The government has been given two months to address shortfalls in its evidence on Iraq's weapons
Ewen MacAskill, Richard Norton-Taylor and David Pallister
Tuesday July 8, 2003
The Guardian
The Commons foreign affairs select committee set four potentially explosive traps for the government yesterday in the row over Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction.
The MPs homed in on four of the biggest weaknesses in the government's September dossier, which was supposedly based on state of the art intelligence. They demanded ministers come up with answers.
The government has two months to reply to the committee. Ministers hope that the worst of the row is behind them but as long as these questions remain the controversy over why Britain went to war will continue.
The committee says
"We recommend that in its response to this report the government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes, in the light of subsequent events."
Assessment
The committee's request goes to the heart of Tony Blair's claim that the Iraqi threat was both "serious and current".
More than two months after the war, the fate of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons remains unclear. They may have been destroyed before the UN's inspectors returned to Iraq late last year or shortly before the war or they may be hidden. Most independent analysts questioned by the committee believe that they are either hidden in places known only to Saddam's security officials - who may have been shot on his orders - or they were destroyed. Those taking the latter view say the only evidence may be paperwork, blueprints or computer discs.
Asked if Iraq produced such weapons after the UN's inspectors left Iraq in 1998, Tom Inch, former deputy director of the Porton Down chemical and biological weapons research station, told the committee: "I do not think there is any compelling evidence to say that they did but again there is no compelling evidence to say that they did not."
The committee points out that even the September dossier gave "no indication of the scale and scope of Iraq's present arsenal of chemical and biological weapons". It is "too soon", it adds, "to tell whether the government's assertions on Iraq's chemical and biological weapons will be borne out."
The committee says there was only lim ited access to human intelligence in Iraq on which to base claims about Saddam's banned weapons programme.
The committee was hampered by the government's refusal to let them see intelligence documents or question John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee (JIC).
Though the committee clears Alastair Campbell of exerting or seeking to exert improper influence on the drafting of the September dossier, it does so "on the basis of the evidence available to us".
It remains unclear what behind the scenes pressure was put on Mr Scarlett to pump up the language of the September dossier. The committee does not doubt that the language was hardened. We do not know how the intelligence agencies responded officially to government pressure for a published dossier on Iraq's banned weapons programme.
We also do not know the full circumstances surrounding the "dodgy dossier" published, apparently without Mr Scarlett's knowledge, in February.
The committee says
"We recommend that, in its response to this report, the government gives its current assessment of the status of the al-Samoud 2 missile infrastructure... and set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's ballistic missile programme generally, and the retained al-Hussein missiles in particular."
Assessment
This recommendation contains a sting. In its September dossier, the government claimed, based on intelligence sources, that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, a version of the Scud.
The dossier said: "They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650 km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region, including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel." The government claimed that the missiles could strike British military bases on Cyprus.
The government yesterday pointed out that before the war began, Iraq was found, by the UN weapons inspectors, to have missiles in excess of the 150km range agreed after the 1991 Gulf war. But none of the al-Husseins have been found and none were fired during the war.
Kenneth Boutin, senior arms control and disarmament researcher at the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, said yesterday that Iraq had cannibalised parts from missiles to extend their range and fired such missiles at Israel in 1991 , but cannibalising them reduced their effectiveness. Inspectors led by Hans Blix found al-Samoud 2 missiles which exceeded the 150-km range, but only by 17km which fell short of threatening Iraq's neighbours. Iraq was destroying these missiles under UN supervision when the war began.
The committee says:
"We recommend that the government explain on what evidence it relied for its judgement in September 2002 that Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
Assessment
The government faces being haunted by its claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger for a banned nuclear weapons programme.
Documents relating to Niger have since been confirmed as forgeries. One expert said yesterday they were so crude that there had been no necessity for the US to send a special envoy to Niger to check them out. That envoy, retired ambassador Joe Wilson, went anyway. He insists British officials knew there was no secret trade in uranium months before its September dossier was published.
The committee does not appear ready to let the matter rest. It asked the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, to say when Britain was first informed that the documents were forgeries. He replied: "We will find out."
MPs asked yesterday why he had failed to come up with an answer in the fortnight since making the promise.
