raised, one or two players folded, there was another raise, another player or two folded, and somebody else capped it! Now, here was decision No. 1. There’s no shame in folding A-K offsuit, especially when you have to play it from out of position and three other players claim to like their hands. Your obvious concern here is that (1) you’re up against K-K or A-A, or (2) you’re up against another A-K. Especially in this scenario, having another A-K out would be a mess. After all, with all of those raises in there, it was very likely that at least one player had a pocket pair. So, I’d need to hit an ace or a king. But two of the six cards I wanted to see on the flop might well be in another hand, and if I hit one of them, I’d be sharing the pot with somebody else. I was actually coming close to folding, when I thought about two things: First, I was getting slightly better pot odds (almost 14-3) because I was paying one fewer bet than the rest. But more importantly, I saw that I had notes on two of the players. Both notes said that those players didn’t need much of a hand to raise (or even reraise). And the last player (the one who had put in the third bet) had no notes next to him.
It was a bit of a gamble, but I jumped in.
I flopped the nuts: A-5-5 rainbow. “Wait — that’s not the nuts. The nuts is A-A-K, or Q-J-10, or K-K-K, or … ” OK, but let’s stop being so technical for a moment and think about this. If one of these folks had A-A, I was drawing essentially dead. But note that for him to have that, he’d have to have specifically the remaining two aces in the deck. When I have to put a player on two specific cards to beat me, that’s monsters under the bed and I’m not playing that game. “What if one of ’em has a 5?” He’s going to win a big pot. But while it was possible that one of them held a 5 (or 5-5), it was very unlikely. In short, I had a hand that I was ready to play for the nuts. My only concern was whether I was splitting the pot with somebody. If so, I was not going to get him out, and I didn’t want to shut out the other players, who would be paying us off.
I checked. After all, I was supposed to be some idiot who called three bets cold in the big blind with nothing but dreams. Let’s see how the others felt about the flop. The UTG guy bet out, and got raised by the next player. Then, the button three-bet! That was almost certainly the other A-K. I just called the three bets cold (and found myself wondering what they thought I had). The UTG guy called both raises cold, but now the original flop raiser folded. He probably had a big pair and decided he needed to take a shot in this monster pot. When three other people were willing to put in three bets each, he knew his Q-Q (or whatever) was no good. I made a note about him.
The turn was a 7, putting a two-flush on the board. Now, I decided to see if we could trap UTG for a few bets. I bet, he called, and (as anticipated) the button raised. I seriously considered three-betting, but I was absolutely sure I was splitting the pot with the button, and I didn’t want UTG out. I decided that he didn’t have a flush draw, but more likely a big pair that he wasn’t willing to give up, or the case ace with a weaker kicker. So, I just called the raise, as did UTG. So far, so good.
The river was a beautiful offsuit 4. I bet out, and UTG folded! What in the world could he have come so far with only to give up now? And now, the button raised again! Well, shucks. Note that he had raised at every opportunity he had throughout the hand. My notes about him (“raises with weak hands”) notwithstanding, bad players are allowed to get dealt A-A. And there was always the danger that he held a 5. So, I simply called, expecting to split the pot. Imagine my astonishment to see that he held A-2 suited. In short, he’d been drawing very nearly dead on the flop. I was delighted not to have to share the monster pot with him, of course, and made a note that he overplayed bad aces.
But the important lesson here is realizing what a monster A-K was, given the preflop play and the exact flop. Had the flop been K-5-5, I still would have had top pair, best kicker. But both A-A and K-K, while unlikely, would have me badly beaten. Had the flop been A-J-5 and I had seen that kind of action, the probability of being shown A-J or J-J was high. It was this specific flop, the action that preceded and followed it, and my notes about the players that enabled me to play top pair like I’d flopped the immortal nuts.
“Between fold and raise”
Lee Jones Card Player Magazine
There is a joke among poker players regarding the answer to any question about the game. We always like to say, “It depends.” While this is obviously a cop-out to some degree, there is a great deal of truth in it. After all, any game that is worth playing rarely has simple answers to even apparently simple questions. You are a Monopoly expert, and somebody asks you, “I own Boardwalk, and another player has offered to buy it from me for $600. Should I sell?” Well, does that player own Park Place? How much cash do you have? How close are you to hitting Boardwalk? And so on, and so on.
