Hey General,
Even though as an old jarhead myself I don't always have time to reply thanks for posting these.
This one rings home a little more than others. Not that it was this day, but my uncle's squad of marines was cut off defending a hill on Okinawa and he was hit and almost bled to death there.
Deepest respects for all those who have gone before.
Semper fi,
Mud
Even though as an old jarhead myself I don't always have time to reply thanks for posting these.
This one rings home a little more than others. Not that it was this day, but my uncle's squad of marines was cut off defending a hill on Okinawa and he was hit and almost bled to death there.
Deepest respects for all those who have gone before.
Semper fi,
Mud
The operation on Okinawa was named Operation Iceberg. It began on Okinawa on April 1, 1945, Easter Sunday. The landing would be referred to as 'L Day' or 'Love Day' and perhaps in keeping with April Fools Day, the landing encountered virtually no opposition. This lack of opposition was unexpected and unprecedented. The Tenth Army itself was unique. With the combination of Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur's forces, a joint task force had been assembled. Not just a U.S. joint task force, but one that included Great Britain. The British Task Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Sir Bernard Rawlings, turned over operational control to Admiral R.A. Sprunce, U.S. Navy, Commander, Fifth Fleet.(16) This combining of marines, soldiers, and naval personnel created the largest group of Americans and Allies to land in the Pacific, 548,000, before it was all over.(17)
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/okinawa/default.aspx
The Battle for Okinawa: April 1 - July 2, 1945
As we enter the month of April, my sense of Marine Corps history arouses with the first day of the month-April Fool's Day.
However, in 1945 in Okinawa, there was a different view. Over 500,000 Americans aboard over 1,200 ships were preparing to assault the island. To these men, April 1st was not only Easter Sunday, it was "L-Day."
The Battle for Okinawa is an immense but fascinating subject that cannot be given justice within the confines of this publication. For that reason, I have included a recommend reading list at the end of the article. The Battle of Okinawa was the largest air, sea, and land battle ever. Put simply, the battle embodied the culmination of two seasoned forces and doctrines. It pitted the inherently offensive American amphibious power in the Pacific and the refined defensive doctrine of a Japanese opponent who was prepared to defend to the last soldier. The battle produced sustained savagery that eclipsed every other Pacific campaign.
Located strategically between Kyushu, the southernmost island of Japan, and Formosa, modern Taiwan, Okinawa was to be used as an advance base for the eventual assault on the Japanese mainland. The island was inhabited by a peaceful people and was sixty miles long and one to twelve miles wide. For their defense, the Japanese abandoned their previous doctrine of resisting at the beaches in favor of an inland defense in depth in the southern one-sixth of the island. Banzai attacks were to be avoided and the American superiority in long-range firepower nullified by close-in fighting from prepared positions. In addition, the room for American maneuver was prevented by the three Japanese defensive belts across the width of the island just north of Naha. These belts consisted of improved natural caves, reinforced manmade bunkers, and concrete family tombs that dotted the island. The Japanese mission was to delay as long as possible to allow time for defensive preparations of the Japanese mainland. This mission symbolized the change in Japanese tactical doctrine from swift attack and an irrational focus on use of the bayonet to a combination static, mobile, and underground defense.
The American tactical strength lay in firepower, specifically supporting arms in the form of artillery, naval gunfire, and aviation. In the end, this advantage was overwhelming. The American Marines and Soldiers hit the Hagushi beaches along the western coast of the island, and were surprised to find very light resistance. As two Army divisions turned southward and two Marine divisions split the island in two and turned northward, some of the optimism in the front lines began to percolate upwards. However, it soon became apparent that the Japanese defenders were using new tactics. Although the Marines experienced a quick but sharp three-week campaign in clearing and securing the northern three-fourths of the island, the Army divisions were advancing into steadily increasing resistance southwards into the outposts of the three Japanese main defensive belts. In addition, an Army division seized the nearby island of Ie Shima with its airfield, but at the cost of popular correspondent Ernie Pyle. Having lost most forward air bases and aircraft carriers, the Japanese high command planned to emphasize suicide-piloted aircraft attacks on Allied ships.
To defend against massed air attack, the U.S. employed light ships as radar picket ships that ringed the island. The pickets provided key early-warning air radar coverage in a 360-degree arc. Despite the bravery of these ships, they sustained heavy losses throughout the campaign, with over 180 ships damaged or sunk.
The Japanese had been refining an air attack tactic known as the "Kamikaze." Although Japanese pilots had been crash-diving their aircraft into American ships sporadically throughout the war, it wasn't until Okinawa that organized mass suicide attacks by aircraft and "Bakas," or piloted, suicide rocket bombs, came to the fore. The absolute alien concept (to the western mind) of suicide attack was surmounted by the terror and strain that these tactics caused among Navy crews. Although most kamikazes were shot down or missed their targets, they contributed to the loss or damage of over three hundred Allied ships during the campaign.