A Foreign Office spokesman insisted yesterday that the evidence about the forged documents had not come to light until after the dossier was published and that the government had based its claims not on the forgeries but on other intelligence sources. The government has hinted it got the information from the intelligence services of two countries, neither of which was the US or Israel.
The committee's failure to unravel the Niger claim is compounded by a series of contradictory statements from Mr Blair and his ministers. Foreign Office minister Mike O'Brien said in a parliamentary written answer that information other than the forged documents had been passed to the International Atomic Energy Agency. But his colleague Denis MacShane said last week: "The UK government did not pass to the IAEA any information on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium." An IAEA source said this month that the only information it had received had been the forged documents.
The committee concluded yesterday that "it is very odd indeed that the government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has been shown to have been forged but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence".
The committee says:
"We recommend that in its response to this report the government set out whether it still con siders the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about the 45 minutes claim, in the light of subsequent events."
Assessment
The origin of the claim that Iraq's banned weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes remains a mystery. The committee asks the government to explain why the claim was given such prominence and whether it still believes it to be accurate "in light of subsequent events".
The claim is attributed to an "established, reliable, and longstanding" MI6 source, who came up with it in August. The joint intelligence committee included it in the dossier which was published shortly afterwards.
The committee says Alastair Campbell played no role in inserting the claim. Andrew Gilligan, a BBC defence correspondent, has said an intelligence source suggested the claim was included at Mr Campbell's behest. Mr Straw says the BBC must apologise for the allegation but he played down the claim to the committee. It was "scarcely mentioned at all", he said.
The committee responds: "This answer begs the question why the 45 minutes claim was highlighted by the prime minister when he presented the dossier to the House and why it was given such prominence in the dossier itself."
Questions remain about when the claim was first passed to the JIC by MI6 which normally jealously guards its sources. It is questionable whether the claim would have been inserted without pressure to hype up the document as much as possible
Ewen MacAskill, Richard Norton-Taylor and David Pallister
Tuesday July 8, 2003
The Guardian
The Commons foreign affairs select committee set four potentially explosive traps for the government yesterday in the row over Iraq's alleged weapons of mass destruction.
The MPs homed in on four of the biggest weaknesses in the government's September dossier, which was supposedly based on state of the art intelligence. They demanded ministers come up with answers.
The government has two months to reply to the committee. Ministers hope that the worst of the row is behind them but as long as these questions remain the controversy over why Britain went to war will continue.
The committee says
"We recommend that in its response to this report the government set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's chemical and biological weapons programmes, in the light of subsequent events."
Assessment
The committee's request goes to the heart of Tony Blair's claim that the Iraqi threat was both "serious and current".
More than two months after the war, the fate of Iraq's chemical and biological weapons remains unclear. They may have been destroyed before the UN's inspectors returned to Iraq late last year or shortly before the war or they may be hidden. Most independent analysts questioned by the committee believe that they are either hidden in places known only to Saddam's security officials - who may have been shot on his orders - or they were destroyed. Those taking the latter view say the only evidence may be paperwork, blueprints or computer discs.
Asked if Iraq produced such weapons after the UN's inspectors left Iraq in 1998, Tom Inch, former deputy director of the Porton Down chemical and biological weapons research station, told the committee: "I do not think there is any compelling evidence to say that they did but again there is no compelling evidence to say that they did not."
The committee points out that even the September dossier gave "no indication of the scale and scope of Iraq's present arsenal of chemical and biological weapons". It is "too soon", it adds, "to tell whether the government's assertions on Iraq's chemical and biological weapons will be borne out."
The committee says there was only lim ited access to human intelligence in Iraq on which to base claims about Saddam's banned weapons programme.
The committee was hampered by the government's refusal to let them see intelligence documents or question John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee (JIC).
Though the committee clears Alastair Campbell of exerting or seeking to exert improper influence on the drafting of the September dossier, it does so "on the basis of the evidence available to us".
It remains unclear what behind the scenes pressure was put on Mr Scarlett to pump up the language of the September dossier. The committee does not doubt that the language was hardened. We do not know how the intelligence agencies responded officially to government pressure for a published dossier on Iraq's banned weapons programme.