And so it is with poker. Virtually everything is dependent on the situation. A tiny change in the playing scenario (such as being penultimate to act instead of last) can change a “zig” to a “zag.” And you have to be alert to them to be a successful poker player. If you do the “obvious” thing all the time, it may mean that you’re not paying sufficient attention to the nuances of the game and the particular hand.
One such interesting situation came up for me recently in an online $15-$30 (limit) game. As is my wont, I had been taking notes on the players as I saw the opportunity, and had them on about four or five of the players at my table. And then, the hand broke out …
I was in the big blind with A-K offsuit. The under-the-gun (UTG) player raised, one or two players folded, there was another raise, another player or two folded, and somebody else capped it! Now, here was decision No. 1. There’s no shame in folding A-K offsuit, especially when you have to play it from out of position and three other players claim to like their hands. Your obvious concern here is that (1) you’re up against K-K or A-A, or (2) you’re up against another A-K. Especially in this scenario, having another A-K out would be a mess. After all, with all of those raises in there, it was very likely that at least one player had a pocket pair. So, I’d need to hit an ace or a king. But two of the six cards I wanted to see on the flop might well be in another hand, and if I hit one of them, I’d be sharing the pot with somebody else. I was actually coming close to folding, when I thought about two things: First, I was getting slightly better pot odds (almost 14-3) because I was paying one fewer bet than the rest. But more importantly, I saw that I had notes on two of the players. Both notes said that those players didn’t need much of a hand to raise (or even reraise). And the last player (the one who had put in the third bet) had no notes next to him.
It was a bit of a gamble, but I jumped in.
I flopped the nuts: A-5-5 rainbow. “Wait — that’s not the nuts. The nuts is A-A-K, or Q-J-10, or K-K-K, or … ” OK, but let’s stop being so technical for a moment and think about this. If one of these folks had A-A, I was drawing essentially dead. But note that for him to have that, he’d have to have specifically the remaining two aces in the deck. When I have to put a player on two specific cards to beat me, that’s monsters under the bed and I’m not playing that game. “What if one of ’em has a 5?” He’s going to win a big pot. But while it was possible that one of them held a 5 (or 5-5), it was very unlikely. In short, I had a hand that I was ready to play for the nuts. My only concern was whether I was splitting the pot with somebody. If so, I was not going to get him out, and I didn’t want to shut out the other players, who would be paying us off.
I checked. After all, I was supposed to be some idiot who called three bets cold in the big blind with nothing but dreams. Let’s see how the others felt about the flop. The UTG guy bet out, and got raised by the next player. Then, the button three-bet! That was almost certainly the other A-K. I just called the three bets cold (and found myself wondering what they thought I had). The UTG guy called both raises cold, but now the original flop raiser folded. He probably had a big pair and decided he needed to take a shot in this monster pot. When three other people were willing to put in three bets each, he knew his Q-Q (or whatever) was no good. I made a note about him.
The turn was a 7, putting a two-flush on the board. Now, I decided to see if we could trap UTG for a few bets. I bet, he called, and (as anticipated) the button raised. I seriously considered three-betting, but I was absolutely sure I was splitting the pot with the button, and I didn’t want UTG out. I decided that he didn’t have a flush draw, but more likely a big pair that he wasn’t willing to give up, or the case ace with a weaker kicker. So, I just called the raise, as did UTG. So far, so good.
The river was a beautiful offsuit 4. I bet out, and UTG folded! What in the world could he have come so far with only to give up now? And now, the button raised again! Well, shucks. Note that he had raised at every opportunity he had throughout the hand. My notes about him (“raises with weak hands”) notwithstanding, bad players are allowed to get dealt A-A. And there was always the danger that he held a 5. So, I simply called, expecting to split the pot. Imagine my astonishment to see that he held A-2 suited. In short, he’d been drawing very nearly dead on the flop. I was delighted not to have to share the monster pot with him, of course, and made a note that he overplayed bad aces.
But the important lesson here is realizing what a monster A-K was, given the preflop play and the exact flop. Had the flop been K-5-5, I still would have had top pair, best kicker. But both A-A and K-K, while unlikely, would have me badly beaten. Had the flop been A-J-5 and I had seen that kind of action, the probability of being shown A-J or J-J was high. It was this specific flop, the action that preceded and followed it, and my notes about the players that enabled me to play top pair like I’d flopped the immortal nuts.
“Between fold and raise”
Lee Jones Card Player Magazine
