WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Tensions between the civilian leaders of the Pentagon, led by Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and the U.S. military's top brass have deepened amid the deteriorating situation in Iraq.
Even before the Iraq war some senior officers chafed under the guidance of Rumsfeld and his team, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone.
Retired officers and defense analysts said the problems have worsened during a war in which critics accuse Rumsfeld's team of neglecting to provide enough troops to stabilise Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein, botching the planning for the postwar period, and failing to anticipate and later comprehend an insurgency that threatens the mission with failure.
"The war itself has led to, rightly or wrongly, the feeling among many in the military that they're not receiving competent direction, that it is too ideological, and that a lot of their military efforts have been wasted by what they regard as poor, inept planning for the stability phase," said Anthony Cordesman, a former Pentagon official now with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
The military, particularly the Army, has been strained mightily in maintaining troop levels in Iraq far higher than the Pentagon had forecast. Faced with a relentless insurgency, the Pentagon ordered 20,000 troops to remain three months longer than promised, and scrambled to find ways to maintain the current count of 138,000 troops there through the end of 2005.
Meanwhile, the military has been stained by a scandal in which soldiers physically and sexually abused Iraqi prisoners.
"It's obvious there has been damage to the U.S. military as an institution because it is over-strained and it is over-deployed. And it is beginning to see its morale erode because it is losing confidence in the direction of the war," Cordesman said.
Retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni, former top U.S. commander in the Middle East, criticised Rumsfeld's team in "Battle Ready," a book written with author Tom Clancy.
"In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at a minimum true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption," Zinni wrote.
'WAITING HIM OUT'
University of North Carolina military historian Richard Kohn said a natural tension has existed between political appointees named by any president to head the Defense Department and the professional military officers who must follow their lead. Kohn said Rumsfeld's relationship with the military brass has been as tense as any defense secretary except Robert McNamara, the Vietnam War era Pentagon chief.
"He has alienated the military," Kohn said. "Many of them are waiting him out, or avoiding bringing problems to him, or trying to avoid dealing with him. And he knows that. And he avoids them quite frequently, and circumvents them, and tries to get around the bureaucracy."
"He's blunt. He's direct. He can be abusive. He can be difficult. And he's often indecisive. He keeps questioning and questioning, and he doesn't provide these people with answers. And they're not sure what his position is. They're not sure what he wants," Kohn said.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. William Nash, who commanded an armoured brigade in the 1991 Gulf War and led troops into Bosnia, said some grumbling by senior officers is customary.
"But this time around, it seems that there are some very serious concerns, primarily oriented on the issue of what this escapade (Iraq) has done to the military, primarily the Army," added Nash, now with the Council on Foreign Relations.
Rumsfeld, who also served as defense secretary from 1975 to 1977, began his second stint in 2001 determined to reassert civilian control over the generals and admirals, who he felt were ceded too much sway in the Clinton administration.
"The Constitution calls for civilian control of this department, and I'm a civilian," Rumsfeld once told reporters.
Rumsfeld's first skirmishes stemmed from his quest to "transform" the military from a plodding, Cold War-era relic into an agile force designed to confront 21st century threats.
Rumsfeld was seen as particularly hard on the Army, undercutting its former top officer, Gen. Eric Shinseki. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz dismissed Shinseki's assertion a month before the war that several hundred thousand U.S. troops might be needed to stabilise postwar Iraq.
"The Shinseki thing is really ironic because not only was he badly treated, he was right," Nash said.
Reuters.
Even before the Iraq war some senior officers chafed under the guidance of Rumsfeld and his team, including Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Stephen Cambone.
Retired officers and defense analysts said the problems have worsened during a war in which critics accuse Rumsfeld's team of neglecting to provide enough troops to stabilise Iraq after ousting Saddam Hussein, botching the planning for the postwar period, and failing to anticipate and later comprehend an insurgency that threatens the mission with failure.
"The war itself has led to, rightly or wrongly, the feeling among many in the military that they're not receiving competent direction, that it is too ideological, and that a lot of their military efforts have been wasted by what they regard as poor, inept planning for the stability phase," said Anthony Cordesman, a former Pentagon official now with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
The military, particularly the Army, has been strained mightily in maintaining troop levels in Iraq far higher than the Pentagon had forecast. Faced with a relentless insurgency, the Pentagon ordered 20,000 troops to remain three months longer than promised, and scrambled to find ways to maintain the current count of 138,000 troops there through the end of 2005.
Meanwhile, the military has been stained by a scandal in which soldiers physically and sexually abused Iraqi prisoners.
"It's obvious there has been damage to the U.S. military as an institution because it is over-strained and it is over-deployed. And it is beginning to see its morale erode because it is losing confidence in the direction of the war," Cordesman said.
Retired Marine Corps Gen. Anthony Zinni, former top U.S. commander in the Middle East, criticised Rumsfeld's team in "Battle Ready," a book written with author Tom Clancy.
"In the lead-up to the Iraq war and its later conduct, I saw at a minimum true dereliction, negligence and irresponsibility, at worse, lying, incompetence and corruption," Zinni wrote.
'WAITING HIM OUT'
University of North Carolina military historian Richard Kohn said a natural tension has existed between political appointees named by any president to head the Defense Department and the professional military officers who must follow their lead. Kohn said Rumsfeld's relationship with the military brass has been as tense as any defense secretary except Robert McNamara, the Vietnam War era Pentagon chief.
"He has alienated the military," Kohn said. "Many of them are waiting him out, or avoiding bringing problems to him, or trying to avoid dealing with him. And he knows that. And he avoids them quite frequently, and circumvents them, and tries to get around the bureaucracy."
"He's blunt. He's direct. He can be abusive. He can be difficult. And he's often indecisive. He keeps questioning and questioning, and he doesn't provide these people with answers. And they're not sure what his position is. They're not sure what he wants," Kohn said.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. William Nash, who commanded an armoured brigade in the 1991 Gulf War and led troops into Bosnia, said some grumbling by senior officers is customary.
"But this time around, it seems that there are some very serious concerns, primarily oriented on the issue of what this escapade (Iraq) has done to the military, primarily the Army," added Nash, now with the Council on Foreign Relations.
Rumsfeld, who also served as defense secretary from 1975 to 1977, began his second stint in 2001 determined to reassert civilian control over the generals and admirals, who he felt were ceded too much sway in the Clinton administration.
"The Constitution calls for civilian control of this department, and I'm a civilian," Rumsfeld once told reporters.
Rumsfeld's first skirmishes stemmed from his quest to "transform" the military from a plodding, Cold War-era relic into an agile force designed to confront 21st century threats.
Rumsfeld was seen as particularly hard on the Army, undercutting its former top officer, Gen. Eric Shinseki. Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz dismissed Shinseki's assertion a month before the war that several hundred thousand U.S. troops might be needed to stabilise postwar Iraq.
"The Shinseki thing is really ironic because not only was he badly treated, he was right," Nash said.
Reuters.