We also do not know the full circumstances surrounding the "dodgy dossier" published, apparently without Mr Scarlett's knowledge, in February.
The committee says
"We recommend that, in its response to this report, the government gives its current assessment of the status of the al-Samoud 2 missile infrastructure... and set out whether it still considers the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about Iraq's ballistic missile programme generally, and the retained al-Hussein missiles in particular."
Assessment
This recommendation contains a sting. In its September dossier, the government claimed, based on intelligence sources, that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, a version of the Scud.
The dossier said: "They could be used with conventional, chemical or biological warheads and, with a range of up to 650 km, are capable of reaching a number of countries in the region, including Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel." The government claimed that the missiles could strike British military bases on Cyprus.
The government yesterday pointed out that before the war began, Iraq was found, by the UN weapons inspectors, to have missiles in excess of the 150km range agreed after the 1991 Gulf war. But none of the al-Husseins have been found and none were fired during the war.
Kenneth Boutin, senior arms control and disarmament researcher at the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre, said yesterday that Iraq had cannibalised parts from missiles to extend their range and fired such missiles at Israel in 1991 , but cannibalising them reduced their effectiveness. Inspectors led by Hans Blix found al-Samoud 2 missiles which exceeded the 150-km range, but only by 17km which fell short of threatening Iraq's neighbours. Iraq was destroying these missiles under UN supervision when the war began.
The committee says:
"We recommend that the government explain on what evidence it relied for its judgement in September 2002 that Iraq had recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."
Assessment
The government faces being haunted by its claim that Iraq was seeking uranium from Niger for a banned nuclear weapons programme.
Documents relating to Niger have since been confirmed as forgeries. One expert said yesterday they were so crude that there had been no necessity for the US to send a special envoy to Niger to check them out. That envoy, retired ambassador Joe Wilson, went anyway. He insists British officials knew there was no secret trade in uranium months before its September dossier was published.
The committee does not appear ready to let the matter rest. It asked the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, to say when Britain was first informed that the documents were forgeries. He replied: "We will find out."
MPs asked yesterday why he had failed to come up with an answer in the fortnight since making the promise.
A Foreign Office spokesman insisted yesterday that the evidence about the forged documents had not come to light until after the dossier was published and that the government had based its claims not on the forgeries but on other intelligence sources. The government has hinted it got the information from the intelligence services of two countries, neither of which was the US or Israel.
The committee's failure to unravel the Niger claim is compounded by a series of contradictory statements from Mr Blair and his ministers. Foreign Office minister Mike O'Brien said in a parliamentary written answer that information other than the forged documents had been passed to the International Atomic Energy Agency. But his colleague Denis MacShane said last week: "The UK government did not pass to the IAEA any information on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium." An IAEA source said this month that the only information it had received had been the forged documents.
The committee concluded yesterday that "it is very odd indeed that the government asserts that it was not relying on the evidence which has been shown to have been forged but that eight months later it is still reviewing the other evidence".
The committee says:
"We recommend that in its response to this report the government set out whether it still con siders the September dossier to be accurate in what it states about the 45 minutes claim, in the light of subsequent events."
Assessment
The origin of the claim that Iraq's banned weapons could be deployed within 45 minutes remains a mystery. The committee asks the government to explain why the claim was given such prominence and whether it still believes it to be accurate "in light of subsequent events".
The claim is attributed to an "established, reliable, and longstanding" MI6 source, who came up with it in August. The joint intelligence committee included it in the dossier which was published shortly afterwards.
The committee says Alastair Campbell played no role in inserting the claim. Andrew Gilligan, a BBC defence correspondent, has said an intelligence source suggested the claim was included at Mr Campbell's behest. Mr Straw says the BBC must apologise for the allegation but he played down the claim to the committee. It was "scarcely mentioned at all", he said.
The committee responds: "This answer begs the question why the 45 minutes claim was highlighted by the prime minister when he presented the dossier to the House and why it was given such prominence in the dossier itself."
Questions remain about when the claim was first passed to the JIC by MI6 which normally jealously guards its sources. It is questionable whether the claim would have been inserted without pressure to hype up the document as much as possible