In addition to suicide attacks from the air, a larger threat, The Japanese battleship, Yamato, the largest warship ever built and the pride of the once-mighty Imperial Japanese Fleet, was dispatched to Okinawa on April 6, 1945, with no protective air cover. In effect, this was a naval kamikaze mission. Caught steaming in the open, she was mauled by hundreds of U.S. carrier aircraft and sent to the bottom so violently as to be seen and heard in southern Japan hundreds of miles away.
Back on the island, the Army and Marines slugged their way south. As the pace of violence quickened in late April, terrain features with names that strike a chord of macabre nostalgia became hotly contested killing fields-Wana Ridge, Wana Draw, The Pinnacle, Kakazu Ridge, Sugarloaf, Horseshoe, Half-Moon, Urasoe, Shuri Castle. The Americans slugged their way south with satchel charges, flamethrowers, tanks, small arms, knives, grenades, and supporting arms, the toll in blood mounting.
The Americans finally broke the main Japanese defense line and, in the end, employing "blowtorch and corkscrew" (flamethrowers and high explosives combo), the Japanese had withdrawn to the southern tip of the island. On June 18, Lt. Gen. Buckner was hit and killed by a coral fragment thrown up by a Japanese artillery shell, becoming the highest-ranked Allied general to be killed in action in World War II. Marine Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger assumed temporary command of Tenth Army until relieved five days later by Army Lt. Gen. Joseph A. Stilwell, the first and only time a Marine has commanded a field army. Two days later, Generals Ushijima and Cho committed ritual suicide, according to their Bushido tradition. The eighty-two day Okinawan campaign was officially declared over on July 2. American casualties exceeded 68,000, of which over 10,000 were killed. Okinawan civilians themselves lost one-third of their population with over 150,000 killed. Of the over 100,000 Japanese defending the island, almost all were killed.
Recommended Reading
1. Feifer, George; Tennozan: "The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb", Ticknor and Fields, NewYork, 1992. (Editor's Note: HIGHLY RECOMMENDED)
2. Appleman, Roy E., and James M. Burns, et. al.; "Okinawa: The Last Battle", Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1993
3. Gudmundsson, Bruce I.; "Okinawa" in Military History Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 3, American Historical Publications, Inc., 1995.
4. Huber, Thomas M.; Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945, Leavenworth Papers No. 18, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.
5. Leckie, Robert; Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II, Viking Penguin, New York, 1995.
6. Manchester, William; Goodbye Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1979.
7. Nichols, Charles S. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.; Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific, The Battery Press, Nashville, 1955.
8. Sledge, Eugene B.; With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1981.
9. Belote, James H. and William.; Typhoon of Steel. Harper and Row, New York, N.Y. 1970.
http://www.dcmilitary.com/marines/hendersonhall/6_14/national_news/
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/wwii/okinawa/default.aspx
The Battle for Okinawa: April 1 - July 2, 1945
As we enter the month of April, my sense of Marine Corps history arouses with the first day of the month-April Fool's Day.
However, in 1945 in Okinawa, there was a different view. Over 500,000 Americans aboard over 1,200 ships were preparing to assault the island. To these men, April 1st was not only Easter Sunday, it was "L-Day."
The Battle for Okinawa is an immense but fascinating subject that cannot be given justice within the confines of this publication. For that reason, I have included a recommend reading list at the end of the article. The Battle of Okinawa was the largest air, sea, and land battle ever. Put simply, the battle embodied the culmination of two seasoned forces and doctrines. It pitted the inherently offensive American amphibious power in the Pacific and the refined defensive doctrine of a Japanese opponent who was prepared to defend to the last soldier. The battle produced sustained savagery that eclipsed every other Pacific campaign.
Located strategically between Kyushu, the southernmost island of Japan, and Formosa, modern Taiwan, Okinawa was to be used as an advance base for the eventual assault on the Japanese mainland. The island was inhabited by a peaceful people and was sixty miles long and one to twelve miles wide. For their defense, the Japanese abandoned their previous doctrine of resisting at the beaches in favor of an inland defense in depth in the southern one-sixth of the island. Banzai attacks were to be avoided and the American superiority in long-range firepower nullified by close-in fighting from prepared positions. In addition, the room for American maneuver was prevented by the three Japanese defensive belts across the width of the island just north of Naha. These belts consisted of improved natural caves, reinforced manmade bunkers, and concrete family tombs that dotted the island. The Japanese mission was to delay as long as possible to allow time for defensive preparations of the Japanese mainland. This mission symbolized the change in Japanese tactical doctrine from swift attack and an irrational focus on use of the bayonet to a combination static, mobile, and underground defense.
The American tactical strength lay in firepower, specifically supporting arms in the form of artillery, naval gunfire, and aviation. In the end, this advantage was overwhelming. The American Marines and Soldiers hit the Hagushi beaches along the western coast of the island, and were surprised to find very light resistance. As two Army divisions turned southward and two Marine divisions split the island in two and turned northward, some of the optimism in the front lines began to percolate upwards. However, it soon became apparent that the Japanese defenders were using new tactics. Although the Marines experienced a quick but sharp three-week campaign in clearing and securing the northern three-fourths of the island, the Army divisions were advancing into steadily increasing resistance southwards into the outposts of the three Japanese main defensive belts. In addition, an Army division seized the nearby island of Ie Shima with its airfield, but at the cost of popular correspondent Ernie Pyle. Having lost most forward air bases and aircraft carriers, the Japanese high command planned to emphasize suicide-piloted aircraft attacks on Allied ships.
To defend against massed air attack, the U.S. employed light ships as radar picket ships that ringed the island. The pickets provided key early-warning air radar coverage in a 360-degree arc. Despite the bravery of these ships, they sustained heavy losses throughout the campaign, with over 180 ships damaged or sunk.
The Japanese had been refining an air attack tactic known as the "Kamikaze." Although Japanese pilots had been crash-diving their aircraft into American ships sporadically throughout the war, it wasn't until Okinawa that organized mass suicide attacks by aircraft and "Bakas," or piloted, suicide rocket bombs, came to the fore. The absolute alien concept (to the western mind) of suicide attack was surmounted by the terror and strain that these tactics caused among Navy crews. Although most kamikazes were shot down or missed their targets, they contributed to the loss or damage of over three hundred Allied ships during the campaign.
In addition to suicide attacks from the air, a larger threat, The Japanese battleship, Yamato, the largest warship ever built and the pride of the once-mighty Imperial Japanese Fleet, was dispatched to Okinawa on April 6, 1945, with no protective air cover. In effect, this was a naval kamikaze mission. Caught steaming in the open, she was mauled by hundreds of U.S. carrier aircraft and sent to the bottom so violently as to be seen and heard in southern Japan hundreds of miles away.
Back on the island, the Army and Marines slugged their way south. As the pace of violence quickened in late April, terrain features with names that strike a chord of macabre nostalgia became hotly contested killing fields-Wana Ridge, Wana Draw, The Pinnacle, Kakazu Ridge, Sugarloaf, Horseshoe, Half-Moon, Urasoe, Shuri Castle. The Americans slugged their way south with satchel charges, flamethrowers, tanks, small arms, knives, grenades, and supporting arms, the toll in blood mounting.
The Americans finally broke the main Japanese defense line and, in the end, employing "blowtorch and corkscrew" (flamethrowers and high explosives combo), the Japanese had withdrawn to the southern tip of the island. On June 18, Lt. Gen. Buckner was hit and killed by a coral fragment thrown up by a Japanese artillery shell, becoming the highest-ranked Allied general to be killed in action in World War II. Marine Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger assumed temporary command of Tenth Army until relieved five days later by Army Lt. Gen. Joseph A. Stilwell, the first and only time a Marine has commanded a field army. Two days later, Generals Ushijima and Cho committed ritual suicide, according to their Bushido tradition. The eighty-two day Okinawan campaign was officially declared over on July 2. American casualties exceeded 68,000, of which over 10,000 were killed. Okinawan civilians themselves lost one-third of their population with over 150,000 killed. Of the over 100,000 Japanese defending the island, almost all were killed.
Recommended Reading
1. Feifer, George; Tennozan: "The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb", Ticknor and Fields, NewYork, 1992. (Editor's Note: HIGHLY RECOMMENDED)
2. Appleman, Roy E., and James M. Burns, et. al.; "Okinawa: The Last Battle", Center of Military History, United States Army, Washington, D.C., 1993
3. Gudmundsson, Bruce I.; "Okinawa" in Military History Quarterly, Vol. 7 No. 3, American Historical Publications, Inc., 1995.
4. Huber, Thomas M.; Japan's Battle of Okinawa, April-June 1945, Leavenworth Papers No. 18, Combat Studies Institute, US Army Command and General Staff College, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, 1990.
5. Leckie, Robert; Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II, Viking Penguin, New York, 1995.
6. Manchester, William; Goodbye Darkness: A Memoir of the Pacific War, Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1979.
7. Nichols, Charles S. and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.; Okinawa: Victory in the Pacific, The Battery Press, Nashville, 1955.
8. Sledge, Eugene B.; With the Old Breed at Peleliu and Okinawa, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1981.
9. Belote, James H. and William.; Typhoon of Steel. Harper and Row, New York, N.Y. 1970.
http://www.dcmilitary.com/marines/hendersonhall/6_14/national_news/
